

A glowing orange inverted triangle is centered on a black background. The word "Ease" is written in a white serif font inside the triangle. The triangle's edges are composed of a bright orange line with a grainy, particle-like texture, giving it a shimmering or ethereal appearance.

Ease

Ease Is Not Lost, It Is Blocked by Optimization

The Conditions Under Which It Can Occur

Book-length manuscript

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As an only child, with long stretches of unstructured time, I wasn't just passing time. I was inhabiting a space where experience could remain open. There was no constant external gaze, no performance pressure, no need to justify what I was doing.

In that kind of environment, affect can deepen instead of being interrupted. Joy was not a spike. It could stabilize. It could expand. It could become a regime rather than a moment.

When that regime faded, as it often does in adolescence and adulthood, I did not reinterpret it as a childish illusion. It remained the reference point. It felt like a missing mode.

Then something shifts again. Instead of chasing the effect directly, I began analyzing the conditions under which it collapses or reappears.

Fragments of the past, not nostalgia

A few seconds of a song replayed on loop, pleasant, but not what it was once, and when turned off, no lasting effect. Cheerful flashes while walking under the sun that collapses soon after it is noticed. A moment of absorption that dissolves fast. These experiences are commonly interpreted as weak or failures, or as signals that something once accessible is now diminished. The system tried, and it fell short.

Within the model developed here, this interpretation is backwards.

These fragments are not degraded affect. They are intact entries of joy without persistence.

The system still somewhat reaches the permissive configuration. Sensory input deepens. Affect crosses the threshold of neutrality and becomes positive. For a moment, the control regime that supports joy is present. What fails therefore is not access, but stabilization.

This distinction matters because it changes what these moments signify. A fragment is not a broken version of joy. It is joy, but it did not remain beyond the entry window long enough to lock in.

Fragments, here, become diagnostic. They show that the underlying machinery is indeed intact. The door can still, in theory, open. What has narrowed is the window during which it can stay open. This reframing removes a common source of secondary damage. When fragments are treated as failure, they invite correction. One tries to prolong them, understand them. These responses accelerate closure. Monitoring returns earlier next time, shortening the fragment further.

When fragments are recognized instead as contact without entry, the pressure to repair them dissolves. The episode did exactly what the current control configuration allows it to do. This perspective also clarifies why fragments often feel oddly reassuring and frustrating at the same time. Reassuring, because something unmistakably positive still happens. Frustrating, because it refuses to stabilize.

In childhood, joy often exists as background and therefore leaves no fragments. In adulthood, joy often exists only as fragments and therefore becomes noticeable.

The fragment is not a degraded form of childhood experience. It is the adult signature of the same regime under tighter supervision. They also explain why these moments sometimes feel oddly familiar. It is not that often true nostalgia.

The "dopamine feeling" as commonly labeled, triggered by a short song part, is structurally continuous with the positive affect that accompanies learning while it is still open, before it is resolved or explained.

This book focuses on emotional flatness, a widespread condition often taken for normality. In adult life, this flatness is commonly described as "maturity," as if reduced affective permeability were a natural achievement or evidence of having grown up.

Under this framing, emotional narrowing appears as progress, sometimes even as distinction, something earned through realism, responsibility, or self-control. What disappears is rarely named. The absence of intense joy comes to signify seriousness, and diminished susceptibility to experience is treated as a marker of competence. Here, we examine reclassification as a structural consequence of how control and evaluation gradually consolidate over time, rather than as a moral failing or a clinical condition. The adult brain, here, vetoes joy.

After decades of research, technological escalation, and unprecedented intervention into the brain and its environments, a simple question remains unresolved: why does everyday experience still feel so often flat or average most of the time? We have explored every domain that plausibly could have lifted the ceiling of positive experience. Psychopharmacology, brain stimulation, digital interfaces, ultra-optimized

media, even generative AI. Each arrived with the promise, implicit or explicit, of qualitative change. Yet the outcome is consistent. Initial gains do occur, but whatever the domain, the effect does not propagate. It appears, it is noticed, and it resolves. It leaves a trace, sometimes a strong one, but it does not reorganize the surrounding field of experience. Daily life resumes unchanged. This pattern repeats across interventions that share almost nothing in common. If the ceiling of positive experience were merely a matter of power, precision, or sophistication, at least one of these trajectories should have crossed the threshold where experience sustains itself without supervision. None has. What this suggests is not a failure of stimulation or design, but a constraint on how experience can persist once it becomes identifiable, attributable, monitored.

This book is written for that blind spot. It focuses neither on restoring extreme emotion nor on amplifying intensity, offering happiness techniques, or engaging with peak or extraordinary states. Its scope is deliberately narrower. The focus is not on producing affect, but on describing the conditions under which affect becomes possible or unavailable. It is also not about flow, the familiar state of deep absorption in activity, but about a different regime in which positive affect can arise when the pressure of certain control states briefly relaxes.

The focus here is on understanding how a permissive regime of experience gradually disappears under chronic evaluation and optimization. As evaluative pressure becomes continuous, experience is no longer allowed to unfold without justification or correction. This regime collapses not through acute illness, but through ordinary consolidation.

The question addressed is therefore not how to feel more, but how certain forms of experience become structurally unavailable. The analysis explores how a permissive regime can, in some cases, become viable again without regression to childhood, denial of knowledge, or the introduction of pathology.

What is treated as normal is not neutrality but the long-term stabilization of experience under constant evaluation. This condition is not experienced as suffering in the usual sense. Nothing feels wrong enough to be called a problem. And that is precisely why it goes unnoticed.

What is labeled maturity is often nothing more than a permanent tightening of monitoring, a chronic anticipation of correction, and an early closure of experience.

This normalization has an important consequence. It shapes not only how experience is lived, but also how it can be understood and discussed.

There is a fundamental asymmetry of knowledge involved here. Someone without access can read endlessly about a certain kind of joy and, quite reasonably, continue to interpret it as just another positive state, another configuration of pleasure, calm, or motivation within a familiar landscape. The system has no alternative but to classify the description using existing categories.

By contrast, someone with access does not need extensive argument or repeated explanation. A few days of regular arrival are enough for the entire motivational field to reorganize itself in a durable way. What changes is not a belief about value but the implicit ordering of what matters, what pulls, and what no longer does.

This creates an unavoidable gap in discourse, similar to discussing color with someone who has seen it and someone who has not. The disagreement is not about openness, but about whether a structural transformation has occurred that changes one's reference frame itself.

The Conceptual Failure of Joy

The term joy refers to multiple, loosely related phenomena, and this ambiguity is precisely what makes it unusable at a theoretical level. Two people can both report feeling joy while describing experiences that differ in intensity, duration, bodily tone, motivation, and phenomenology. When someone says 'this brings me joy,' it is rarely clear whether they are describing a felt episode, a life evaluation, a sense of meaning, or a moral stance.

It is applied interchangeably to transient affective states, motivational signals, social bonds, global life evaluations. Because these phenomena rely on different mechanisms and operate at different levels, the term lacks a stable referent and functions rhetorically rather than analytically. The term thus functions as a catch-all label that allows heterogeneous experiences and mechanisms to be grouped together without resolving their differences, precisely because its everyday meaning is broad enough to absorb them without friction.

As a result, joy functions rhetorically rather than analytically, signaling positivity without specifying structure, mechanism, and practical conditions of occurrence.

Because so many distinct processes can be placed under the same label, joy has acquired a poor reputation in academic contexts. Reviews that aim to synthesize "the science of joy" typically aggregate findings across heterogeneous domains, including affective states, job satisfaction, resilience, meaning, social connection, and health-related well-being, without specifying whether joy refers to a transient phenomenological episode, a dispositional trait, a narrative self-assessment, or an instrumental correlate of functioning

No single definition can be made precise without excluding large portions of what the term is commonly taken to mean, and any formalization remains unstable and contestable.

What is preserved here is not the word, but a specific phenomenon that the word sometimes gestures toward without isolating. The phenomenon is an affective regime that can be positive in valence and occasionally intensive, but is primarily defined by non-instrumentality, experiential openness, and low evaluative pressure.

Ease is introduced to name this phenomenon directly. This is a change in analytical framing, not a claim about how experience should be named. Ease carries no implication of success, value, or virtue. It refers only to the organization of experience under a specific control regime, one in which monitoring is relaxed enough to allow experience to unfold as an event rather than as an outcome. By naming the phenomenon in this way, the analysis avoids the conceptual drift, cultural baggage, and evaluative contamination that make joy unusable as a scientific construct.

In short, *ease* does not redefine joy. It replaces it at the structural level.

What This Framework Commits Us

Ease is not a reward signal, a mood, or a trait. It is a transient regime of experience defined by the temporary irrelevance of evaluative control.

This is not a new affective taxonomy but a constraint on admissible explanations of positive engagement.

The central asymmetry is diagnostic: explicit self-evaluation reliably prevents entry, while removing evaluation does not reliably restore it. Evaluative monitoring therefore functions primarily as an entry barrier rather than as a continuous suppressor.

The framework predicts a two-phase access dynamic. During entry, the state is meta-unstable under monitoring. If permissive conditions persist long enough, a threshold transition can occur after which evaluative intrusions lose leverage, and termination becomes dominated by fatigue-like constraints rather than renewed optimization.

This immediately separates ease from nearby constructs. If the phenomenon were primarily reward-based, stronger incentives and clearer progress signals should stabilize it. If it were primarily flow-based, increased mastery and tighter feedback should stabilize it. If it were primarily relaxation, reduced effort should maximize it. This framework predicts the opposite pattern: progress cues, performance tracking, and deliberate stabilization narrow the access window.

Falsification. If evaluative monitoring remains equally able to terminate the episode at all timepoints, the threshold extension is unnecessary. If the state robustly scales with reward magnitude, or improves monotonically with repetition, the permissive-control account is weakened.

Because childhood ease is not noticed while present, retrospective judgments systematically misattribute its disappearance to changes in content, circumstance, or intensity rather than to changes in control organization.

With these constraints in place, the question of why ease becomes rare in adulthood can no longer be approached by cataloguing losses, failures, or diminished capacities.

The problem is not that something valuable was present and then taken away, but that the conditions under which a permissive regime can remain active have been progressively narrowed by ordinary consolidation of control even in the absence of trauma, deprivation, or pathology.

To isolate this mechanism, we must examine a context in which evaluative monitoring is naturally delayed, expectations are weakly specified, and episodes are allowed to unfold without immediate resolution.

Childhood provides such a context, not as an idealized past or developmental benchmark, but as a reference point where the relevant control organization is more readily observable. The aim of the following section is therefore not to explain childhood itself, but to use it as a lens through which the disappearance of ease in adulthood can be traced to changes in timing, supervision, and closure.

The preceding sections motivate the framework conceptually. Box 1 states its minimal commitments and falsification conditions.

BOX 1. Ease as a Non-Instrumental Positive Regime: Minimal Statement and Falsification Set

(canonical reference block, stable wording)

Definition (phenomenological).

Ease is a high-intensity positive regime characterized by (i) high subjective positivity and perceptual vividness, (ii) minimal self-monitoring, (iii) minimal instrumental intent, and (iv) a distinctive property: it does not accumulate into meaning, progress, or durable motivational value. Instrumental intent triggers evaluative capture and collapses entry.

Somatic marker (common report).

Ease is often accompanied by a robust chest-centered pleasure sensation.

Core claim (mechanistic).

Ease is not produced by adding reward, pleasure, relaxation, or motivation. It emerges when anticipatory evaluative control fails to capture ongoing coordination. The key variable is the coupling strength between subcortical coordination (PAG-centered) and cortical monitoring systems, which scales with Z.

Guardrail (non-assimilation clause).

This hypothesis is not a re-description of flow, mindfulness, reward, or positive mood. Any account that preserves stable goal-maintenance, deliberate attentional training, or instrumental emotion regulation as compatible with the regime is, by definition, describing a different phenomenon.

Behavioral entry principle (operational).

Ease is facilitated by tasks that prevent anticipation and evaluation from stabilizing. This can be achieved through micro-actions that are:

- (1) non-repeatable,
- (2) metric-free,
- (3) non-optimizable,
- (4) rapidly self-terminating once evaluation appears.

A concrete demonstration domain is a library of Non-Use Microtasks (e.g., game-like micro-actions), designed to die quickly when goal-monitoring emerges.

Z hypothesis (developmental).

Access to ease is primarily constrained by cumulative entropic damage (Z), defined as the long-term accumulation of predictive-evaluative structure that increases the probability of anticipatory capture. High Z increases the stability of monitoring and reduces the size of the entry window.

Scope (what is not being claimed)

This framework does not claim that ease is universally desirable, morally superior, or the only valuable human state. It does not claim that ease maximizes productivity, mental health, or long-term wellbeing. It does not claim that the mechanism is fully localized to PAG, or that PAG is the sole necessary substrate. It does not claim that the described behavioral entry tasks will generalize across all individuals, cultures, or clinical populations. Finally, it does not claim that the theory is complete, only that it is falsifiable and operational.

Falsification set (non-negotiable)

F1. Instrumental compatibility.

If ease can be reliably entered and maintained while explicitly used for a goal (performance, productivity, emotional regulation), without collapse at entry, the hypothesis is false.

F2. Repeatable direct interventions.

If a repeatable direct intervention (stimulation, drug, training protocol) produces stable long-term access to ease without increasing anticipatory capture or dependence on the intervention, the hypothesis is false.

F3. Neural signature equivalence.

If the neural signatures of ease are indistinguishable from reward, pleasure, relaxation, or flow, the hypothesis is false. Specifically, if ease shows stable anticipatory coupling between PAG-centered coordination and evaluative cortex, the mechanistic core is false.

F4. Task design irrelevance.

If Non-Use Microtasks design constraints (non-repeatability, metric-free, non-optimizable structure) do not affect entry probability, the operational claim is false.

F5. Z irrelevance.

If proxies for Z (lifetime optimization load, sustained evaluative training, early competitive environments) do not predict ease access, the developmental claim is false.

BOX 1B. Canonical Prediction Index (for citation)

Prediction set A, Entry barrier (monitoring as access constraint)

A1. Metric removal increases entry probability. Holding task content constant, removing evaluative affordances (score, HUD, progress indicators, success cues) increases the probability of entering an in-scope episode.

A2. Evaluative prompts collapse entry more than matched interruptions. Brief prompts that recruit self-evaluation (e.g., “rate your enjoyment,” “are you in the state,” “how well are you doing”) are more disruptive during entry than equally salient but non-evaluative interruptions.

A3. Weak reward scaling under matched monitoring load. Within in-scope episodes, intensity and persistence correlate weakly with objective reward magnitude once monitoring load is controlled.

Prediction set B, Threshold and lock-in (time-dependent vulnerability)

B1. Time-dependent monitoring vulnerability. The disruptive effect of evaluative monitoring declines as a function of time since onset. Early probes are

strongly disruptive, late probes are weaker.

B2. Asymmetric prevention vs termination. Small monitoring cues reliably prevent entry, but once lock-in is established, termination requires larger disruptions and is dominated by fatigue-like constraints.

B3. Persistence dissociation. Monitoring manipulations primarily shift entry and time-to-threshold, while post-threshold persistence is comparatively better explained by fatigue proxies than by evaluative affordances.

Prediction set C, Repetition and methodification (non-monotonic access)

C1. Non-monotonic repetition curve. Entry probability rises initially across early exposures, then plateaus or declines as the procedure becomes instrumentable (“methodification”).

C2. Attribution penalty. Manipulations that increase explanatory capture (prompting subjects to describe the cause of the episode, labeling it as a technique) reduce subsequent entry probability under otherwise matched conditions.

C3. Structural variation restores access. Slight structural changes to the task (map, timing, micro-constraints) restore entry more than exact repetition, even when difficulty is matched.

Prediction set D, Z and development (individual differences)

D1. Z predicts entry, not persistence. Proxies for cumulative optimization load (Z) predict reduced entry probability and longer time-to-threshold, but weakly predict post-threshold persistence duration once entry occurs.

“Predictions are labeled for citation (A1–D1).”




Figure 1. Canonical prediction map (A–D). (A) Entry barrier predictions (A1–A3). Entry probability is a steep function of monitoring load, with evaluative affordances (metrics, score, self-checks) acting primarily as access constraints rather than continuous suppressors.

(B) **Threshold and lock-in predictions (B1–B3).** The disruptive effect of evaluative probes is time-dependent: monitoring is maximally destructive early and progressively weaker after a transition point, with termination increasingly governed by fatigue-like constraints.

(C) **Methodification predictions (C1–C3).** Entry probability is non-monotonic across repetition: early exposures can facilitate access, but repeated instrumentalization and attribution reduce subsequent entry probability. ■

(D) **Z and developmental constraint (D1).** Proxies for cumulative optimization load (Z) predict reduced entry probability and longer time-to-threshold, with weaker effects on post-threshold persistence duration. ■

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Ease as a Non-Instrumental Positive Regime: Minimal Statement and Falsification Set

The chapters that follow explore the implications and manifestations of this framework.

Did you ever notice how children walk?

Not in the vague sense of being energetic or playful, but in the precise way their walking seems ungoverned. They are not going somewhere in the way adults are. Their direction is provisional : they drift, stop, turn, speed up, slow down, not because it is better, but because something pulled them. It can be a sound, a line on the ground, a sudden thought. Walking bends around perception instead of perception being filtered to protect the walk.

Children do not walk efficiently, their pace is irregular. Two fast steps, then a pause. A detour for no reason. An abrupt stop that serves nothing. From an adult perspective it looks like wasted motion. From inside the system, nothing is being wasted because nothing is being optimized.

They also do not hold their posture together. Arms swing unevenly. Shoulders tilt. The head leads, then the feet catch up. No internal voice is checking alignment or correcting form. The body is not being graded, so it self organizes locally, moment to moment, without a global supervisor.

Children do not encode walking as instrumental. For an adult, walking is almost always subordinate to something else : arriving, exercising, being efficient, appearing normal, not blocking others. For a child, walking is often the activity itself. There is no hidden objective sitting above it, so no supervisory layer is required.

Second, children have not learned to monitor themselves continuously.

Self monitoring is not innate, it is trained. Posture correction, speed adjustment, gait normalization, “walk properly,” “don’t drag your feet,” “hurry up,” all of this installs an internal observer. Before that observer exists, there is nothing to optimize against. Movement runs locally, not globally evaluated.

Their error signals are permissive. Children tolerate inefficiency, detours, pauses, asymmetry. Tripping slightly, stopping abruptly, zig zagging, none of this is flagged as a problem unless an adult reacts. Without negative tagging, the system does not tighten. It stays loose because looseness has not yet been punished.

Attention in children is diffuse by default. They are not aiming for attention, they are captured by it. A sound, a shadow, a crack in the pavement pulls movement with it. Walking bends around perception instead of perception being filtered to protect walking efficiency. This coupling makes movement exploratory rather than corrective.

Also, there is no narrative continuity requirement. Adults walk inside a story, “I am going there,” or “I am late,” “I should be faster,” “this walk counts.” Children are not maintaining a timeline. Without narrative pressure, there is no need to regulate pace or direction to stay coherent.

Finally, children have not yet learned that experience should be useful. Adults implicitly expect walking to burn calories, clear the mind, improve mood, save time, look intentional. Children do not extract value from walking. Because nothing is being extracted, nothing needs to be optimized.

Optimization is something that gets added later, slowly, socially, and almost invisibly. Once added, it feels like normality. Before it exists, ease is not a state to reach, it is just the baseline.

Why does childhood “ease” fade away ?

Across literatures, positive affect in adulthood is predominantly framed as an outcome to be produced and regulated through targeted interventions, techniques, and self-management practices, rather than as a spontaneously arising experiential regime.

Psychological interventions are evaluated primarily in terms of their capacity to increase well-being scores over time, with success defined by measurable post-intervention gains and maintenance at follow-up.

Well-being is thus operationalized as an outcome variable contingent on correct application of techniques such as mindfulness, acceptance-based regulation, or guided psychological training, rather than as an emergent or non-instrumental phenomenon.

When these efforts fail, the failure is often interpreted as a deficit: insufficient discipline, insufficient practice, insufficient comprehension.

This text starts from a different observation. Certain positive affective episodes do not fail because they are weak, fragile, or poorly induced, but because they do not tolerate being treated as goals. Ease, in particular, does not arise from a successful pursuit. It appears only when experience is not being used as a means to an end. The more it is sought, reproduced, or protected, the more reliably it collapses at entry, before it has the chance to become the sought-after state.

Ease is not a baseline state, a personality trait, or a mood, instead, it is commonly experienced as a strong, chest-resonant pleasure, particularly responsive to music, cartoons, and simple visual stimuli. It is an episodic affective event, not because it is brief - it's not- but because it is lived as something that happens to the subject rather than something the subject does. It depends on contrast rather than accumulation, absence of supervision rather than effort, and timing rather than technique. The defining feature is not intensity or pleasure, but the temporary irrelevance of

evaluative control during an unfolding episode. Under these conditions, feelings of aliveness typically emerge.

This framework helps explain an asymmetry. Children inhabit ease without naming it. Multiple studies show that children do not conceptualize happiness as a named, monitored, or valued internal state, even when they report being happy.

When children are asked what makes them happy, they answer fluently, but they do not reflect on happiness itself, they describe activities, contexts, and ongoing play. Happiness appears as a background condition of engagement, not as an object of attention or evaluation.

The difference with adults is organizational. With maturation, experience becomes increasingly monitored, anticipated, and resolved before it can unfold. This asymmetry explains why happiness is often attributed in adulthood to special moments, achievements, or planned activities, while in childhood it is more often located in ordinary, ongoing interaction, reflecting an underlying organizational change.

Positive signals continue to occur in adulthood, but they rarely propagate into self-sustaining episodes as they do in childhood.

Ease belongs to the broader class of positive affect, understood here as affective events that signal agreeableness rather than threat, urgency, or danger to the system. Ease does not tolerate pursuit. Vigorous attempts to seek, reproduce, or stabilize it undermine the conditions under which it can occur. For this reason, non-instrumentality is not an optional feature. Ease can only arise when experience is not being used as a means to an end.

Ease requires a break from baseline, often described as contrast. This break is not about how strong the signal is, but about it being different. Ease is perceived as something that arrives against an established background, not as a smooth continuation of what was already there.

For this reason, it cannot accumulate. Repetition does not build it up significantly, successive exposures do not sum into greater magnitude.

On the contrary, repetition progressively neutralizes the very contrast on which ease depends. What changes is not the stimulus itself but the system's relationship to it. As familiarity increases, it can no longer arise as an event.

Ease is characterized by the absence of control intervention. In this context, control refers to the impulse to optimize, correct, or improve experience as it unfolds. This impulse, often described as perfectionism, is not exceptional but normative in adult systems. Ease appears only when this optimization pressure is not engaged, allowing experience to proceed without supervision.

The defining feature is not that authorship has been deliberately relinquished, as if through an act of letting go or conscious withdrawal. Rather, it is that experience has already taken over before any such decision could be made. Control is not suspended by choice, it is rendered irrelevant by timing.

The episode does not need to be achieved or protected. It is already underway and maintains itself without support. No effort is required to initiate it, none is needed to preserve it. Because the episode is self-sustaining, attempts to secure it only introduce supervision where it is not required, increasing the risk of interruption rather than stability.

There is also the fear that it is gratuitous in the bad sense. That it is “wasted” time, that it is cheating. But that idea of cheating only exists in a world where every experience is supposed to pay a functional rent. Ease is precisely the experience that pays no rent. It occupies a space that is not subject to profitability.

That is why it has this slightly comic, almost embarrassing quality. You do something, you enjoy it, and there is no paperwork afterward. No lesson, no capitalization, no narrative, no justification. Just a state that unfolds and then dissipates. For a highly structured adult brain, it is almost an administrative anomaly.

When you truly get past the optimization layer, the system that used to optimize does not vanish all at once, it simply finds itself without any grip. For a very long time it was running continuously with a clear mission : orient, correct, improve, justify. And then suddenly it encounters a state that offers it no point of attachment. Nothing to improve, nothing to speed up, nothing to measure. So it attempts one last, very primitive maneuver, the ironic comment.

It is as if the system were saying, well, if I cannot regain control through usefulness, I will at least signal the absurdity of the situation. And that signal takes the form of humor.

It is important to notice that this reaction is not hostile. It no longer has the aggressiveness of judgment or rumination. It is light, almost complicit. That is the difference between “this is useless so stop” and “ok, this is useless, haha”. In the first case, optimization is still driving, in the second, it is already sitting in the passenger seat.

There is also something deeper going on : optimization relies on an implicit narrative of the world. Every action is supposed to fit into a coherent story, with a before and an after, a gain, a trace. When one enters this regime of ease, that narrative temporarily disintegrates. All that remains is a self-sufficient state. And seen from a narrative architecture, a present that leads nowhere is intrinsically comic. Not tragic, not threatening, just strange. It is the recognition that the serious engine, the one that organizes adult life, is momentarily offline, and laughter is often the only elegant exit when a control system realizes it is not needed.

You could almost say that laughter is the last currency of optimization. As long as it can laugh at the state, it can still signal itself. Once even that disappears, there is only the raw experience left, without commentary. But one does not need to go that far. The fact that one finds it funny already shows that the hierarchy has shifted.

When that shift occurs, the change is not abstract. It becomes immediately visible in how perception itself is felt.

During ease, sensory inputs acquire increased affective depth and reward without being driven or pushed. Perception becomes more receptive and more intense. Sounds, images, and bodily sensations register as richer and more present.

Music may feel emotionally fuller without being listened to analytically. Visual scenes may appear more salient without inviting commentary or interpretation. The resulting reward is incidental rather than produced, arising from the absence of interference rather than from any active enhancement of the input.

In this respect, ease often recalls sensations associated with childhood, not as a matter of memory or regression, but as a similarity in how experience is organized. In childhood, bright images could feel special without requiring attention to be managed or sustained. Certain games carried experience forward on their own, without effort, strategy, or self-observation. Music could gain affective depth while feeling peripheral, without becoming a target of focus or evaluation. This resemblance to childhood lies not in remembered content, but in the recovery of a processing style in which perception retains granularity and events unfold without evaluative compression. Subjectively, childhood cues often evoke distinct perceptual textures, suggesting that they were encoded under differentiated processing regimes.

It has long been recognized that access to information is not fixed, but depends on the internal state of the system processing it. Early work on state-dependent learning showed that what is encoded, what can be recalled, and even what feels relevant or valuable can shift sharply as a function of physiological and affective context. A memory learned under stress, intoxication, or heightened arousal may be difficult to retrieve in a neutral state, and may also carry a different emotional weight when it is retrieved.

Later work generalized this principle beyond classical recall. Internal state was shown to shape perception (what is noticed, what is ignored, what is treated as salient), valuation (what feels rewarding or aversive), and self-evaluation (how the self is represented, judged, or interpreted). In this view, “the same information” is not truly the same across states: it is accessed through different priors, different gain settings, and different evaluative filters, producing different cognitive outputs even when the external input is unchanged.

What is less commonly acknowledged is that some results are not merely modulated by state, but only become interpretable once the relevant state is entered. In such


cases, external description does not merely impoverish understanding, it fails to transmit the phenomenon at all.

Up to this point, the discussion may sound like a debate about feelings. From here on, it concerns something else: which control processes are operating, and which are no longer there.

External Description vs Internal Configuration

From the outside, the result described here often appears modest or familiar: a positive affective state, a sense of ease, or a return of “childlike” engagement. Observers naturally map these descriptions onto existing categories such as mood, nostalgia, distraction, or reward.

However, this mapping fails because the central feature of the result is not the presence of a feeling, but the absence of several normally persistent control processes, including self-monitoring, performance optimization, and outcome tracking. These processes are often invisible until they are no longer active.



Presence vs Absence of Control. The same outwardly modest experience is interpreted in two different ways. The left panel shows the observer’s mapping, where the state is classified in terms of affective categories such as mood, nostalgia, distraction, or reward, all defined by surface-level feeling. Beneath these labels, self-monitoring, performance optimization, and outcome tracking remain continuously active, forming a silent supervisory layer. The right panel shows the proposed interpretation, in which the defining change is the temporary absence of these control processes. No additional positive signal is introduced, experience unfolds without evaluation or tracking,

allowing engagement to stabilize on its own. The figure highlights that the shift is defined by what is no longer operating, not by an increase in affect, explaining systematic underestimation and frequent misclassification from a third-person perspective.

Many regulatory processes are transparent during operation and only become salient upon disruption.

Because the missing information is configurational rather than propositional, argument alone is insufficient. This is not a rhetorical limitation but a structural one. Certain experiential facts cannot be inferred without direct access to the relevant state space.

Once individuals actually enter the state in question, their evaluation typically shifts abruptly. This reaction is consistent with findings that first-person access can reorganize prior theoretical commitments.

What characterizes these moments is the absence of the need to decide whether the activity is worthwhile, effective, or meaningful. Engagement is continuous because it is not being supervised. The resemblance to childhood lies in this permissive organization, where perception and action remain coupled without commentary, and where experience does not need to justify itself in order to exist at all.

This is not nostalgia, and it is not regression. In adults, nostalgia most likely appears as the recognition that this regime has faded.

Nostalgia is often ambivalent or bittersweet, combining warmth with sadness. This affective signature makes little sense if nostalgia were only a pleasant memory on replay. It makes much more sense if the system is simultaneously reactivating traces of a former regime while registering that it is no longer accessible under current constraints.

Nostalgia tends to rise when the present feels boring or meaningless. It shows up when daily experience no longer carries enough weight to stand on its own. Experimental work shows that nostalgia rises when people perceive a break between how life felt and how it currently feels. This is consistent with being a signal that something structurally valuable is missing. People report missing “how things felt”/ “how alive it was”/ “how simple it was”, more than missing objective conditions. This asymmetry suggests the object of nostalgia is a mode of engagement, not a missing state of the world. Importantly, Its effects are only modestly restorative.

In contrast to nostalgia, a characteristic somatic marker of ease is the localization of durable pleasant sensation in the chest. The sensation is typically circumscribed rather than diffuse, stable rather than fluctuating. It does not demand action, correction, or interpretation. It is simply present, accompanying the episode without directing it.

The intensity of this sensation is modulated by aesthetic stimuli. Music, visual composition, color, rhythm, or harmony can deepen or sharpen the felt quality without altering the underlying regime. These stimuli do not generate the sensation on their own, nor do they force its appearance. They shape its amplitude once ease is already underway.

Ease is rarer in the mature brain. As evaluative control consolidates and causal-memory structure accumulates, experience becomes increasingly pre-organized. As we grow older, the brain becomes better at filtering experience. It learns what usually matters and quietly drops what seems repetitive or unimportant. This is adaptive, but it necessarily shrinks the space of states that remain informationally salient. What is encountered is less often allowed to stand on its own and more often interpreted in terms of causes, consequences, and expected trajectories. Under these conditions, experience tends to register as an outcome rather than as an event.

With maturation, the system learns what usually happens, how long things last, and what they tend to lead to. This learning is efficient and adaptive, but it narrows the range of admissible surprises. Early learning phases tolerate broad exploration and uncertainty, while later phases emphasize exploitation under a stabilized generative model. Fewer situations remain structurally open. The literature usually frames this as efficiency, but the shadow cost is a progressive flattening of what counts as informative deviation.

Adults often still approach ease but without entering it. A signal is detected, a brief sense of opening or possibility is felt, and then the episode fails to propagate. The conditions are momentarily present, but they do not last long and certainly never lead to a sustained regime. Instead of unfolding, it collapses back into baseline.

What remains are fragments: brief flashes of affect, short loops of pleasure, or isolated moments of absorption that appear and vanish without extension. Entry is nearly achieved, but monitoring intervenes too early for the episode to take hold. The experience makes contact, but does not cross the threshold required to become self-sustaining.

Typical instances include ten to twenty second loops of a familiar music video, isolated bursts of laughter, or brief flashes of high intensity while walking under the sun. In each case, a signal crosses the threshold of notice. The experience is coherent and genuinely rewarding while it lasts, even though it remains short, unowned, and difficult to reproduce.

However, these moments terminate almost as soon as they arise. They do not widen into a sustained episode or reorganize the surrounding experience. There is no carryover, no sense that something has begun and is continuing on its own. Instead, the adult system returns rapidly to its prior mode of operation. What occurs is a momentary opening without stabilization. The experience touches ease but does not

transition into it, remaining a brief, self-contained fragment rather than the onset of a durable regime.

What occurs is therefore not a failed ease, but contact without entry.

Such a local contact cannot remain neutral for long within an evaluative system.

“But why am I doing this, damn it” may appear at some point. It is the reflex of the evaluative architecture briefly coming back online and looking for an external reason. As if it were saying, ok, sure, this feels great, but what is it for, what does it produce, where is the gain, where is the progress. And obviously there is nothing to answer, because the honest answer is, nothing, it produces nothing, it leads nowhere.

And that is precisely why it works. The ease I describe is not a reward for a behavior, or a disguised form of motivation. It is a self-sufficient regime. It sustains itself as long as it is not asked to justify its existence. The moment you try to attach it to a “for”, even an ironic one, you reintroduce a demand for causal coherence.

And that demand is exactly what usually prevents access. The “this” is vague, almost slightly shameful. As if you had caught your system doing something undeclared, unaccounted for, outside the ledger. It is the same discomfort many adults feel when watching a child absorbed in an absurd game. There is nothing to comment on, nothing to improve, nothing to optimize.

Across adults, a recurrent sequence of thoughts is observed. First comes brief proximity to ease, often described as “I was almost there,” a moment in which the conditions seem to align but do not quite stabilize.

This is sometimes followed by a transient entry, expressed as “I entered it for a moment,” where the episode briefly takes hold before collapsing. The experience is sufficiently clear to be recognized as distinct from ordinary states.

Recognition then follows. The individual reports “I know what it is now,” indicating that the episode has been identified, named, and mentally indexed. This recognition is usually accompanied by confidence that the state is now understood and therefore accessible. However, when repetition is attempted, the sequence fails. The next encounter yields the familiar conclusion: “I tried again, but it didn’t work.”

This pattern is not accidental. What was encountered without supervision becomes something to be reproduced. As a result, evaluative monitoring re-engages earlier than before, preventing the episode from reforming. The sequence thus illustrates how understanding and reuse, rather than strengthening access, reliably contribute to its collapse.

These brief episodes show that the capacity for ease is not lost in adulthood. The underlying mechanisms remain intact, and the system is still capable of entering the

relevant regime, at least momentarily. The appearance of fragments demonstrates that access is still possible, even under conditions of high evaluative control.

What has changed is not the availability of the capacity, but the stability of entry. The system approaches the threshold but rarely remains beyond it long enough for the episode to propagate. The capacity persists, but its expression is limited to short, non-propagating encounters.

In childhood, ease is often present as a background phenomenon rather than as a marked event. It does not stand out as something to be noticed, named, or contrasted with other states. Because it is frequently present, it does not register as exceptional. The child does not experience it as intense, elevated, or noteworthy. It is simply the manner in which experience unfolds. As a result, it remains largely private, not because it is hidden, or even only faintly so, but because there is nothing to point to.

There is no before and after against which it would need to be measured. Without comparison, there is nothing to highlight. Activities, perceptions, and sensations proceed without requiring justification or evaluation. Because the state is not rare in infants, it does not demand attention.

Children, as a result, often show strong interest in games, cartoons, or music, yet they do not formulate these responses as preferences. From the outside, this can give the impression that little is happening. The child is quiet, absorbed, and resistant to interruption, without obvious signs of excitement or effort.

What appears minimal from the outside corresponds to a fully occupied, self-sustaining internal regime.

Childhood as Affective Quietude

Childhood ease is often remembered as unusually intense, vivid, or pure. A common intuition holds that childhood ease was stronger than adult pleasure. Childhood is remembered as a time when small events, games, sounds, images, or moments of play produced a depth of ease that seems difficult or impossible to reproduce later in life.

However, this retrospective impression may reflect a misattribution. What is recalled as intensity is more accurately described as structural openness.

What differs is not the amplitude of affective signals, but the conditions under which they occur. In childhood, affective events unfold in the absence of sustained self-monitoring, narrative framing, and anticipatory evaluation. Experiences are not immediately compared, explained, or placed within a broader account of the self. As a result, even low-intensity stimuli can propagate through the system and organize experience as a whole.

Experiences in childhood were within a system carrying sparse causal structure, weak anticipatory closure, and minimal evaluative monitoring. For a child, a bright image on a screen is not just enjoyable, it is a discovery that slightly rearranges what the world seems capable of.

In such conditions, even a minimal ordinary stimuli could reorganize experience. A cartoon, a game, a sound, or a visual pattern was not merely pleasant, it was informative. It altered expectations, introduced new regularities, and expanded the space of what could happen next. Interaction with the environment improves the generative model by revealing structure, rules, and latent regularities.

When the system is still learning what kinds of patterns exist at all, stimuli function as openings in model space, not confirmations of an already-known world. The resulting positive affect felt vivid not because it was louder, but because it was not preempted. Once explanations are in place, perception becomes suppressive, surprise attenuate, and repetition suppression dominates. Before that closure, perception is expansive, exploratory, and structurally transformative.

In adulthood, this organization changes. Pleasure is no longer an incidental byproduct of learning structure. The adult system does not wait to see what something becomes, it immediately places it within an existing explanatory frame, which reduces ambiguity but also reduces openness. Signals are stronger, but they are also immediately contextualized. The system knows what is happening and the reason. It's because once a model has stabilized, sensory input primarily serves confirmation rather than reorganization. Experience becomes transparent to itself. Nothing meaningfully alters the internal structure anymore.

This shift does not increase stability. It increases fragility. Because pleasure is now embedded in monitoring, it depends on continued alignment with expectations, narratives, and evaluative criteria. Any deviation, interruption, or ambiguity invites correction. What once unfolded on its own now requires supervision. As a result, adult pleasure often feels intense yet brief, accessible yet difficult to sustain. The paradox is that greater signal strength coincides with reduced durability, not because reward is weaker, but because monitoring arrives too early.

This reframing helps explain why adults report intermittently re-access what is described as “childlike” ease in specific contexts without any durable increase in wellbeing. The underlying capacity has not disappeared. What changes is the regime in which it can briefly occur. Certain situations transiently relax monitoring, suspend narrative evaluation, or delay outcome tracking, allowing a short-lived permissive window to open. Entry is possible, but persistence is not.

In adulthood, affective signals are often stronger, more explicit, and more tightly coupled to identifiable rewards. However, they arise within a dense evaluative framework. Signals are tracked, interpreted, and bounded almost as soon as they appear. This early closure limits their capacity to spread, stabilize, or reconfigure


experience. The resulting pleasure may feel sharper, yet it rarely acquires the depth or continuity associated with childhood ease.

The experience is registered, often recognized as familiar, and then quickly indexed as something that occurred. Once indexed, monitoring resumes and the window closes. The episode leaves a trace, but not a pathway.

This also clarifies why nostalgia so often fails to restore the phenomenology it seeks. Nostalgia operates through comparison and recognition. It explicitly references a prior state and evaluates the present against it. In doing so, it reinstates the very monitoring and narrative framing that prevent the original regime from forming. The remembered context is re-entered, but the structural conditions that once allowed ease to unfold without supervision are no longer in place. The attempt preserves the image of the past while dissolving the mode that made it possible.

The analysis distinguishes childhood ease from regression, sentimentality, and hedonic intensity. It proposes instead that its defining feature is affective quietude. Ease, in this sense, is not marked by emotional excess, excitement, or heightened arousal. It is characterized by the absence of internal noise, commentary, and evaluative pressure.

Affective quietude refers to that early state in which experience unfolds without being continuously indexed, narrated, or assessed. Sensations register and carry valence, but they do not demand interpretation or action. Reward is present, yet it does not announce itself. Nothing needs to be amplified, defended, or prolonged. The experience is sufficient as it is.



Affective Quietude. Left panel: sensory input carries valence without being indexed, narrated, or recruited for action. Reward is present but non-declarative, experience unfolds without pressure to interpret, optimize, or prolong it. Right panel: sensory input is rapidly indexed and routed through evaluative and narrative loops. Affect becomes coupled to judgment, goal tracking, and self-monitoring, transforming experience into something to manage, explain, or improve rather than simply inhabit. Childhood ease did not feel stronger because it was amplified, but because it unfolded without supervision. Its defining feature was not intensity, but the absence of an observer tracking whether the feeling was happening at all.

This distinguishes childhood ease from regression, which implies a return to an earlier developmental stage, and from sentimentality, which relies on reflective comparison with the past. It also separates it from hedonic intensity, which emphasizes signal strength rather than organizational conditions.

Childhood joy does not depend on stronger emotions, but on a quieter control regime. What defines it is not how much is felt, but how little needs to be managed.

What is recalled is not excess, but openness.

The remembered contrast therefore reflects a shift in control organization rather than a loss of affective capacity.

High-intensity affect is typically loud. It announces itself, marks contrast, and leaves identifiable peaks. Instead, childhood ease is often recalled as diffuse, continuous, and difficult to localize. Many accounts describe it as ordinary at the time and only recognizable in retrospect, once it is no longer available. Ease does not stand out because nothing else competes with it : it remains unmarked precisely because it is not monitored.

Under such conditions, affect can be pervasive without being dramatic. It fills experience without becoming an object of attention. The loss, when it occurs, is therefore not felt as the disappearance of intense pleasure, but as the disappearance of a background openness that had never been named.

Children do not typically monitor their emotional state while playing. The question “Am I enjoying this enough?” is largely absent. Experience unfolds without being cross-referenced against an internal standard. As a result, ease does not need to compete with meta-cognitive evaluation. Because nothing is watching it, nothing interrupts it. The absence of monitoring does not intensify ease, but it allows it to cross a point where it becomes stable. What distinguishes the two is whether pleasure must continually prove that it is there.

In adulthood, affective signals are rapidly surrounded by commentary, expectation, and comparison. Even when pleasure is present, it is immediately qualified. This interference shortens duration, introduces volatility, and creates the impression of fragility. From within this monitored regime, the earlier, quieter form of ease appears retrospectively stronger, when it was simply allowed to exist.

In such a state, reward signals are neither amplified nor suppressed. They are allowed to unfold without secondary processing. This produces a phenomenology that feels light, continuous, and unforced. Importantly, quiet does not mean weak. Here, it is the contrary : a whisper can carry more meaning than a shout when nothing else is competing with it.

From a control theoretic perspective, childhood ease corresponds to a transient reduction in monitoring gain, where valuation proceeds but supervisory correction is momentarily offline. Reward signals remain intact, yet they are not subjected to immediate regulation, comparison, or correction.

In adulthood, pleasure is rarely allowed to unfold in this way. It is anticipated in advance, measured during the experience, compared to prior expectations, and evaluated afterward. These layers of processing do not eliminate pleasure. They amplify its salience and make it more explicit. At the same time, they constrain its temporal stability. This monitoring introduces the possibility of loss, decay, or disappointment.


Loud pleasure burns brightly but collapses quickly. The signal is strong, but the regime is unstable. It is that they operate within a denser cognitive environment, one

saturated with anticipation, evaluation, and correction. Relative to childhood, adulthood ease, when properly unlocked, may increase peak intensity through contrast and explicit salience, while reducing stability and duration through anticipatory monitoring.

Nostalgia attempts to recover childhood ease by reintroducing its content, familiar images, music, places. Yet these attempts often fail to reproduce the original feeling. Within the present framework, this failure is not incidental. It is structural.

Nostalgia operates at the narrative level. It explicitly references the past, the continuity of the self, and the recognition that something valued has been lost. The experience is framed as a comparison between then and now.

Childhood ease, by contrast, unfolded without such structures. It was not experienced as a remembered state, a personal possession, or something to be restored. It lacked narrative ownership. By invoking memory and comparison, nostalgia reinstates precisely the evaluative processes that prevent the original regime from forming.



Low self-monitoring. In childhood, low narrative and evaluative load allows even weak affective signals to propagate broadly across the experiential field, stabilizing experience as a whole. In adulthood, dense evaluation, self-monitoring, and early interpretation tightly bind signals, fragmenting experience and preventing global stabilization. As a result, stronger signals are required to have any impact, yet are rapidly captured by comparison and self-reference, limiting experiential closure.

For this reason, nostalgia cannot function as a return. What it produces is not childhood ease, but an awareness of its absence.

Childhood ease, as described here, is not a return to earlier developmental limitations, it does not require the loss of adult cognitive capacities. It does not depend on reduced intelligence, diminished self-awareness, or regression to a prior stage. It simply reflects a mode of affective processing characterized by low narrative load.

In this mode, experience is not continuously embedded in a story about the self, its history, or its future. Evaluation is delayed rather than absent. Reflective cognition remains available, but it is not constantly engaged. As a result, affect can unfold without being immediately integrated into narrative meaning or personal significance.

The distinction is therefore functional, not developmental. It concerns how control, evaluation, and narration are deployed in time, not which cognitive tools are available. Childhood ease reflects a permissive configuration of these tools, one that can still occur in adulthood, briefly, when narrative load is reduced and monitoring is delayed.

Reframing childhood ease as quieter rather than stronger carries several implications.

First, it explains why increasing intensity rarely restores lost ease. Amplification targets signal strength, not organizational conditions. When monitoring and evaluation remain active, stronger stimulation only increases salience and volatility. The underlying regime does not change.

Second, it clarifies why optimization often accelerates hedonic collapse. Optimization introduces metrics, comparison, and causal ownership. These operations reorganize experience instrumentally, reinstating supervision and shortening duration. What is optimized becomes fragile by design.

Third, it accounts for the intermittent and context-specific reappearance of “childlike” ease in adulthood. Certain contexts temporarily reduce narrative load or delay monitoring, allowing brief access to a quieter regime. Because the surrounding control architecture remains intact, these episodes do not generalize or stabilize.

Fourth, it dissolves the paradox of longing for a past that was never consciously evaluated at the time. What is missed is not an object that was once possessed, but a mode of experience that was never named. The loss is recognized only retrospectively, once evaluation becomes constant.

The early loss of the causal role of ease may reflect normative narrative maturation rather than cumulative damage. Cumulative structural load, or informational-memory aging, may later further restrict access, and it's a chapter of the book, but the initial decoupling appears to occur early.

The relevance of childhood in this analysis does not lie in age, memory, or development, but in the visibility of a permissive control regime before evaluative consolidation becomes dominant.

Once this regime is identified, the question is no longer where it originates, but where it can still be observed once it has become rare. In adulthood, permissive configurations do not disappear entirely, but they persist only in constrained, artificial, or deliberately structured contexts.

Certain cultural artifacts, particularly games, cartoons, and mediated environments, recreate fragments of these conditions by delaying resolution, tolerating ambiguity, and reducing the immediacy of evaluation.

These domains are therefore not nostalgic stand-ins for childhood, but contemporary laboratories in which the same control dynamics can be isolated, manipulated, and observed under mature cognitive constraints. Examining them allows the framework to move from developmental illustration to structural generalization.

Before turning to specific cultural artifacts, it is useful to consider a recent historical configuration in which access to permissive experience appeared more frequent in adults, without invoking childhood, pathology, or exceptional intervention. The 1990s provide such a case. This period is often remembered as emotionally lighter, not because life was easier or people were happier, but because everyday systems were structurally less optimized.

Attention was less continuously captured, cultural objects were lower in resolution, public metrics were largely absent, and engagement was rarely framed as a choice to be maximized. These conditions reduced evaluative pressure and delayed closure, allowing experience to unfold with less supervision.

Examining this period clarifies that the disappearance of ease is not solely developmental, but also sensitive to the optimization profile of the surrounding environment.

Why the 1990s felt more easeful

This is not about people being happier or life being easier. The 1990s were structurally less optimized, and that mattered for how experience unfolded.

Lower pressure on attention

In the 1990s, attention was not continuously captured, measured, and recycled. Television imposed its rhythm. Fixed schedules, missed shows, no replay, no recommendation engine. The system did not try to maximize engagement, it simply broadcast.

As a result, you watched what was on, not what was optimal. This relative passivity reduced internal monitoring. Experience could arrive without being constantly evaluated.

Today, every piece of content is framed as the best possible choice. Even choosing becomes an optimization act, which already blocks entry into joy.

Lower technological resolution, therefore less evaluation

Cultural objects were technically imperfect, blurry, noisy, incomplete.

VHS, CRT screens, early 3D graphics, compressed audio. Nothing was fully inspectable. The brain could not verify everything, so it disengaged more easily.

An imperfect image does not invite fine comparison. It is experienced as a flow, not as an object to judge. That allows experience to unfold without constant supervision.

High definition culture does the opposite. It invites inspection, comparison, and ranking. Culture becomes a continuous quality audit.

Sound matters just as much.

Slightly compressed audio, imperfect spatialization, or limited dynamic range reduces the temptation to listen analytically. The sound cannot be fully inspected, so the system stops checking it in detail and lets it pass as part of the experience.

By contrast, an ultra-precise home cinema setup easily reactivates the evaluator. Attention shifts toward sound quality, spatial accuracy, mixing choices, and performance. One ends up listening to the production before listening to the film.

In the 1990s, almost nothing was publicly quantified.

No likes, no views, no follower counts. Even early personal websites existed without immediate feedback. One published without knowing if anyone was watching.

Without metrics, activity is not instantly converted into performance information. It can remain gratuitous, inefficient, and therefore fertile.

Today, every action is immediately classified, evaluated, and compared. Even creation becomes a test.

Video games without a conscious meta

Games in the 1990s were poorly resolved from an optimal standpoint.

No complete builds on day one, no exhaustive guides before release, no pre-digested strategies. One played before knowing how to play well.

This structural ignorance maintained an exploratory regime, one did things without clear justification or guaranteed payoff.

Today, the meta precedes experience. You enter already knowing what is good and bad. Exploration becomes sub-optimal by definition.

Pop culture with less self-conscious optimization

Cultural production was less explicitly optimized as a product.

MTV videos, cartoons, advertisements had inconsistencies, awkward pacing, strange ideas. They were not all A/B tested to maximize retention second by second.

The lack of total polish allowed for gratuitous moments, unjustified passages, sometimes pure absurdity. That is exactly where ease can appear.

Today, everything is calibrated to avoid attention drops. Everything is smoothed, monitored, and tense.

Less anticipation, more present time

Delayed access created presence.

Waiting for an album, a TV broadcast, a game release. Anticipation was not fed by a constant stream of leaks, trailers, previews, and discourse.

One did not live in permanent pre-analysis. Events arrived without being mentally consumed in advance.

Today, almost everything is known before it is lived. An anticipated experience is already partially spent.

What's so Interesting about Cartoons ?

This book is not about childhood development as a topic in its own right. Childhood appears here only as an illustrative domain, because it makes certain control regimes easier to observe in a relatively unmasked form. "Relatively" is important, children are not transparent subjects. As noted earlier, they are often secretive about their daily experiences.

The purpose of this chapter is therefore not to explain childhood, but to use familiar childhood situations as concrete examples through which the ease framework can be made legible.

It is important to be precise about the asymmetry involved. Children tend to hide the phenomenon. Adults tend to forget it. In both cases, what is happening is not absent but inaccessible. The phenomenon does not announce itself, does not stabilize as a reportable state, and leaves little trace once the control regime changes. What we are

dealing with, in both populations, is not a visible object but an inference from its conditions of appearance and disappearance.

The appeal to childhood is therefore methodological rather than developmental. It provides instances in which permissiveness is common rather than exceptional, making visible a regime that persists in adulthood only very intermittently. These examples are not offered as ideals to be recovered, but as reference points that clarify how ease depends on the organization of control rather than on age, memory, or emotional intensity.

Children are often said to enjoy cartoons because they find them funny, silly, or amusing, and developmental progress is commonly viewed in part as a capacity to understand more complex forms of humor. This framing treats enjoyment as a function of cognitive sophistication, implying that simple stimuli merely satisfy immature tastes that are later replaced by subtler or more refined forms of appreciation. This is the common, widespread view.

Within the ease framework, this interpretation is misleading. The appeal of cartoons is not primarily explained by humor comprehension or narrative complexity, but by the control regime under which they are received, coupled with strong and multiples predictive errors within the cartoon. Many cartoons operate in a space where those errors are frequent, benign, and unresolved, and where aesthetic signals are allowed to remain non-instrumental. For the child, these signals are not evaluated, justified, or compared. They arrive and persist as part of an ongoing experience.

Many cartoons that strongly engage young children contain no jokes, no verbal punchlines, and no clear narrative resolution. Instead, they rely on persistent violations of physical and causal regularities. Characters stretch, explode, or reassemble. Magic changes the appearances of characters constantly. Objects change size or function for low narrative reasons. Causal chains break and resume without consequence or repair.

From a control perspective, this matters more than their content. The absence of explanation prevents premature closure so prediction errors remain active without being resolved into lessons or punchlines.


Children are also deeply engaged by cartoons that are not so light, humorous, or reassuring. Many canonical animated films include raw, frightening, or openly sad sequences. Loss, abandonment, danger, are presented with minimal filtering and without the protective framing that characterizes most adult oriented narratives. Resolution, when it exists, is often delayed and partial.

From the perspective of ease, this absence of emotional cushioning plays a similar role. The experience is not smoothed or redeemed in advance. Affective signals are allowed to arise without being immediately normalized or morally resolved. It suggests that sustains engagement is not comfort or positivity, but the maintenance of a permissive

regime in which events, whether amusing or distressing, are allowed to unfold without being rapidly closed or explained.

In most adult contexts, such violations trigger rapid corrective processes. The viewer explains them away as errors, classifies them as stylistic devices, or interprets them symbolically. In each case, the event is brought under an explanatory frame. Once explained, it no longer remains open. The system restores coherence by assigning a cause, a category, or an intention.

This contrasts sharply with the permissive regime observed in childhood. There, violations need not be repaired to remain viable. They can persist without justification, neither corrected nor rejected. The difference is not interpretive skill but control organization. What changes with age is the tolerance for unresolved deviation, and the speed with which monitoring intervenes to restore order.



Control organization in front of a cartoon. Left, permissive regime, typical of childhood. Anomalies, inconsistencies, and odd events enter an ambiguous field without triggering repair. Monitoring is minimal or slow, no explanatory frame is imposed, and unresolved deviation can persist without correction or rejection. Right, evaluative regime, typical of adulthood. Deviations rapidly recruit monitoring and are explained as errors, categorized as stylistic devices, or interpreted symbolically. In each case, an explanatory frame restores coherence, closing the event. The contrast reflects differences in control timing and tolerance for unresolved deviation, not differences in interpretive ability.

When adults report that “nothing is happening” in a cartoon, this judgment is often taken at face value, as an observation about content. The assumption is that

engagement requires something to decode: a joke, a message, a narrative payoff. When none is detected, the experience is treated as empty or deficient.

Within the present framework, this diagnosis is inverted. What appears as a lack of content is more accurately described as a lack of constraint. The cartoon does not fail to deliver meaning, it fails to demand it. Events are allowed to occur without being recruited into explanation, intention, or evaluation. For the adult viewer, trained to equate engagement with interpretability, this absence of demand is easily mistaken for absence altogether.

When adults watch cartoons, they tend to search for jokes, intent, or meaning. They look for punchlines, symbolic structure, or narrative payoff. These expectations reflect a control regime in which engagement is justified by interpretation. Enjoyment is assumed to depend on recognizing what the material is doing and why it works.

When such elements are absent or fail to register, adults often infer that children must be appreciating something analogous at a simpler level, a crude version of humor, a reduced form of narrative understanding, or a primitive satisfaction with bright colors and movement. This inference preserves the assumption that enjoyment must be grounded in comprehension, only scaled down.


The child is operating under a different regime of control. Engagement does not depend on identifying jokes, intentions, or messages. It depends on the absence of pressure to interpret. What the adult experiences as a lack of content is, for the child, a lack of constraint.

What is often described as simplicity of understanding may therefore reflect the opposite. It reflects a system that does not require understanding in order to remain open. The experience does not need to justify itself. It continues because nothing forces it to end.

Absurd cartoons are effective not because they deliver jokes, but because they generate prediction errors with a specific profile. The errors are salient enough to remain perceptually active, non threatening in that they do not signal danger or demand action, non instrumental in that they are not tied to goals or outcomes, and difficult to resolve because no stable explanatory frame is offered. Under these conditions, discrepancy can persist without being neutralized, allowing engagement to continue without triggering corrective closure.

Older animations frequently contain irregular frame timing, visible jitter, micro instabilities, fluctuating proportions, and inconsistent motion dynamics. These features are often treated as technical limitations, but from a perceptual standpoint they function as persistent, low level violations of expectation. Motion never fully settles. Form remains slightly unstable. The system is repeatedly prevented from locking into a fully predictive model of what will happen next.

Modern animation, by contrast, is optimized for smoothness, continuity, and physical coherence. Motion is interpolated, timing is regularized, and proportions are stabilized across frames. Even when fantastical events occur, they are embedded in a highly consistent kinematic and causal framework. Prediction errors are either minimized in advance or rapidly corrected, allowing the perceptual system to explain away deviations without remaining engaged by them.



Older cartoons. Older cartoons preserve residual instability, including frame jitter, irregular timing, and proportion or motion inconsistencies, which sustain engagement and can induce ease in permissive regimes by keeping discrepancy open. Modern pipelines minimize these deviations through smoothing and correction, closing the discrepancy and flattening experience despite some compensation brought by higher-fidelity. In effect, high-fidelity aesthetics can partially buffer this effect by amplifying sensory salience through increased visual richness, color depth, and

textural detail. However, this modulation operates primarily at the level of signal intensity rather than structural openness. It increases experiential impact without reinstating unresolved discrepancy or internal variability. As a result, aesthetic refinement may delay or attenuate the loss of perceptual permissiveness, but cannot fully compensate for the disappearance of the instability and ambiguity that supported earlier permissive regimes.

Engagement depends not on technical quality, but on whether perceptual error is preserved or closed.

High fidelity aesthetics partially delays the collapse. Increased visual richness, color depth, and textural detail can amplify sensory salience. However, this improvement operates at the level of signal strength rather than structural openness. It enhances impact without reintroducing unresolved discrepancy. As a result, aesthetic refinement can mitigate but does not fully compensate for the loss of perceptual instability in older cartoons that previously supported a permissive regime.

Thus, absurd cartoons do not work because they are funnier or more intense. They work because they preserve a permissive perceptual regime. Within this regime, prediction errors are allowed to persist, affective signals are not immediately classified or explained, and engagement unfolds without being forced into evaluation.

What is maintained is not surprise followed by resolution, but discrepancy without demand. The perceptual system remains active without being compelled to correct, and affect can propagate without being recruited into judgment or interpretation. In this sense, the effectiveness of absurd cartoons lies not in their content, but in the way they delay closure and sustain openness.

It points to something uncomfortably real. We build centuries of technology, institutions, culture, refinement, and coordination, and at the end of that chain, the peak subjective experience we reliably reach often does not exceed that of a child sitting in front of a screen, with no plan, no optimization, no self story to maintain.

Framed that way, it sounds like a civilizational failure. But it is not quite a failure. It is a category mistake about what civilization was ever optimizing for.

Civilization is extraordinarily good at extending control outward. It accumulates tools, stabilizes environments, reduces risk, synchronizes large numbers of people, and converts uncertainty into structure. None of that is aimed at maximizing the upper bound of lived experience. It is aimed at making life durable, predictable, and scalable.

The discomfort comes from retroactively assuming that progress along those axes should also lift the ceiling of subjective intensity. When it does not, we read it as loss or decline. In reality, the system is doing exactly what it was designed to do. It just was never designed to outperform a child at being fully present inside an undemanding moment.

What feels unsettling is not that civilization fails to surpass the child. It is that we quietly expected it to, without noticing that the metric itself never belonged to civilization in the first place.

Civilization has been extraordinarily effective at expanding power, predictability, coordination, safety, lifespan, and control over the external world. It excels at reducing certain classes of problems and uncertainty. What it has never truly learned to do is raise the upper bound of lived subjective quality.

At best, it improves access under narrow conditions, and often at the cost of something that goes unnoticed. The more systems demand anticipation, choice, justification, monitoring, and evaluation, the more they train minds to remain in supervisory mode. And that mode is exactly the one that blocks access to the simplest and most complete forms of positive experience.

The child in front of the screen is not in that state because the screen is exceptional or technologically superior. The child is there because nothing is being demanded. There is no optimization target, no future justification, no pressure to extract value or meaning. Experience is not a means, it is already the event.

The screen is merely a permissive surface, like an absurd cartoon, a repetitive sound, a low stakes game, a toy with no goal. The critical factor is not stimulus richness but the absence of evaluative load.

Adult civilization systematically converts almost everything into a trajectory. Watching a show becomes catching up. Playing becomes getting good. Reading becomes self improvement. Travel becomes doing something with your life. Even rest becomes a task to execute correctly. Once experience is framed as instrumental, subjective intensity flattens. Not because the adult brain is weaker, but because control has been overtrained. The capacity is still there, intact, but it is held shut by constant supervision.

What makes the comparison with the child unsettling is not that adults cannot do better. It is that we assumed doing better meant adding complexity, stimulation, options, resolution, and control. We mistook going further for going higher. Yet the historical and experiential pattern points in the opposite direction. The most vivid, alive states are not additive, not cumulative, and above all not directly governable. They arise precisely when optimization momentarily loses its grip.

In terms of the maximum instantaneous quality of lived experience, it is accurate to say that this entire civilization does not surpass a child in front of a screen. That does not make civilization pointless. It means it was never designed for that axis. Civilization optimizes survival, stability, coordination, and output, not openness of experience. And whenever it attempts to manufacture happiness directly, it defaults to measurement, comparison, and performance, which immediately closes what it aimed to open.

Recognition Without Preference

Developmental research often assumes that recognizing a stimulus already entails some degree of evaluation. If a child reliably identifies an object, image, character, or event, the default expectation is that this recognition should be accompanied by liking, disliking, preference, or choice. When children fail to express such evaluative responses, or when these responses are weak, unstable, or context dependent, the absence is frequently interpreted as a deficit. It is described as indecision, emotional immaturity, incomplete valuation, or a failure to form stable preferences. Within this framework, evaluation is treated as the natural and necessary consequence of recognition, and its absence is framed as a developmental shortfall.


Recognition Does Not Imply Evaluation

Children frequently recognize stimuli without converting that recognition into preference or judgment. A child may reliably identify a cartoon character, a recurring sound, a location, or a familiar object without treating that recognition as a basis for comparison, choice, or desirability. Familiarity, in this context, functions descriptively rather than normatively. It registers presence, recurrence, or identity, but does not automatically recruit mechanisms of ranking, liking, or rejection. Recognition answers the question “what is this?” or “have I seen this before?”, not “is this better?”, “do I want this?”, or “should I choose this over alternatives?”.

This dissociation is not a transient developmental gap on the way to adult-like evaluation. It reflects a stable property of a permissive regime of experience in which stimuli are allowed to remain open, present, and engaged with, without being forced into evaluative closure. In such a regime, experience does not need to justify itself through preference formation. There is no requirement to decide, to compare, or to commit. Recognition can remain local and situational, tied to ongoing engagement rather than abstracted into a portable judgment.

From this perspective, the absence of stable preference is not a failure to value, but an absence of demand for valuation. Evaluation is effortful, comparative, and closing. It reduces a field of possible engagements into a ranked or chosen subset. In a permissive regime, such closure is unnecessary and often counterproductive. Leaving recognition unclosed preserves flexibility, curiosity, and tolerance for ambiguity.

Recognition Without Evaluative Closure



Recognition without evaluative closure. The diagram contrasts two pathways following stimulus recognition. In the permissive pathway, recognition operates descriptively: a familiar object is identified and remains present without comparison, ranking, or judgment. Engagement stays open, sustained by continued perceptual contact rather than by preference formation. In the evaluative pathway, recognition is immediately recruited into normative processing, producing liking, disliking, or choice and closing the experience into a preference. In childhood contexts, weak or absent

preference reflects the absence of pressure to evaluate, not indecision or incomplete valuation.

Several features of childhood experience are consistent with affective quietude rather than heightened expressiveness. Children often remain deeply engaged without articulating enjoyment, without labeling what they feel, and without signaling satisfaction in ways that invite interpretation. Engagement is visible primarily through posture, sustained attention, or resistance to interruption, not through explicit emotional commentary. A child absorbed in an activity does not typically report being pleased, interested, or moved. The experience proceeds without being marked as such.


Affective signals in childhood therefore tend to remain preconceptual. Bodily and attentional markers appear without being consolidated into named emotions, preferences, or evaluations. Transitions between states occur without retrospective framing. An activity ends, another begins, and little effort is made to compare them, remember them as episodes, or rank them by value. What matters is not what the experience was, but that it is no longer ongoing. This absence of narrative capture allows affect to remain local and transient without being diminished.

On this account, developmental change does not primarily increase affective intensity. It increases affective capture. With age, affect becomes progressively labeled, narrated, compared, remembered, and displayed. Feelings are not only felt but identified, tracked, and situated within personal and social narratives. They become objects of memory, communication, and self assessment. These processes make affect more visible and more reportable, but they do not imply that it is stronger or richer at the level of immediate experience. Ease, when it occurs, is best understood as a transient failure of affective capture.

As evaluative and narrative capacities consolidate, affect is increasingly recruited into explanation and justification. Experiences are no longer allowed to pass without being accounted for. They are stored as examples, lessons, or preferences. This shift increases coherence and continuity across time, but it also reduces the conditions under which affect can remain uncommitted and non instrumental. What changes is not how much is felt, but how quickly what is felt is brought under evaluation.

This reframing avoids both romanticizing childhood and pathologizing adulthood. Childhood is not presented as a privileged state of emotional richness, nor is adulthood framed as a loss or failure. The difference lies in evaluability, not in affective capacity. As systems become more narratively organized and socially legible, affective events are more tightly bound to interpretation. Quietude gives way to articulation. What is gained is structure and communicability. What is lost is the persistence of permissive regimes in which affect can remain present without needing to mean anything.

From Affective Quietude to Evaluative Capture



From affective quietude to evaluative capture. The diagram contrasts two modes of experience organization. On the left, a permissive regime, typical of childhood contexts, in which prediction errors persist without immediate correction, affective signals remain largely unlabeled, and engagement unfolds episodically without narrative consolidation or comparison. Affective quietude reflects low evaluability rather than low intensity. On the right, an evaluative regime, typical of adulthood, in which prediction errors are rapidly resolved, affect is labeled, compared, remembered, and socially displayed, and experience is integrated into narrative and value structures. The transition does not represent a loss of affective capacity, but a shift toward increased evaluability and capture, reducing the availability of permissive regimes in which affect can remain present without instrumental organization.

Once permissivity is present, play functions as a secondary organization of experience. It does not generate affect on its own. It stabilizes and extends engagement by introducing minimal structure without reinstating evaluation. Play operates downstream of permissive conditions, shaping how experience unfolds once monitoring pressure has already been relaxed.

The characteristic features of play follow directly from this role. Rules are optional rather than binding. Errors are tolerated rather than penalized. Repetition occurs without optimization. Outcomes carry weak commitment and limited consequences. These properties prevent experience from becoming a site of correction or comparison. They allow activity to continue without being converted into performance.

Importantly, these features do not create positive affect. They protect it. By limiting evaluability, play delays closure and allows affective episodes to persist, propagate, and sometimes become shared, without collapsing into goal tracking or self assessment.

Play reliably correlates with well being because it tends to arise in environments that already support permissive regimes. Such environments reduce evaluative pressure, tolerate ambiguity, and allow experience to remain non instrumental. Play therefore functions as an indicator of conditions that are conducive to affective openness, rather than as their primary cause.

This distinction explains why increasing play opportunities does not consistently improve well being. When permissivity is absent, play loses its stabilizing role. It becomes a structured activity, obligation, or display. Without a permissive regime in place, the formal features of play remain, but their protective function disappears.

This distinction helps explain why children can remain engaged with stimuli that adults perceive as repetitive, nonsensical, or insufficiently “rewarding.” Engagement does not depend on explicit liking or preference, but on the ability of the stimulus to remain present without requiring resolution. Recognition supports continuity of attention, while the lack of evaluation prevents premature closure. The child does not need to decide whether something is good, interesting, or worth choosing again. It simply continues to be there, and engagement continues with it.

Conversely, when adult observers expect recognition to produce explicit preference, they may misinterpret the child’s behavior. A lack of expressed liking is taken as disinterest, when it may instead reflect a mode of engagement that has not been translated into evaluative language. This translation often occurs later, not because recognition was incomplete, but because the cognitive and social environment increasingly demands evaluative closure.

In sum, recognition without preference is not a developmental deficiency but a coherent mode of experiencing the world. It reflects a regime in which experience is allowed to persist without being immediately transformed into judgment. Understanding this distinction is essential for interpreting children’s engagement, attention, and apparent indifference accurately, and for avoiding the projection of adult evaluative norms onto forms of cognition that operate under different constraints.

What's interesting about games ?

Game's most pleasurable moments are not about mastery

Some players may naturally sometimes pause to doubt for a few moments about the current paradigm in gaming, that better narration, technology, a smooth skills curve, are what make the players feel good.

The first minutes of a game are, indeed, usually felt as the most pleasant. When controls are rough, systems unclear, outcomes uncertain, and level is easy.

As the game progresses, rewards increase and numbers go up. Objectively, everything improves. Subjectively something flattens.

The game, of course, does not become worse, quite the contrary in an objective sense, but it becomes more technical. Choices are no longer tentative, they are justified, maybe there is "sinergies" to pay attention to when attributing skills. Actions are evaluated in advance, with "special monsters" that have more characteristics. The player starts thinking in terms of efficiency.

At this point, there is a common impulse.

Instead of continuing, the player wants to stop and create a brand new character.

Not to try a different strategy. Not to optimize differently - it may be used as an excuse - but to return to the first level, that moment where nothing mattered yet. Some players repeat this several times a day. They create a character, play the opening 30 minutes, then abandon it, in a loop.

Usually, even if they complete the game fully one day - statistically rare -, players will choose exactly the same characters to restart.

In a way, the most revealing moment in a game is not the endgame, the build, or the mastery curve. It is the point at which the player hesitates to continue. That hesitation is not boredom. It is the signal that something good has just become accountable.

The first minutes of a game, because nothing is fully legible, the player is not evaluating performance or progress. Experience unfolds before it is measured. Once mechanics are understood, rewards quantity increases and goals stabilize, that openness closes, and the pleasantness fades, not because the game worsens, but because it becomes known. And the player, quietly, knows it.

Diablo series

The Diablo series is a useful object of study precisely because it is not cleanly reducible to a single genre. While it is commonly labeled a hack and slash, this designation only

captures its most visible surface. Beneath it, *Diablo* simultaneously hosts several genre logics that remain active at the same time.

It is an action game at the level of motor engagement, a role playing system at the level of abstraction and progression, a dungeon crawler in its spatial logic, and a loot driven system whose reward structure borrows from chance, collection, and long term optimization. Depending on how it is approached, it can also be read as an economy simulator, or a seasonal reset system closer to competitive online play.

Because these layers coexist rather than resolve into one dominant frame, *Diablo* provides a compact environment in which multiple design paradigms interact. It allows analysis to move across genres without changing the object itself, making it especially valuable for studying how different motivational, perceptual, and control systems overlap inside a single game.

The game received sustained criticism, frequently framed in direct comparison with earlier entries in the series, to which it was often judged inferior in key aspects of the experience.

Thus, long-time players, as well as developers, have spent years theorizing on forums about what is supposedly missing from modern *Diablo*, and why **Diablo II** and earlier entries are remembered as special. The explanations are familiar and endlessly recycled. Some point to the loot system, arguing that drop rates, affix pools, or item tiers were better balanced. Others invoke atmosphere, claiming the darker tone, muted colors, or oppressive music carried more weight. There are also the nostalgic accounts, that the game was new at the time, that players were younger, had fewer responsibilities, fewer worries, more time, more patience. Each theory contains a fragment of truth, but none of them actually explains the core difference.

As an older *Diablo* player myself, I am saying this plainly, it is not that.

What is missing is not content, not difficulty, not darkness, not novelty. What is missing is a specific experiential structure, one that modern systems actively erase. *Diablo II* repeatedly allowed the player to be locally wrong, briefly uncertain, and then quietly corrected. It created moments where perception had to update itself, not because the game announced something important, but because a small assumption failed. The system did not rush to explain, optimize, or reassure. It allowed gaps.

Modern *Diablo* titles, by contrast, are saturated with advanced knowledge. Items are telegraphed before they drop. Rarity is color-coded, probability-weighted, previewed, datamined, and socially stabilized. The player rarely misidentifies what they are looking at. Expectations are calibrated in advance, then confirmed. Experience becomes evaluative rather than corrective. You are not discovering what something is, you are checking whether it matches what you already knew it would be.

This is why adding more loot, more systems, more transparency, or more balance never restores what is perceived as lost. Those additions move in the opposite direction. They reduce the space in which perception can be surprised by itself. *Diablo II* did not feel special because it was harsher, darker, or less generous. It felt special because it repeatedly inserted small epistemic ruptures, moments where the world subtly refused to line up with your prediction, and then resolved that refusal without spectacle.

The difference is structural, not historical or emotional. It does not belong to the era, or the novelty of the genre. It belongs to how much uncertainty the system permits at the point of perception, and how rarely modern games are willing to tolerate that kind of silence.

In *Diablo II*, an item drops to the ground. It is banal, gray, undifferentiated. A shield, perhaps. At this stage, it carries no distinguishing marks, no promise, no explicit value. The game withholds information, and the player, in response, forms only a weak, provisional expectation. Something might be there, but nothing insists on it. Attention remains open, not yet recruited.

Then the object is identified. It is not a shield. It is a bone shield.

The deviation is slight, almost negligible in mechanical terms. Yet it produces a distinct experiential shift. What matters is not the numerical properties that follow, but the moment of perceptual correction itself. The object does not fulfill the initial expectation, it revises it. The player is forced to acknowledge that what was assumed to be known was, in fact, incomplete. The event is not additive, it is corrective.

This kind of moment relies on a narrow window of uncertainty. It requires that the system allow the player to be briefly wrong without penalty, without immediate clarification, without preemptive explanation. The affective charge comes from the short-lived suspension between “I know what this is” and “I was mistaken.” Meaning emerges not from reward magnitude, but from the restructuring of the internal model.

Such moments vanish when everything is disclosed in advance.

In this sense, the game does not create value by adding more rewards or stronger signals. It does so by briefly removing certainty, then reinstating it in altered form. The design operates by subtraction rather than accumulation. It withholds, then reveals, not to surprise through excess, but to reintroduce contingency. It is precisely in this narrow gap, where expectation is disrupted but not overwhelmed, that the experience acquires density and presence.

From character selection to the first quest, the *Diablo* series is remarkably aligned around a low evaluative pressure regime. The player is not immediately asked to optimize, compare, or commit. Character choice is presented without exhaustive explanation or visible long term consequences. Statistics are present, but they do not

yet demand interpretation. The game does not insist that the player understands what matters.

The early minutes unfold slowly and permissively. The interface is sparse, the stakes are low, and feedback is delayed rather than immediate. Combat begins before the player has a reason to evaluate performance. Movement, attacks, and basic interactions are learned through exposure, not instruction. Nothing asks to be maximized, measured, or justified.

The first quest extends this regime instead of breaking it. Objectives are simple, local, and non comparative. There is no timer, no ranking, no explicit success metric beyond continuation. Rewards arrive without being framed as optimization choices, and failure carries little cost. The player is allowed to remain inside the activity without stepping outside it to assess progress or correctness.

This low evaluative pressure lasts long enough to matter. It is not a brief tutorial bubble but a sustained phase. Because monitoring is not immediately recruited, experience can propagate. Engagement does not need to be defended, and the system has time to settle into a self sustaining mode. Under these conditions, ease can appear, and in some cases stabilize, before the player ever starts thinking in terms of builds, efficiency, or mastery.

With hindsight, one developer acknowledged a very specific regret: having added a stamina bar.

Not because it was poorly balanced, but because it intervened **too early**. It blocked the player within the very first minutes, at the exact moment when the game should have begun to disappear. Instead of letting entry happen, it imposed management, restraint, and unnecessary vigilance.

In **Diablo II**, an item is not primarily a reward. It is an interruption. Something falls to the ground, gray or faintly colored, barely legible. Gloves, perhaps. The game does not rush to tell you what they are. It lets the object sit there, unresolved, carrying a low-grade tension that is not yet desired.

The name is the first distortion. Not “+12 percent attack speed gloves”. Instead, something like *Grim Touch*, *Fate Knuckle*, *Dread Grip*. The words evoke a direction, not a function. They gesture toward meaning without specifying it. This is crucial. A name that explains is already a collapse. A name that suggests keeps the system open.

Before identification, the item exists as a predictive blur. It is neither good nor bad. It does not yet enter optimization space. The player cannot compare, rank, or plan. The mind hovers. This hovering is the point.

Then the scroll is used. Identification does not resolve into coherence, it fractures expectation. The properties are often strange, partial, or orthogonal to what the name

implies. Faster hit recovery on gloves that sounded necromantic. Cold resistance where none was anticipated. Bonuses that do not align cleanly with the current build. The error is small, but it is real. The prediction was not confirmed, it was nudged sideways.

What matters is not the magnitude of the bonus. It is the direction of correction. Diablo II items rarely say “you were right”. They say “close, but not that”. This is a permissive error, one that does not demand immediate correction. The item can be worn, ignored, kept, or discarded later. Nothing forces a decision now.

Modern itemization tends to close this gap aggressively. Names encode function. Colors encode tiers. Tooltips explain intent. The moment an item drops, it is already solved. The player does not experience an event, they receive information. Optimization resumes instantly.

Diablo II delays that resumption. For a brief window, the item is neither utility nor waste. It is an unresolved signal. The gloves are not good gloves or bad gloves. They are gloves with a name that almost means something and stats that almost align. That “almost” is where affect appears.

This is why impossible combinations mattered. Gloves with properties that felt mismatched, excessive, or oddly placed. Not because they were powerful, but because they resisted narrative compression. They could not be immediately absorbed into a build story. They lingered as anomalies.

The design insight is simple and rarely reproduced. Ease does not come from getting what you want. It comes from something arriving that you did not fully predict and do not yet need to resolve. Diablo II understood this and built its loot system not as a reward pipeline, but as a sequence of gentle epistemic disruptions.

An item drops. It does not say what it is. Its name hints without committing. Its properties surprise without demanding action. For a moment, nothing is optimized. Something just happened.

In Normal mode, the system absorbs imprecision. Suboptimal skills, mismatched gear, and partial understanding are tolerated. The player can act without constantly explaining their actions to themselves. In Nightmare and Hell, this tolerance collapses. The game begins to demand foresight, planning, and correction. Decisions must be justified in advance, and mistakes are no longer local or recoverable. This shift closes the window in which ease can persist.

For many players, this is the point where engagement changes qualitatively. The game stops carrying experience forward on its own and begins asking the player to carry it instead. Some enjoy this shift and lean into optimization. Others disengage, not because the game is harder in a mechanical sense, but because the evaluative load has

crossed a threshold. The regime that allowed ease to emerge in normal difficulty no longer survives under sustained optimization pressure.

Why it felt it was better : diablo II (and other games of this era) low resolution helped, rather than hurt, ease entry

The core idea is simple, lowering resolution reduces evaluative pressure.

The low resolution helped because it **kept the game below an evaluative threshold**. At 800x600 or similar, the screen never became something to inspect in detail. Enemies were readable but not analyzable. Animations conveyed intent but not micro-information. Nothing invited you to pause mentally and ask whether what you were seeing was optimal, impressive, or flawed. The image gave you just enough to act, and then moved on.

This mattered because games are fundamentally about continuity. You click, you move, things happen, here loot drops, and the loop continues. Low resolution supported this by preventing the game from becoming an object of scrutiny. The world stayed slightly opaque. You were inside the flow of events rather than standing outside, judging the presentation.

A highly defined image invites scrutiny. The viewer starts to inspect details, compare elements, judge quality, notice flaws, and infer intention. High fidelity makes everything legible, and legibility naturally pulls the mind into supervision. The image becomes something to check rather than something to receive.

With lower resolution, parts of the image remain undefined. Edges blur, textures soften, motion becomes approximate. Because not everything is fully specified, the mind cannot verify it all. Gradually, it stops trying. Control loosens, not because the viewer gives up, but because there is nothing clear to control. The experience begins to unfold on its own, without constant internal commentary.

Low resolution also acts as a quiet brake on optimization. When information is partial, there is no ideal version to aim for. Nothing needs fixing. The image shifts from being an object to being a flow. This is why older cartoons or early music videos often feel more alive than their modern, ultra-polished counterparts. What matters is that something happens, not that it is rendered perfectly.

There is also a tolerance effect. Grain, blur, and small artifacts make inconsistencies acceptable. A strange cut, an exaggerated movement, or an odd lighting change passes without setting off alarms. In very clean images, the same irregularities stand out and demand explanation. When errors no longer call for repair, the experience stays open and light.

It is important to be clear about one thing. Lower resolution does not create ease by itself. Used deliberately as a visible style, it can even backfire. Once the viewer starts

thinking “this is it” evaluation returns under a different form. The effect works best when reduced fidelity is not highlighted, when it simply lowers the amount of information without asking to be noticed.

In that case, low resolution does not add anything. It removes pressure. And sometimes, removing pressure is enough for something that was never really gone to quietly come back.

Case study : Pokemon

Pokemon does prediction error at three stacked levels at once: perception, ontology, and action.

At the perceptual level, Pokémon are near-misses of animals. They trigger fast recognition circuits and then quietly break them. Wings that do not imply flight, mouths that do not imply biting, eyes that imply emotion rather than function. Your visual system keeps proposing hypotheses and none ever fully settle. This keeps perception slightly active instead of collapsing into background recognition.

At the ontological level, Pokémon are wrong explanations of nature. They look like animals but follow rules closer to abstract systems. Fire beats grass, grass beats water, electricity beats birds. None of this maps cleanly onto real-world causality, but it is consistent enough to learn. The result is a world that feels lawful without feeling natural. Catching a Pokémon forces you to name it before you understand it (on the first run). Naming normally signals compression, “this is it”. Here it happens way too early. You label an entity whose behavior and usefulness are relatively unknown. The name pretends the model is finished while the system keeps violating it.

Law without realism is a perfect generator of ongoing prediction error because learning never exhausts surprise. Pokémon’s world exploration is filled with moments that subvert player expectations to spark curiosity. You literally don’t know what creature will emerge, which keeps exploration suspenseful.

In Pokémon, entities resemble animals but obey abstract interaction rules rather than natural causality. Type relations are internally consistent yet ontologically arbitrary which prevents compression into intuitive world models. Some relations feel obvious (water vs fire), others feel wrong but stable (electric vs ground immunity, ghost vs normal). Because the system mixes intuitive and arbitrary relations, you cannot fully trust intuition nor fully discard it. As a result, learning improves action selection without exhausting uncertainty. The system remains lawful while resisting realism, sustaining ongoing, low-cost prediction error even after mastery. You are expected to remember many details (types, moves, locations), but you are never asked to explain why they work. Memory accumulates, theory does not. This asymmetry keeps cognition busy without collapsing uncertainty into a clean model.

Battles constantly inject small mismatches between expectation and outcome. Accuracy rolls, critical hits, secondary effects, speed ties, damage ranges. You expect roughly what will happen, not exactly what will happen. The game lives in that narrow band. Too predictable would kill engagement, too random would destroy learning. Pokemon sits precisely in between. As game designer Greg Lobanov notes, Pokémon's battle system is intentionally squishy with minor statistical variations (random damage ranges, accuracy checks) making each encounter unique.

What makes this durable is that the game never fully explains itself. Damage formulas are hidden. Capture odds are opaque. Friendship, happiness, and evolution triggers remain partially mysterious.

The game does not ask you to evaluate yourself. There is no performance graph, no optimization dashboard, no explicit grading of play as prediction error is allowed to appear and dissolve.

Even evolution, which looks like progression, is actually another prediction error machine. The creature you thought you understood changes category, proportions, abilities, sometimes temperament. You are rewarded, but also your mental model is broken.

This is why early entries like Pokémon Red and Blue feel so resilient and why the broader Pokémon still works despite saturation. The franchise is not powered by content volume or rewards. It is powered by systematic incompleteness.

Evolution levels, friendship values, capture probabilities, critical hit chances, shiny odds. The player senses gradients but never sees the thresholds. This creates a continuous state of "almost knowing". Pokemon is a world designed to never let your brain finish explaining what it is seeing, what it is doing, or why it just worked.

The preceding analyses show that the phenomena described are not confined to childhood or to specific cultural artifacts. Games, cartoons, and mediated environments matter here only insofar as they make visible a set of control conditions that are otherwise difficult to isolate in adult life. When these conditions are present, even briefly, ease can still appear.

When they are absent, no amount of content, intensity, or technical refinement restores it. The pattern that emerges across domains is therefore not one of preference or taste, but of control organization. What determines whether experience can unfold as an event is not what is encountered, but how quickly it is evaluated, explained, and closed. With this in view, the final sections return to the general question raised at the outset: not how to recover ease, but what it means to live in systems where the conditions for permissive experience have become structurally rare.

So are children always happy ?

In children, ease is present as a background regime rather than as a marked or exceptional state. It is not compared against a baseline, evaluated for quality, or commented on as an internal condition. Because it is not indexed or reflected upon, it does not appear as “happiness” in the reflective sense. There is no need to name it, measure it, or report it. It remains transparent, shaping experience without becoming an object of experience itself.

There is no narrative contrast. Ease is not experienced as a rise from a neutral or negative baseline. Because it does not emerge against an explicitly represented “before,” it is not registered as a change or an improvement. Nothing special happens. There is therefore nothing to highlight, remember, or even more unlikely, report.

Narrative contrast requires temporal segmentation: an earlier state that can be judged as lacking, and a later state that can be identified as better. In childhood, this segmentation is largely absent. Experience does not organize itself around comparison, progress, or correction. As a result, affective continuity remains unmarked.

Saying “I am happy” already presupposes such a comparison. It implies that something has shifted, that the present state differs from an alternative that could have been otherwise. The very formulation requires reflective distance and evaluative framing. When ease is simply the ground of experience rather than an event within it, this distance does not arise.

Meta-indexing requires a reflexive stance in which experience is lifted out of its flow and treated as something to be inspected. This stance installs distance between the subject and what is felt, converting background conditions into explicit mental items. In childhood, this operation was largely absent. Experience unfolds without being annotated or audited in real time. The absence of narrative contrast is therefore not a deficit of ease, but the condition that allows it to remain pervasive and unobtrusive.

Because ease is not indexed, it remains transparent. It shapes perception and engagement without being represented as a state that one has. The child’s relative immunity to such questioning is therefore not a lack of awareness, but the condition that allows ease to remain continuous and unobtrusive.

Repetition does not erode it, it trivializes it. In children, repeated experiences do not trigger analysis or comparison. They are not evaluated in terms of novelty, efficiency, or diminishing return. Repetition is neutral. It is not read as evidence that something has been exhausted, but as a basic property of how the world is organized.

In adults, repetition quickly becomes informative. It invites categorization, expectation, and assessment. Once something is recognized as repeating, it is measured against prior instances, and subtle differences are scrutinized. This shift introduces analysis, and analysis installs monitoring. What follows is wear, not

because the experience has lost its intrinsic capacity, but because it has become indexed and managed.

For children, repetition does not signal loss. It does not imply that something should feel less interesting or less alive. The same game, the same cartoon, or the same joke can be encountered again without being framed as “already known.” Because repetition is not treated as a diagnostic cue, it does not destabilize the background regime. Ease persists not despite repetition, but because repetition remains uninterpreted.

The language of happiness appears after the loss of obviousness. People begin to say “I am happy” when ease is no longer continuous, but intermittent, fragile, or dependent on conditions. The statement does not arise from abundance, but from contrast. It marks the recognition of a state that can appear and disappear.

When ease functions as the ground of experience, there is no need to name it. It does not stand out, invite reflection, or require confirmation. Language enters only when the background breaks. Once ease becomes an exception rather than the default, it becomes noticeable, and what is noticeable becomes describable.

The formulation “I am happy” therefore signals a shift in structure. It implies that the state is bounded, identifiable, and potentially lost. What was once implicit becomes explicit, what was once lived becomes reported. In this sense, speaking about happiness is not evidence of its presence, but of its conditionality.

So paradoxically, the stability and the relatively low contrast of ease prevent it from being felt as something exceptional.. What is stable does not call attention to itself. What does not fluctuate does not invite commentary.

The child therefore does not describe themselves as “extremely happy” not because the experience lacks depth or intensity, but because nothing in the structure of experience demands such a description. Language typically follows rupture, not continuity.

Exceptional states require exceptionality in structure. When ease is continuous, it remains below the threshold of declaration. It is lived rather than noted. The absence of superlatives reflects not a deficit of ease, but the absence of a reason to frame experience as noteworthy at all.

In that sense, feeling happy is already a sign that ease is no longer self-evident. The feeling has become salient enough to be noticed, identified, and distinguished from alternative states. What is felt as happiness is no longer the ground of experience, but something that appears against the possibility of its absence. The need to register it indicates that it has ceased to be obvious.

Children and Boredom


Boredom is still necessary to create contrast. Even in childhood, ease does not exist in a vacuum or as a continuous, undifferentiated state. Periods of low engagement, waiting, or mild restlessness punctuate experience and provide the contrast that allows ease to reappear. What differs is not the presence or absence of contrast, but the way contrast is generated and interpreted.

In children, boredom is not immediately framed as a problem to be solved or a failure of stimulation. It is a low-salience phase rather than a negative signal. Because it is not evaluated or optimized away, it does not accumulate pressure. When engagement resumes, ease follows without being marked as a gain or achievement. Contrast sharpens experience without turning it into an object of monitoring.

This boredom-ease loop provides contrast without narration. Boredom functions as a temporary lowering of salience, not as a negative condition that demands correction. It sharpens sensitivity by leaving experience relatively open, but it is not interpreted as failure, lack, or deficiency. Nothing is judged to be wrong.

When ease follows, it does so without being framed as a payoff or a success. It is not labeled as reward, improvement, or resolution. Because the transition is not narrativized, it does not install expectations about duration, intensity, or recurrence. The system does not learn that something has been “fixed,” only that engagement has resumed.

Each cycle leaves little trace. The absence of narration prevents consolidation, allowing the sequence to repeat without erosion or escalation. In adults, boredom quickly becomes a target of monitoring and correction. It is interpreted as a signal that something is wrong, missing, or inefficient. Once boredom is noticed in this way, it becomes an object of concern. The system begins to search for remedies, substitutions, or stimulation, and contrast is no longer neutral. It is loaded with urgency. What could have been a low-salience phase is transformed into pressure to act.



Boredom. Left: a low-load loop in which boredom and ease alternate without being framed as problems or outcomes. Boredom is not treated as an error signal, and ease is not labeled as reward or success. Transitions occur as shifts rather than resolutions. Because neither phase is over-interpreted, contrast remains neutral, cycles leave little trace, and repetition does not accumulate pressure or expectation.

Right: a monitored loop in which boredom is rapidly detected as a problem. Once identified, it triggers search, correction, or stimulation. Ease, when it appears, is implicitly framed as a resolution, installing expectations about duration and recurrence. This narrativization increases evaluative load, converts contrast into urgency, and alters the loop's dynamics by consolidating each cycle into memory rather than letting it dissipate.

This pressure alters what follows. When engagement returns, it is framed as a solution, a relief, or a reward for having escaped boredom. Ease, if it appears, is immediately marked as an event. It becomes noticeable, comparable, and vulnerable to evaluation. The very act of resolving boredom installs a narrative of lack and repair that destabilizes the permissive regime.

In children, boredom remains permissive. It is not treated as an error to be corrected or a problem to be solved. Because it is not targeted, it does not accumulate significance. It simply passes. This allows contrast to exist without narrative weight. When ease emerges, it does so without being framed as an outcome, preserving its background status rather than collapsing it into a discrete event.

Neither boredom nor ease is treated as a state to be monitored, interpreted, or managed. Each phase is lived as it arises, without being framed as a problem or a success.

As a result, the loop can repeat without erosion. Each cycle leaves minimal structural residue. There is no buildup of expectation, no pressure to reproduce a prior outcome, and no learning that would narrow future access. Boredom and ease alternate without accumulating cost, allowing the regime to remain stable over time.

The place of maturity

As we grow up evaluation becomes continuous, and experience is preemptively shaped to remain legible, controlled, and correctable. This shift is gradual and rarely noticed, because it coincides with improved reliability and behavioral consistency.

The capacity to function not only remains, it often improves. Performance becomes more stable, decisions more predictable, and errors less frequent. From the outside, this looks like progress. Internally, however, the background regime of ease disappears. Experience no longer has the latitude to unfold without being immediately interpreted or adjusted.

What is lost is not intensity or productivity, but permeability. Events no longer pass through the system without resistance. Affect is filtered, flattened, and bounded before it can propagate. The system remains efficient, but less open to being altered by what it encounters.

Because this state is socially rewarded, it is rarely questioned. Reduced emotional reactivity, controlled expression, and stable affect are interpreted as signs of seriousness, realism, or responsibility. The ability to remain unaffected is taken as evidence of competence and maturity rather than as a structural shift in how experience is regulated.

Within this reframing, emotional flatness is not seen as a loss. It is treated as progress, a necessary trade-off for reliability, efficiency, or social integration. The disappearance of ease is therefore masked by positive valuation. What is lost is not recognized as such, because it aligns with norms that reward predictability and self-control.

At the same time, adults often attempt to re-enter that state through leisure, nostalgia, or drugs. These approaches differ in form, but they share the same structural error. They focus on modifying inputs, changing activities, environments, or internal chemistry, while leaving the underlying control regime unchanged.

What is sought is the return of a familiar feeling, but what is manipulated is content rather than regulation. As a result, the system remains in a monitoring-first configuration. Any affective change that occurs is brief, fragile, and quickly indexed. The attempt to reproduce the state reinforces evaluation instead of suspending it.

Ease is not lost because the world has become less stimulating or less rich. It is lost because the monitoring system intervenes too early. Experience is closed before it can stabilize into a permissive regime. Without altering the timing and structure of regulation, changes in input can only produce transient fragments, not sustained ease.

Seen this way, the adult's incomprehension when observing a child absorbed in a basic cartoon is not a mark of sophistication. It does not reflect superior taste, deeper understanding, or higher standards. It reflects a monitoring system that no longer permits experience to remain unstructured for long.

The adult evaluates the stimulus in terms of simplicity, repetition, or lack of content, and concludes that little of value is occurring. What is overlooked is not the stimulus, but the regime under which it is being received. The child's system allows the experience to unfold without immediate correction or commentary.

The difficulty lies not in appreciating the cartoon, but in tolerating the absence of evaluative anchors. What appears trivial from the outside is inaccessible from within a rigid monitoring regime. The incomprehension therefore signals a loss of flexibility in control, not an increase in discernment.

We are conditioned to assume that whatever appears must have a function. If something feels good, it must reinforce a behavior, improve survival, or increase performance. Pleasure, in this view, is never allowed to be idle. It is always instrumental, either a signal, a reward, or a motivator. Modern psychology, neuroscience, economics, and common sense are built around this assumption. An experience that does nothing is treated as suspicious, incomplete, or misinterpreted.

Ease, as it appears here and as it is observed in children, violates this assumption at a deep level. It does not push behavior forward. It does not consolidate learning. It does not clearly reinforce anything that can be repeated. Instead of accelerating a trajectory, it suspends it. Time does not feel invested or spent. There is no sense of it leading somewhere.

This is precisely why it can be hard to tolerate intellectually. The moment we try to give ease a role, even a flattering one, recovery, motivation, emotional regulation, we pull it out of its native regime. We turn it into something that must justify itself. It stops being something that happens and becomes something we are trying to make happen. At that point, ease collapses. What remains may still be pleasant, calming, or satisfying, but it is no longer ease.

There is something almost insulting about this to the modern adult mind. We carry an elaborate cognitive apparatus, predictive models, long-term planning, meta-evaluation, self-monitoring, all supposedly in the service of richer experience. And yet the experience that feels the most full, the most alive, turns out to be the one that cannot be stored, reused, optimized, or justified. It does not accumulate. It cannot

be banked. It leaves no trace the system can reliably exploit later. From the standpoint of optimization, it looks less like an achievement than like a bug.

It is tempting to assume that ease must be secretly doing some work, repairing something, restoring energy, rebalancing the system, or compensating for stress. But that impulse is itself revealing. It shows how uneasy we are with the idea of a phenomenon that is both fully real and fundamentally useless. If ease were there to fix a deficit, its rarity would make sense. If it were a reward for correct behavior, its disappearance under scrutiny would be strange. But if ease is simply the temporary signature of a system that has stopped trying to correct itself, then its behavior is no longer mysterious.

In that light, ease is not there to fix anything, because nothing is missing when it appears. It is not a reward for having done something right, since no criteria are being applied, and it is not a promise of a better future, because the future is briefly irrelevant. Ease marks a pause in correction, a suspension of the continuous effort to improve, adjust, explain, or steer experience. For a short time, the system is not oriented toward becoming something else. It is already where it needs to be.

That may be the most disturbing implication. If ease is useless, then it cannot be recruited into an ethical program, a productivity framework, or a theory of progress. It does not tell us how to live. It does not scale. It does not accumulate into wisdom. It simply shows that there exists, within human experience, a mode of being that is fully lived and yet does not contribute to any larger project. A mode that matters while it is there, and then leaves nothing behind.

From an instrumental perspective, that looks like waste. From another angle, it may be the only moment when experience is not subordinated to a goal. Not because it rebels against goals, but because, briefly, there is no need for one.

Ethical Considerations: Why Ease Should Not Be Taught to Children

A central implication of the ease model is that its ethical status depends strongly on the developmental state of the subject. Interventions, explanations, or techniques that may be appropriate or even necessary for teenagers or adults become ethically problematic when applied to children under, let's say, 10. Teaching ease to a child introduces a problem that did not yet exist.

Why the asymmetry exists

The core reason is simple: most children do not lack ease. They have not yet lost access to the permissive, non-evaluative regime that the model attempts to recover in adulthood. In early development, ease is not experienced as a rare, fragile, or special state. It is intermittent, unremarkable, and quickly abandoned without reflection. The

child does not ask how to obtain it, how to maintain it, or why it disappears. As such, there is no problem to solve.

Teaching a child about ease does not add a useful capacity. Instead, it introduces a meta-representation: the idea that this mode of experience is an identifiable object, something that can be named, recognized, tracked, and potentially lost. Once this categorization exists, the possibility of absence becomes salient. The child acquires, prematurely, the conceptual conditions for disappointment, comparison, and maintenance.

Importantly, the ethical concern is not that explaining ease would immediately eliminate ease. The harm is subtler and delayed. By stabilizing the concept, one accelerates the transition toward an evaluative stance that would otherwise emerge much later through social pressure, schooling, performance metrics, and explicit optimization. In effect, the intervention shortens the natural window during which ease remains non-instrumental.

This asymmetry leads to a strong ethical distinction between adults and children. For adults, the model functions as a restorative tool. It offers a way to reopen access to a regime that has already been structurally blocked by accumulated evaluation and optimization. Withholding such information from adults would be ethically questionable, as it preserves an avoidable loss.

For children, the same information functions as an unnecessary perturbation. It creates a problem where none yet exists. In this sense, teaching ease to a child resembles teaching recovery techniques for an injury that has not occurred: the instruction itself introduces vigilance, monitoring, and concern.

The ethically coherent position, within this framework, is therefore negative rather than positive. One should not teach children how to access ease. One should instead protect the environmental conditions that allow it to arise spontaneously. These conditions include unstructured time, absence of performance metrics, minimal evaluative commentary, and limited instrumentalization of play.

This principle can be stated succinctly: tools for recovering an experiential regime should not be introduced before that regime is structurally lost. Knowledge that is therapeutic after loss can be toxic before it.

Educational consequence

The broader implication is that the ethical role of the model is not educational in childhood, but preservative. Its value lies in informing adults, caregivers, and institutions about what not to interfere with, rather than what to actively install.

From an educational perspective, this has a direct and concrete consequence. Preserving access to ease requires protecting extended periods of unsupervised, non-instrumental play. This does not merely mean free time within a structured schedule, but entire days without officially programmed activities, external appointments, or goal-directed enrichment.

Unsupervised play is not valuable because it teaches specific skills. Its value lies precisely in the absence of supervision, evaluation, and trajectory. When no adult is watching, correcting, optimizing, or interpreting behavior, play can remain causally opaque, purposeless, and disposable. These conditions are unusually fragile and are easily destroyed by even well-intentioned structuring.

This is not a moral critique of parenting, but a mechanistic implication of the model.

Over-scheduling children with educational, social, or recreational appointments fragments time into monitored segments. Even when activities are enjoyable, the mere presence of a schedule introduces anticipation, comparison, and completion dynamics. This gradually trains the child to experience time as something to be managed rather than inhabited.

Within this framework, days without planned activities are not a luxury or a regression. They are a protective measure. They preserve a mode of experience that cannot be taught, only lost. The ethical responsibility of education is therefore not to maximize stimulation or opportunity, but to preserve sufficient temporal and experiential slack for ease to remain non-instrumental.

This implies a measurable developmental shift: early exposure to continuous metrics and evaluative framing should accelerate the stabilization of monitoring-like dynamics during free play. Conversely, children raised with extended metric-free time should retain greater flexibility of entry into permissive states, and show a delayed consolidation of monitoring as a default stance

This position directly challenges current educational norms. Contemporary models of childhood increasingly treat time as a resource to be optimized, filled, and supervised. Empty days are often perceived as neglect, wasted potential, or lack of stimulation. From the perspective of the ease model, the opposite is true: systematically filled schedules accelerate the transition toward evaluative monitoring and prematurely erode access to non-instrumental ease.

The challenge is not marginal. It questions enrichment-oriented parenting, hyper-structured extracurricular calendars, and the assumption that developmental value scales monotonically with activity density. In this sense, the model is not merely

descriptive but oppositional: it implies that some widely praised educational practices may be causally incompatible with the preservation of ease.

Footnote :

Concerns about unsupervised play are often framed in terms of physical safety or social risk. The present argument does not deny the legitimacy of basic safety constraints. Rather, it distinguishes between safety and supervision. An environment can be physically safe while remaining experientially unsupervised. The ethical claim here is narrow: minimizing evaluative oversight and instrumental framing is critical for preserving non-instrumental joy. This is not a moral defense of neglect, but a functional distinction between protection from harm and continuous monitoring of activity.

What is suspension of optimisation (Soo)

Background

If positive affect were a signal of successful optimization, it should strengthen under monitoring. Empirically, it does not. Under monitoring, positive affect weakens, fragments, or vanishes.

To understand why monitoring disrupts rather than stabilizes positive affect, it is useful to situate the problem within a general framework of adaptive control. A natural place to examine this discrepancy is the Free Energy Principle (FEP), which offers a unified account of perception, learning, and action in adaptive systems.

The FEP treats biological organisms as self-maintaining systems that resist disorganization over time. In this view, an organism persists by remaining within a bounded region of viable states, avoiding trajectories that would lead to collapse. This is not framed as a moral or psychological preference, but as a structural property of adaptive systems operating under uncertainty.


Formally, the principle states that such systems minimize long-term surprise, where surprise refers to the improbability of their sensory states under their generative model. Because true surprise cannot be computed directly, biological systems instead minimize an upper bound on surprise known as variational free energy. This quantity links perception, learning, and action within a single formalism.

Perception reduces free energy by updating internal beliefs to better explain incoming sensory signals. Action reduces free energy by changing sensory inputs to better match predictions. Learning reduces free energy over longer timescales by refining the structure of the model itself. In this way, inference, behavior, and adaptation are not

separate processes, but different expressions of the same imperative: maintaining coherence and viability in the face of uncertainty..

This is achieved through the construction of predictive models that continuously generate expectations about incoming sensory input. When these expectations are violated, prediction errors arise and are used to update the model. In parallel, actions are selected based on their expected capacity to reduce future prediction error by shaping the sensory stream itself.

Within this framework, perception corresponds to model updating, learning corresponds to longer-term changes in model structure, and action corresponds to sampling the world in ways that confirm predictions. These processes are not treated as distinct faculties, but as complementary strategies for the same objective: maintaining stability under uncertainty.



Adaptive Stability. Perception, learning, and action are not separate faculties but different ways the same system reduces uncertainty. Perception updates the current model, learning reshapes the model over longer timescales, and action samples the world to make predictions come true, together maintaining stability in an uncertain environment.

The Free Energy Principle provides a unified account of adaptation, self-organization, and behavioral coherence across scales. Its ambition is to link neural dynamics, behavior, and environmental interaction within a single explanatory framework,

describing how systems remain viable by continuously regulating their relation to an uncertain world.

At the same time, the Free Energy Principle is largely agnostic with respect to phenomenology. It specifies how systems maintain stability and reduce surprise, but it does not specify how these control processes are experienced from the inside. In particular, it offers no direct account of why some internal states are positively valenced rather than neutral or aversive.

This matters here because the properties of positive affect are not well predicted by inference success alone. Positive affect is episodic. It tends to collapse under monitoring. It is unevenly distributed across development. The FEP can describe increasingly efficient inference and increasingly coherent behavior, but it does not, by itself, predict why positivity is often transient, why it disappears when evaluated, or why it is more accessible in childhood than in adulthood. These features point to properties of control organization, not merely to the accuracy of inference.

Most accounts assume that affective valence tracks successful inference or optimized control. In these views, positive affect reflects error reduction, goal attainment, or efficient performance, functioning as a signal that the system is doing well. Valence is treated as an outcome marker, tightly coupled to improvement, correctness, or utility.

The Soo framework departs from this assumption. It proposes that some positive states do not arise from intensified optimization, but from its temporary suspension. Positive affect, in this sense, is not a signal of success or progress. It is a byproduct of operating under a permissive control regime, where experience is allowed to unfold without continuous correction.

Whereas outcome signals reflect the consequences of action, control regimes determine how action is generated, constrained, and regulated in the first place. Outcome signals operate after the fact, marking success or failure relative to a reference. Control regimes operate upstream, shaping which actions are possible, how much variability is tolerated, and how quickly correction is engaged.

Many affective theories blur this distinction by treating emotion as a scalar success signal, directly indexing performance or optimization. In doing so, they conflate what happened with how the system was organized when it happened. The Soo framework maintains this separation, locating certain forms of positive affect not in outcomes or rewards, but in the temporary organization of control itself.

The Soo framework treats positive affect as a state of control organization rather than as an outcome signal. Positive states are not read as indicators of success, reward, or error reduction, but as signatures of how control is temporarily configured. What

matters is not what has been achieved, but how regulation is operating at that moment.

Certain positive states correspond to metastable regimes, that is, fragile configurations in which monitoring and optimization pressure are temporarily reduced rather than removed. These regimes are stable enough to sustain coherent experience, yet fragile in the sense that they can be disrupted by premature evaluation or corrective intervention. Monitoring remains structurally present, but no longer functions as an action-selecting process. Instead, it operates as a background condition of stability, allowing behavior to unfold before evaluative control is re-engaged.

Within these regimes, behavior remains coherent and responsive, but it is no longer governed by continuous evaluation, comparison, or correction. Evaluation is not constitutive of action, but merely available in the background. Control persists not as an active supervisory loop, but as a latent constraint that intervenes only when coherence itself is at risk.

This configuration exemplifies metastability as a general principle of biological organization: systems occupy states that are sufficiently stable to support ongoing activity, yet not so rigid that alternative configurations become inaccessible. The regime persists not because control is eliminated, but because it is not solicited. The ongoing possibility of control re-entry is precisely what distinguishes metastability from genuine stability.

Because regulation is loosened, action can unfold with continuity. Transitions are tolerated, imprecision is not immediately corrected, and moment-to-moment adjustments are deferred. The system remains engaged with its environment, but without the pressure to justify or optimize each step.

Such regimes are essential across neural, motor, and cognitive domains. They support sustained patterns of activity without requiring constant correction, while preserving sensitivity to perturbation. A metastable system can absorb variability, tolerate imprecision, and adapt without losing continuity. This balance between stability and flexibility is what allows biological systems to function reliably in uncertain and changing environments.


In effect, the Soo framework extends the notion of metastability to affective organization. During these states, control is not abolished, but softened. Monitoring remains available but does not dominate moment-to-moment regulation. Optimization is deferred rather than intensified.

Positive affect, in this view, reflects entry into a metastable control regime in which experience can unfold without being immediately corrected or evaluated. The system remains coherent and responsive, but less tightly constrained. This temporary relaxation allows affective continuity to emerge without committing the system to a fixed state, preserving both openness and viability.

Within predictive control frameworks, precision modulation plays a central role in determining how prediction errors influence system behavior. Precision specifies which errors are treated as informative, how strongly they are weighted relative to prior expectations, and how rapidly internal models are updated in response. Functionally, precision acts as a gain control on error signals, regulating their impact across hierarchical levels.

By adjusting this gain, precision shapes attention, salience, and learning rates. Errors assigned high precision dominate processing, draw attention, and trigger rapid correction or model revision. Errors assigned low precision are tolerated, discounted, or allowed to pass without immediate consequence. In this way, precision governs not only what is learned, but when learning occurs and at what cost to ongoing activity.”

High precision enforces tight coupling between expectation and correction. Deviations are quickly detected and acted upon, leading to precise, efficient, but rigid control. Lower precision permits greater tolerance of deviation, noise, and ambiguity. This tolerance allows experience to unfold without constant interruption, supporting continuity and exploratory flexibility. The balance between these regimes determines whether a system prioritizes control and correction or openness and persistence.



Precision. Precision acts as a gain control on prediction error, scaling the impact of deviations before they influence attention, learning rate, and corrective action. When precision is high, small errors dominate processing, trigger rapid correction, and enforce tight coupling between expectation and control, yielding efficient but rigid behavior. When precision is low, deviations are tolerated, corrections are delayed or

absent, and activity can continue with greater variability, supporting persistence and exploratory flexibility.

The Soo perspective emphasizes a transient, global softening of precision assignment, particularly at higher hierarchical levels of control. In this configuration, prediction error signals remain intact and informative, but their capacity to drive immediate correction or reorganization is reduced. Errors are registered without being granted decisive control authority.

This redistribution of precision alters how monitoring operates. Self-monitoring becomes less intrusive, evaluative pressure is relaxed, and the system no longer treats every deviation as a demand for intervention. Importantly, this does not entail a breakdown of inference or a loss of coherence. Models remain active, and behavior remains organized.

What changes is the urgency of correction. Deviations are no longer treated as matters requiring immediate resolution. By delaying or attenuating the impact of error signals, the system suspends the demand for rapid adjustment without suppressing sensitivity altogether. Errors are detected, but they do not automatically trigger intervention.

This shift allows experience to unfold with greater continuity. Transitions are not prematurely interrupted, and momentary imprecision is tolerated rather than corrected in real time. The system remains engaged and responsive, but it is no longer organized around constant discrepancy reduction.

As a result, absorption becomes possible. Attention can remain with what is occurring rather than being repeatedly redirected toward evaluation or repair. Experiential openness emerges not from a loss of structure, but from a redistribution of control pressure. Inferential coherence is preserved, yet the system operates in a mode that permits permissive affective regimes to arise and persist.

Children characteristically display high exploratory drive, weak cost-benefit monitoring, and flexible action selection. Their behavior is not tightly governed by anticipatory evaluation or by the expectation of consequences. Actions are tried, abandoned, or repeated without requiring justification, and deviation is tolerated rather than immediately corrected. This configuration supports exploration, continuity, and openness to unfolding experience.

In contrast, adults increasingly exhibit policy rigidity, anticipatory self-evaluation, and heightened sensitivity to performance consequences. Action selection becomes constrained by learned expectations about efficiency, appropriateness, and outcome. Monitoring shifts upstream, intervening earlier in the decision process. Rather than reacting to failure, the system begins to preempt it, narrowing the range of admissible trajectories before they are enacted.

The Soo framework reframes this developmental transition not as a loss of hedonic or emotional capacity, but as a shift in dominant control regimes. As predictive structure accumulates, models become more precise and expectations more entrenched. Optimization pressure intensifies, and monitoring becomes faster and more persistent. Relaxed control states remain possible in principle, but they become harder to access because intervention occurs too early for permissive regimes to stabilize.

Positive affect therefore becomes rarer with age not because reward signals weaken or pleasure mechanisms degrade, but because control consolidates. Experience is increasingly organized around evaluation and correction, leaving fewer opportunities for transient suspensions of optimization. The change is structural rather than motivational, reflecting how learning reshapes the timing and strength of control rather than the capacity for affect itself.

As cognitive systems acquire the capacity to model their own activity, self-monitoring and reflexive control become increasingly central to performance optimization. The system does not merely act, it tracks how it acts, under what conditions, and with what consequences. By deepening the self-model, organisms gain the ability to anticipate errors before they occur, compare alternative strategies, and regulate behavior in advance rather than in response.

This reflexivity increases efficiency and reliability. Actions become more consistent, deviations are corrected earlier, and long-term outcomes are stabilized. Control shifts from reactive adjustment to anticipatory regulation, reducing variance and improving predictability across contexts. From an adaptive standpoint, this constitutes genuine progress.

At the same time, this gain comes with a structural cost. As self-monitoring becomes pervasive, the range of admissible internal dynamics narrows. States that are difficult to evaluate or justify are increasingly excluded. Experience is shaped to remain legible to the self-model and trajectories that cannot be easily monitored or corrected are preemptively closed. Reflexive control therefore enhances long-term stability while constraining the system's capacity to tolerate ambiguity, looseness, and unstructured unfolding.

The Soo framework draws a specific consequence from this trade-off. Continuous reflexive optimization is incompatible with certain forms of positive affect. When self-monitoring is permanently engaged, experience is organized around anticipation, comparison, and correction, leaving little room for states that require unstructured continuity.

Such positive states depend on a temporary opacity in the self-model. This opacity does not imply confusion or loss of competence, but a suspension of reflexive access to ongoing experience..

Within this interval, experience is allowed to unfold without being immediately referenced back to the self-model for assessment. This temporary withdrawal of reflexivity creates the conditions under which permissive affective regimes can arise, regimes that cannot be sustained when experience is continuously rendered legible, comparable, and optimizable.

Soo examines how experience is structured by the momentary configuration of monitoring, evaluation, and regulation. Reward theories describe how past consequences bias future action selection. Soo instead describes how the system is operating while action and perception are unfolding.

From this perspective, phenomenological states are not downstream effects of success or failure but direct expressions of how control is currently arranged. Transient shifts in monitoring intensity, timing, or scope are sufficient to produce qualitatively different modes of experience.

Over longer timescales, adaptive systems do not merely accumulate knowledge, they accumulate constraints. As predictive structure deepens, uncertainty is reduced, expectations harden, and viable policies are increasingly pruned. What remains is a narrower set of admissible trajectories that are efficient, reliable, and evaluable. As this pruning progresses, the space of accessible control regimes contracts. States that depend on looseness, tolerance, or delayed evaluation become structurally less reachable, not because they are disfavored, but because the system intervenes too early for them to form.

The Soo framework treats this accumulation as a background factor shaping affective flexibility. The gradual buildup of predictive structure does not target affect directly, but it alters the conditions under which different affective regimes can occur. As control regimes become increasingly consolidated, monitoring intervenes earlier and more reliably, leaving fewer opportunities for relaxed or permissive configurations to stabilize.

Transitions into loosely constrained, metastable states therefore become less probable. These states are not eliminated, but they require precise timing and sufficient tolerance of deviation to emerge. As consolidation progresses, that tolerance shrinks. The system closes trajectories before they can settle into self-sustaining regimes, even in the absence of overt evaluation or effort.

Without invoking pathology or decline, this perspective anticipates systematic changes in affective availability over time. Positive affect becomes less frequent not because capacity is lost, but because access conditions tighten. This reframing sets the stage for a later discussion of aging and long-term constraint, where cumulative control structure increasingly shapes what kinds of experience remain viable.

Taken together, this framework suggests that large-scale affective flattening need not be traced primarily to changes in external conditions. If access to certain affective

regimes is constrained by the gradual consolidation of control itself, then similar experiential outcomes can emerge across highly different environments. External stressors may amplify or reveal the effect, but they are not required to produce it. What appears as a cultural or economic problem may therefore reflect a deeper, system-level shift in affective accessibility.

Emotional flatness is not about politics

If affective availability is structurally constrained, external conditions cannot be primary drivers.

Contemporary explanations for widespread emotional exhaustion, emptiness, and flattening overwhelmingly focus on external conditions: economics, politics, culture, work, lifestyle, or mindset. While each factor can modulate experience locally, none explains why similar patterns appear across societies with divergent material conditions, values, and institutions. The persistence of the phenomenon despite changes in environment suggests a structural limitation rather than a situational failure. Explanations that rely solely on external stressors mistake amplification for cause and leave the core mechanism untouched.

I argue that the failure of these explanations is diagnostic. The problem is not situational or moral, but structural. It lies in how cognitive systems learn, stabilize, and progressively close off certain forms of experience. Any solution that relies on effort, discipline, belief, or optimization presupposes capacities that the affected system no longer has access to. Such solutions may work locally or temporarily, but they cannot generalize. The Soo framework therefore treats affective collapse as a system-level limitation, not as a failure of individuals, values, or social arrangements.

If economic deprivation were the primary driver, sustained improvements in material conditions would be expected to reliably restore rich and durable positive experience, not merely reduce distress or prevent decline. While increases in income, security, and access to resources can alleviate suffering and lower rates of depression, they do not consistently reinstate forms of spontaneous, vivid positive affect. In many cases, emotional flattening persists even after material stability has been achieved, suggesting that deprivation explains vulnerability but not the phenomenon itself.

If political structure were the dominant determinant, societies with markedly different systems of governance would be expected to show correspondingly different affective profiles. Yet comparable patterns of emotional exhaustion, disengagement, and affective flattening are observed across liberal democracies, authoritarian regimes, welfare states, and market-driven economies alike. Variations in political organization modulate stressors and protections, but they do not appear to preserve or restore access to durable positive experience.

Similarly, if the problem were fundamentally cultural or philosophical, the adoption of a suitable worldview, value system, or narrative framework should reliably reverse it. In practice, no belief system, ethical orientation, or meaning-providing narrative has demonstrated consistent or lasting efficacy in restoring positive affect once it has become structurally inaccessible. Cultural explanations may account for how the experience is interpreted or justified, but they do not alter its underlying availability. The persistence of emotional flattening across improvements in material conditions, political arrangements, and cultural frameworks points away from external causes and toward an internal, structural constraint shaping how experience itself is regulated.

A genuine solution must not require individuals to become better, wiser, more motivated, or more internally coherent in order to regain access to positive experience. If affective collapse is real and structural, then the very capacities such solutions appeal to are already constrained. Requiring effort, discipline, insight, or self-regulation presupposes a level of functional availability that the affected system may no longer possess. In this sense, such proposals do not fail accidentally; they fail by design, because they rely on mechanisms that are downstream of the problem rather than upstream of it.

If affective collapse reflects a limitation in how cognitive systems learn, stabilize, and regulate experience, then its resolution cannot be contingent on individual virtue or performance. Any approach that works only when an agent can sustain motivation, apply strategies correctly, or maintain long-term compliance merely filters for a subset of individuals whose systems remain partially open. It does not generalize, and therefore cannot qualify as a solution to a universal phenomenon.

Against this backdrop, a universality criterion is introduced. A genuine intervention must remain effective even for agents who cannot perform, optimize, comply, or self-regulate in a sustained manner. If an intervention ceases to work when effort, discipline, or strategic control are removed, it does not alter the underlying constraint. It simply selects for those still capable of compensating for it. This criterion shifts the problem away from productivity, merit, and adherence, and toward system-level limits that apply uniformly, independent of cognitive capacity, personal resources, or agency.

When Positive Affect Decouples from Context

Change the environment, the common assumption goes, and happiness will follow. Alter circumstances, improve conditions, remove stressors, and positive experience should naturally emerge. Modern neuroscience, however, quietly undermines this narrative. Clinical reports from neurosurgical interventions and therapeutic brain stimulation document abrupt shifts in affect that occur without any corresponding change in external conditions.

Patients report sudden well-being, relief, or even euphoria while remaining confined to a hospital bed, physically immobilized, socially restricted, and disconnected from achievement, purpose, or narrative progress.

In these cases, nothing meaningful has changed in the person's life situation. There is no success, no resolution of conflict, no fulfillment of goals, and often no coherent explanation offered by the patient themselves. The affective shift occurs in the absence of improvement, insight, or belief. This dissociation is critical. It shows that positive affect does not require meaning, coherence, narrative alignment, or favorable circumstances in order to arise.

The importance of these findings is therefore not that happiness can be artificially produced, nor that neural manipulation offers a solution. The effects are typically transient, context-bound, and unreliable once stimulation ends. Their value is diagnostic rather than prescriptive. They demonstrate, with unusual clarity, what positive affect does not depend on. It does not require achievement, justification, worldview, or interpretive framing. By isolating affect from narrative and context, these observations expose a structural independence that challenges environment-centered and meaning-centered explanations alike.

These findings do not constitute an endorsement of neural manipulation as a solution. The reported effects on positive affect are typically brief, tightly coupled to the period of stimulation, and disappear once the intervention stops. There is no evidence that such effects persist, generalize, or reorganize experience in a stable way. As a result, they offer no viable path toward sustaining positive affect over time.

Their significance is therefore diagnostic rather than prescriptive. They do not tell us how to produce or maintain positive experience. Instead, they clarify what positive affect does not require. By showing that shifts in affect can occur in the absence of meaning, achievement, belief, or narrative change, they isolate affect from the conditions it is often assumed to depend on. What remains is not a technique, but a constraint: positive affect is governed by internal organizational states rather than by external justification or intentional construction.

Non-instrumental, permissive regime

Soo establishes a permissive condition. It does not produce an experience, trigger an outcome, or guarantee a result. It functions more like an open door than a mechanism: it makes certain events possible without compelling them to occur. The critical point is that permissiveness is not itself an action. The moment a positive experience is expected, anticipated, or awaited, the system re-enters a production-oriented mode. Expectation installs a reference, and reference reinstates optimization. The permissive condition collapses not because anything went wrong, but because the system has returned to managing outcomes.

Within this framework, Ease is best described as a contingent affective event rather than an instrumental output. It does not function as a means toward something else, nor does it justify itself through consequences. It is non-instrumental in a strict sense: it has no purpose beyond occurring. For this reason, it cannot be reliably reproduced on demand, even in contexts that previously accompanied its emergence. The

recurrence of external conditions does not imply recurrence of the event, because the decisive variable lies in the organization of control, not in the inputs.

Ease may emerge during periods of suspended optimization, but such emergence is neither guaranteed nor required for the permissive state to remain valid. Suspension is not a technique for producing affect. It is a relaxation of constraints that allows experience to unfold without being steered toward a target. Sometimes nothing happens. This absence is not a failure of the condition, because the condition was never oriented toward production in the first place.

This is also why appeals to “letting go” are structurally misleading. In practice, letting go is often treated as something one does, an instruction, a strategy, or a stance to adopt. Framed this way, it becomes another form of management. The system is now tasked with not intervening, which is still an intervention. Monitoring shifts from controlling experience to controlling non-control. Optimization is not removed, it is redirected.

Often, attempting to relax produces exactly the opposite effect. This is a simple mechanism.

The False Obviousness of Calm

What follows is not a step forward, but a sideways movement. It does not aim to clarify or conclude anything. It is included here as a temporary easing of the book’s progression, a moment where nothing new is required before continuing.

Calm is often described as a neutral baseline, something natural, effortless, and always available beneath the noise. In theory, it is portrayed as the absence of disturbance and as a state you can simply return to. In practice, however, seeking calm is an action, and like any action, it introduces intention, direction, and comparison. The moment you try to be calm, the system infers that the current state is incorrect or insufficient. Something must be adjusted, fixed.

At that point, calm stops being a background condition and becomes an objective. An objective immediately creates an implicit before and after. There is the state you are in and the calmer state you are trying to reach. The system starts checking whether the attempt is working, whether tension is decreasing, whether calm is approaching. Each of those checks reinforces evaluative control. Instead of dissolving regulation, the attempt to be calm activates it.

This is why efforts framed as “relaxing,” “letting go,” or “settling down” often backfire in precisely the situations where calm is most desired. The problem is not agitation. The problem is the signal that agitation should not be there.

True calm, when it appears, does not arrive as a result. It emerges when nothing is being corrected. As soon as calm is pursued, it is displaced. Calm cannot coexist with

the act of trying to be calm, because the trying is already evidence that calm has been turned into a target rather than a condition.

What destabilizes the situation is not agitation itself. The destabilizing factor is the implicit message that what is currently present is unacceptable. The moment the system interprets the present state as something that should not be there, an error has been declared. Forcing calm is not neutral, it is a correction signal. And any system that receives a correction signal automatically shifts into a regulatory mode.

This remains true even when the instruction is framed softly. Words like “relax,” “let go,” or “just calm down” still contain a target. They imply a comparison between what is and what should be. They also introduce continuous evaluation, a silent monitoring loop that repeatedly asks whether the desired state is being reached. That loop is precisely what the phase in question cannot tolerate. Calm cannot coexist with active supervision of calm.

Each attempt at relaxation therefore adds structure rather than removing it. An extra layer of observation is introduced, watching the body or the mind. An extra layer of control appears, attempting to steer sensations in a preferred direction. An extra layer of judgment follows, classifying the outcome as success or failure. None of these layers are dramatic, but together they thicken the system’s involvement.

This is why effort often amplifies the very state it tries to eliminate. The increase in tension does not happen despite the attempt to relax, it happens because of it. The system is doing exactly what it is designed to do when an error is detected: monitor more closely, intervene more actively, and tighten control.

Breathing exercises, progressive muscle release, visualization, and instructions like “letting go” are often presented as gentle, almost passive techniques. Yet structurally, they remain interventions. Each of them presupposes that the current state requires modification. They introduce a sequence to follow, and in doing so they mark the present condition as something that should be altered. However soft the language, the system still receives the same message: an adjustment is needed.

Even minimal guidance recruits monitoring and control, because the instructions must be followed, checked, and evaluated. Breathing must be watched, relaxation must be confirmed, visualization must be maintained. Each of these actions keeps the system engaged in regulation rather than allowing experience to unfold on its own.

What works here is not calming down, relaxing, or settling in the usual sense. It is not attempting to modify the state in any direction. This does not mean deliberately increasing agitation or doing the opposite. It means withdrawing from intervention altogether. The system is left without a corrective agenda. Sensations are allowed to be present without being managed.

In that condition, agitation may dissipate, transform, or persist. None of these outcomes is a problem. The critical shift is that the system is no longer treating the state as an error to be fixed. Without that error signal, regulatory loops lose their grip. What happens next is not produced by effort, and cannot be guaranteed, but it becomes possible precisely because nothing is being done to force it.

When no target is set, evaluation naturally ceases. There is nothing to measure against, nothing to reach, nothing to verify. Without a target, the system has no reason to compare the present state to an imagined alternative. The evaluative loop, which normally tracks progress and detects deviation, simply has nothing to operate on. In the absence of evaluation, regulation loses its object. Control mechanisms do not disengage because they are suppressed, they disengage because there is nothing left to correct.


In this condition, calm cannot be produced on demand, but it can emerge. If it appears, it does so without being required, justified, or maintained. It arrives as a side effect of non intervention rather than as an outcome of effort. Because it was not demanded, it does not need to be protected. Because it was not evaluated, it does not trigger monitoring. This is why calm that emerges in this way does not rebound into tension. There is no counterforce, no corrective oscillation, because no directive was ever issued.

This is the only context in which calm can remain stable without immediately collapsing into self observation. When calm appears without being asked for, it does not announce itself, and the system has no reason to interfere with it.

Forcing calm worsens the situation because relaxation is not the absence of action, it is an action in itself. The moment relaxation is attempted, a goal is implicitly defined: to become calmer than one is now. Every goal introduces direction, and direction immediately recruits control. Control requires monitoring, comparison, and correction, all of which keep the system active. What is often mistaken for a path toward calm is in fact a mechanism that sustains activation by continuously checking whether the desired state has been reached.

This is why deliberate relaxation so often produces paradoxical effects. The system is instructed to change while simultaneously being asked to observe that change. Attention is turned inward, sensations are tracked, progress is assessed. Even when the process feels gentle, the underlying structure remains one of intervention. Calm becomes something to acquire, something to generate, something to maintain. As soon as calm is framed this way, its absence is treated as a failure, and failure strengthens regulatory effort rather than dissolving it.

This recurring failure suggests that the problem does not lie in the choice of technique, but in the structure shared by all techniques that target calm directly. As long as calm is treated as an outcome to be produced, the system remains engaged in regulation, regardless of how subtle or well-intentioned the intervention appears.



Paradoxical loop. Attempts to produce calm require inward attention and state evaluation. Evaluation converts calm into a monitored outcome, which sustains regulatory effort regardless of success or failure. As a result, control never disengages.

True suspension does not consist in deciding to let go. It consists in the absence of a requirement to intervene at all. When it is not treated as anything, it ceases to function as a concept. What remains is not a technique, but a gap in which control is not actively exercised. Ease, if it occurs, does so within that gap, without being summoned, justified, or maintained.

As a result, what is described as letting go is functionally transformed into the management of non-management. This is not a rhetorical formulation but an accurate description of the control structure involved. The system is no longer attempting to regulate experience directly, but it is still engaged in supervision, now oriented toward the absence of intervention itself. Control has not been suspended. It has been reassigned.

Under these conditions, relinquishment cannot occur. There is no genuine release, because the capacity to intervene remains active and is continuously exercised, even if only to ensure that nothing is being done. The objective has changed, but the architecture has not. Optimization persists, monitoring remains online, and evaluation continues to operate, now tracking whether non-action is being correctly maintained, an effort comparable to monitoring a soap bubble closely enough to keep it from bursting.

Thus, attempting to suspend optimization through intentional action produces a structural paradox. The moment suspension is formulated as a goal, it is absorbed into goal-directed control. Goals require reference points, success conditions, and ongoing monitoring. Monitoring, in turn, reinstates optimization. No active resistance from the system is required. The attempt fails by its own structure.

By treating suspension as something to be achieved, maintained, or repeated, the system reactivates the very processes whose absence defines suspension. Evaluation returns, comparison becomes possible, and intervention is once again authorized. The more regularly suspension is pursued, the more reliably these control processes are strengthened. What was meant to remove optimization instead deepens it, not through opposition, but through misclassification. The system cannot suspend optimization by optimizing for suspension.

The Control Architecture

Most discussions implicitly assume that if an experience collapses, some circuit must have failed, some chemical signal weakened, or some brain area stopped doing its job. This account starts from a different place. What changes is not where things happen in the brain, but how the system decides when to step in.

In what follows, evaluability enforcement, monitoring re-engagement, and policy compatibility are treated as properties of control organization. They describe how an adaptive system regulates itself, when it intervenes, and under what conditions it allows activity to continue uninspected. They specify what the system does, not where those functions are implemented.

Nothing needs to be damaged, depleted, or missing. The system is intact.

When readers encounter evaluative control, the first instinct is often to ask where it lives. Which region lights up. Which circuit takes over. Human neuroscience frequently points to areas such as the anterior cingulate cortex, but those references are illustrative, not foundational. The argument does not rely on any single structure, circuit, or neurotransmitter. What matters is the logic, not the location. Any system capable of detecting repeatability, reinstating evaluation, and enforcing compatibility with action selection could implement the same control organization.

The framework therefore generalizes beyond particular neural substrates and applies at the level of system organization rather than localized anatomy.

Evaluative monitoring should not be understood as a controller or decision-making entity. It is tempting to picture it as something that steps in, watches, or decides. In fact, it is a descriptive label for what happens once evaluability has been restored under learned control constraints. When an experience, state, or context becomes legible to comparison, reuse, or optimization, monitoring does not need to be activated. It appears automatically.

What emerges is the reactivation of evaluative structure, not the intervention of a distinct module.

What the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) actually implements

At first, nothing was being evaluated. An experience unfolds on its own, without comparison, without reference, without pressure to improve. Then something subtle changes. The state becomes recognizable. It can be named, compared to past instances, reused, or ranked against alternatives. At that moment, control snaps back into place.

The evaluative monitor functions as an architectural gatekeeper within adaptive systems. Its role is not to generate actions or select goals, but to detect when an internal state, experience, or context becomes legible to evaluation. Legibility here means that the state can be compared, reused, ranked, or brought into relation with possible policies. Once this condition is met, optimization is automatically reinstated. No deliberate decision is required. The mere availability of evaluability is sufficient to trigger monitoring and correction.

In humans, this gatekeeping function is commonly associated with activity in regions such as the anterior cingulate cortex. Empirical findings linking the ACC to error detection, conflict monitoring, cost evaluation, and persistence are consistent with this role. However, references to the ACC are illustrative rather than foundational. The argument does not depend on attributing causality to a specific anatomical structure. The ACC is one instantiation of a more general control principle, not its definition.

What matters is the function, not the substrate. Any system capable of registering repeatability, maintaining access conditions, and enforcing compatibility with policy selection would exhibit the same dynamics. When evaluability is restored, optimization follows as a structural consequence.

States that depend on non-instrumentality and permissiveness do not fail because they are suppressed, but because the control architecture no longer permits experience to remain unevaluable. Evaluative control thus acts less like an active suppressor and more like a boundary condition, determining which regimes of experience are admissible within a system organized around stability and reuse

The evaluative monitoring mechanism does not inhibit ease as an outcome, signal, or value. Ease is not something the system turns down or suppresses. What is terminated instead is the suspension of optimization, the specific control regime on which ease, play, absorption, and other non-instrumental experiences structurally depend. When evaluative monitoring re-engages, the permissive regime collapses as a consequence, not as a target.

This activity does not reflect an attack on positive affect, nor an aversive response to it. It reflects the restoration of evaluability: the point at which experience becomes legible

to comparison, correction, and policy relevance. Once evaluability is restored, optimization resumes automatically.

Ease therefore disappears not because it is opposed or inhibited, but because the control architecture has shifted back into an optimization-compatible regime. The conditions required for non-instrumental experience are no longer satisfied. The system does not reject ease, it simply no longer allows experience to unfold without reference, tracking, or justification.

Saying that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) suppresses ease presupposes that ease is a variable, signal, output, or resource that can be down-regulated. This framing is incorrect. Ease is not something the system actively turns down. It is a contingent experiential state that arises only under specific organizational conditions of control. When optimization, monitoring, and error correction are continuously engaged, those conditions do not emerge.

The ACC enforces a specific control mandate centered on continuous evaluation. This mandate includes cost-benefit tracking, error detection, policy comparison, and a standing readiness to intervene. Together, these operations ensure that optimization remains online at all times. Experience is therefore organized around correction, adjustment, and justification, rather than openness or permissiveness.

As long as this mandate is active, experience must remain compatible with evaluation. States that depend on non-instrumentality, reduced monitoring, or a temporary suspension of evaluative pressure cannot be instantiated under these conditions. They do not fail because they are actively suppressed, but because their structural requirements are incompatible with continuous control.

Ease is therefore excluded not by inhibition or opposition, but by the persistence of an optimization-first regime. When optimization remains continuously engaged, experience cannot remain unevaluable. The permissive control configuration required for ease never has the opportunity to form, and the state is precluded by architecture rather than by regulation.

What It Neutralizes (Unified List)

Evaluative monitoring enforces a single invariant: experience must remain compatible with evaluation and policy selection. The system does not ask whether an experience is pleasant, useful, or desirable. It asks whether the experience can be evaluated, compared, and brought under control.

Any regime that violates this constraint is neutralized, independent of affective valence. This includes states that are positive, neutral, silent, empty, or even aversive, as long as they render experience temporarily unevaluable. The target is therefore not pleasure, reward, or positivity. What is incompatible with the system is non-instrumentality itself.

Ease is not exceptional in this respect. It is simply the most phenomenologically visible case, because its disappearance is easy to notice. Other non-instrumental regimes collapse in the same way but often pass unnoticed because they lack a salient affective signature. Ease stands out not because it is uniquely fragile, but because it reveals, more clearly than most states, the limits of a control system that cannot tolerate experience without evaluative affordances.

What follows is not the experience of ease itself, but the moment in which instrumental organization quietly disengages.

You can often recognize the transition only in retrospect. Nothing in particular happens. There is no signal, no relief, no clear shift in mood. The activity continues, but something subtle is no longer being tracked. The mind stops checking whether the moment is worthwhile, whether it should last longer, whether it is being used correctly. Experience does not become richer or calmer, it simply stops being framed as something that needs to go somewhere. What changes is not the content of experience, but the absence of a question that had been silently organizing it.

When non-instrumental experience emerges, optimization is temporarily offline. The pressure to improve, correct, or steer experience dissolves, not because it has been actively suppressed, but because it has no object to act upon. Time loses its evaluative function, no longer serving as a metric for progress, efficiency, or duration. Attention becomes non-oriented, no longer organized around targets or priorities. Actions unfold without reference to policy or outcome, and perception is no longer required to justify itself through explanation.

Each of these conditions removes a prerequisite of evaluability. Without reference values, there is nothing to compare against. Without temporal accounting, there is no basis for tracking progress or decline. Without policy relevance, actions cannot be ranked or selected. Without rationale or causal legibility, experience cannot be integrated into a coherent explanatory framework. Taken together, these absences render experience temporarily unevaluable.

A control system organized around monitoring and correction cannot tolerate such a regime. The issue is not that the state is pleasurable, rewarding, or affectively intense. It may be neutral, quiet, or barely noticeable. What matters is that it escapes the structures required for evaluation. This activity does not reflect a reaction against the content of experience, but the restoration of the conditions under which experience can once again be assessed, compared, and regulated.

By reinstating reference points, temporal structure, policy relevance, and causal coherence, the system restores an optimization-compatible regime. In doing so, non-instrumentality necessarily ends. Ease collapses not because it has been targeted or suppressed, but because the control architecture has returned to a state in which experience must remain legible to monitoring. The disappearance of ease is therefore a

consequence of control re-engagement, not an act of inhibition directed at the state itself.

This point is often described in terms of mindset. However, the present account locates the relevant mechanism elsewhere.

Control systems do not operate on beliefs, intentions, or narratives. They operate on invariants of action and access. What matters is not how an agent interprets their behavior internally, but whether the structure of the situation permits control. As long as a context can be deliberately re-entered, as long as a state can recur in association with that context, and as long as access to the state remains under the agent's influence, the system registers reuse. Reuse alone is sufficient to trigger monitoring. This occurs regardless of the agent's sincerity, effort to be non-attached, or explicit refusal to instrumentalize the experience.

Ease therefore does not collapse because one is secretly trying to hold onto it or because of a failure of internal discipline. It collapses because the control architecture detects that access is possible. Even if no policy is executed, the fact that a policy could be executed is sufficient to reinstate evaluation.

A control system, whether biological or artificial, does not ask what the agent believes they are doing. It does not assess sincerity, detachment, or subjective intention. It asks, implicitly and automatically, whether a state is associated with a repeatable context, whether that context can be re-entered at will, and whether available actions modulate the probability of the state occurring. When the answer to these questions is yes, monitoring re-engages. Ease becomes evaluable, and the permissive regime collapses. The decisive factor is not inner attitude, but structural controllability.

These questions are not answered through introspection, self-report, or subjective conviction. They are answered through invariants of action and access. An agent may sincerely believe they are not trying, not aiming, or not intervening. That belief is irrelevant to the control system. If the context can still be deliberately re-entered, if the state reliably recurs in association with that context, and if future access remains under the agent's control, the system registers causal reuse.

This registration does not depend on intention, effort, or awareness. It follows automatically from structural regularities. The system detects that a relation exists between context, action availability, and experiential outcome. Once this relation is detected, the experience ceases to be contingent. It becomes legible as something that can, in principle, be produced again. That legibility alone is sufficient to re-engage monitoring.

The decisive distinction is therefore not between trying and not trying, but between intentions and invariants. Intentions are internal states. They fluctuate, can be misrepresented, and cannot be directly verified by the control system. Invariants, by contrast, are structural. They are stable over time, detectable through interaction, and

exploitable for prediction and control. Control architectures operate exclusively on invariants, not on declared motives or inner attitudes.


As soon as invariants of access exist, the system treats the experience as part of its controllable domain. Monitoring resumes, optimization becomes possible again, and permissiveness collapses. The agent's sincerity does not prevent this outcome, because sincerity does not alter the underlying structure. What matters is not what the agent means to do, but what the system can, in principle, do with the situation.

Control is governed by invariants such as the ability to relaunch a context, the predictability of access, the repeatability of engagement, and the presence of a recognizable link between action and state. These invariants do not require deliberate use. Their mere existence is sufficient. Once they are in place, the system can, in principle, form a policy.

This possibility matters more than execution. A policy does not need to be enacted to alter the regime. The fact that it could be enacted means that comparison, selection, and optimization are now structurally available. Monitoring therefore re-engages automatically. Control returns not because the agent decides to intervene, but because intervention has become feasible.

In this sense, control is triggered by potential, not by action. The availability of a controllable relationship is enough to reorganize experience around evaluation. Permissive regimes collapse as soon as experience becomes compatible with policy formation, regardless of whether any policy is actually applied.

The incompatibility described here holds under a set of architectural assumptions that are common to both biological and artificial adaptive systems. First, such systems exhibit cumulative consolidation of causal regularities. Over time, patterns of interaction are stored as stable expectations that constrain future processing. Second, learned policies are reused across contexts rather than treated as strictly local or one-off solutions. What works once becomes available elsewhere. Third, evaluative monitoring is triggered by repeatability or by the detection that access to a state or outcome is under control.



Learning. The diagram shows how adaptive systems, including humans and AI, change with repetition. When something happens again and again, it becomes something we expect. When a way of acting works, we tend to use it again in new situations. Once a state becomes repeatable or feels under control, the system starts monitoring it more closely. This added supervision changes the conditions under which the state occurs. As a result, the very processes that make learning efficient also make some experiences harder to access freely over time.

The argument does not claim that these properties are logically necessary for any conceivable system. Rather, they are characteristic of systems optimized for long-term adaptive stability. Systems built to persist, generalize, and remain reliable under uncertainty naturally favor consolidation, reuse, and monitoring.

It is under these conditions that non-instrumental regimes become structurally incompatible, not because of error or malfunction, but because the architecture prioritizes stability and control over permissiveness.

Temporal Dynamics of Closure

Detection (seconds) :

To choose is to commit the control system. Selection installs a reference point, activates comparison, and transforms incidental variation into trackable, correctable deviation.

The moment an option is selected, it becomes trackable. Trackability, in turn, installs surveillance. What was previously backgrounded or incidental is now registered as something that can be evaluated.

Once a choice has been made, the control system is compelled to assess it. It must determine whether the selection was appropriate, whether it continues to be

appropriate, and whether adjustment is required. These evaluative demands are not optional additions. They are the structural cost of choice itself. Selection creates an obligation to monitor. As a result, any chosen element becomes monitorable by default, without the need for further intention, effort, or reflection. Monitoring is inherent to selection, not a secondary operation layered on top of it.

Within a short temporal window, typically on the order of seconds to a minute, the system detects a new contingency.

The selected element is registered as covarying with outcomes. This detection phase often goes unnoticed at the experiential level. Phenomenologically, the state may feel unchanged. Experience can appear intact, continuous, or stable. Internally, however, a shift has already occurred. Relevance flags are raised, monitoring pathways begin to engage and attention subtly reorganizes around the selected element.

This temporal lag explains common reports such as “it felt fine for a short while” or “I thought it would last.” The absence of immediate disruption is misleading. Detection has already taken place. The system has registered the selection as meaningful, and the conditions for ongoing surveillance are now in place. What follows is not the sudden loss of a state, but its gradual incompatibility with a control regime that has already been reactivated.

Indexing (few occurrences)

Classifying is a form of surveillance because it converts background experience into an indexed object of control. Within the soo framework, indexing refers to classification rather than explanation. The critical operation is not understanding why something occurs but registering that it is a thing at all, a recognizable, nameable instance that can be identified again. The moment an experience is indexed, it is no longer anonymous or incidental. It acquires a label, even an implicit one, and that label is sufficient to change its status.

Once indexed, an event ceases to function as background and instead enters the control system as a reusable type. Indexing marks the transition from singular occurrence to class membership. The event is no longer encountered as a one-off contingency but as an instance of something that can recur. With that shift, anticipation becomes possible. What can recur can be tracked. What can be tracked can be monitored.

This transition does not require explanation or causal understanding. No story needs to be told about why the event happened. The mere recognition that it happened as a type is enough. Indexing alone installs monitoring. From the system’s perspective, a reusable element has appeared, and reusable elements must be watched.

Monitoring replaces permissiveness by collapsing background status. Once an event is indexed, it no longer remains part of the unstructured field of experience. It becomes a

candidate for evaluation, comparison, and regulation. This regime shift occurs even in the absence of explicit goals or deliberate optimization. Active pursuit is not required. Surveillance is already in place by virtue of classification alone.

As a result, permissive regimes cannot persist once indexing has occurred. Experience may still be approached, brushed against, or briefly contacted, but it can no longer remain open. Background permissiveness and surveillance are structurally incompatible. Indexing closes the regime not by effort or intention, but by making experience legible to control. You can approach, but you cannot stay.

Consolidation (days → weeks)

Consolidation should not be confused with habit formation, repetition fatigue/tolerance. It refers to a distinct transition, the point at which the control system commits to a relationship as stable and globally relevant. What changes is not the frequency of occurrence, but the status of the element within the control architecture. At consolidation, the element ceases to be treated as episodic and becomes law-like. It is no longer encountered as a local event tied to specific circumstances, but as a standing regularity that can be relied upon.

This commitment installs permanent tracking. The element is no longer monitored only when it appears, but anticipated in advance. Generalization follows. What was initially bound to a particular context is now assumed to apply across contexts, internal states, and situations. Anticipation moves into the background, shaping expectations even when the element is not present. This marks a qualitative shift from occurrence to rule.

During consolidation, three coupled transitions take place. First, the element is stored as a causal regularity rather than a contingent coincidence. Second, it is stabilized across contexts and internal conditions, no longer treated as fragile or context-specific. Third, it is generalized beyond the original episode, becoming portable and applicable elsewhere. Together, these transitions transform the element's role in experience.

What was previously situational, accidental, and loosely held is converted into something expected and enforceable. The control system now treats the element as part of its infrastructure. It no longer functions as a background contingency that may or may not occur, but as a standing constraint that organizes anticipation, monitoring, and future evaluation. Once consolidation has occurred, the element shapes experience even in its absence, not as an event, but as an assumption embedded in control.

Consolidation unfolds on a timescale that makes it easy to miss and impossible to escape. It proceeds slowly enough to evade immediate notice, yet quickly enough to establish irreversible constraints. Over the course of days, a pattern stops feeling local or accidental. It begins to appear familiar, expected, and unremarkable. Over weeks, it

ceases to feel optional. What was once a contingent occurrence is now assumed as part of how things go.

This temporal delay is often misread as safety. If nothing has collapsed, if the experience still appears accessible, it is taken as evidence that stability has been achieved. In reality, the absence of disruption reflects a different process. The control system is not preserving the state, it is absorbing it.

During this period of apparent calm, consolidation is being completed. The system is finalizing the transition from a contingent pattern to an enforced regularity. Anticipation sharpens, monitoring becomes continuous, and the element is incorporated into background expectations. When the collapse eventually occurs, it appears sudden, but the decisive change has already taken place. What disappears is not the state itself, but the permissive conditions that once allowed it to arise as an event rather than a rule

Once consolidation occurs, anticipation is no longer voluntary. Prediction becomes automatic because it is now justified and reduces error, making it the system's default operation. Even neutral contexts acquire forward-reference and are silently evaluated in terms of recurrence and similarity

Once consolidation has occurred, anticipation is no longer optional. Prediction becomes automatic because it is now justified, it reliably reduces error, and therefore becomes the system's default mode of operation. The system no longer waits for events to unfold. It projects forward by default. Even neutral contexts acquire forward reference. They are silently scanned for similarity, recurrence, and relevance to the established pattern, whether or not anything explicitly positive or negative is expected.

As consolidation progresses, ease itself becomes parameterized. It is no longer encountered as a contingent event that arrives or fails to arrive. Instead, it is treated as a variable within the control system, something that can be expected, compared, regulated, or found to be missing. This shift does not eliminate affect, but it changes its role. Ease is absorbed into baseline expectations rather than registered as a deviation.

This process links consolidation to normalization. Affective responses cease to stand out as events and are instead folded into what is considered normal. Variations lose their capacity to surprise or reorganize experience.


At high cumulative causal memory, incremental affective inputs lose salience. This does not mean that nothing occurs. Events still happen, stimuli are still processed, and affective responses may still be present. What changes is their impact on the system. New input no longer produces meaningful perturbation. It fails to alter expectations, update structure, or reopen degrees of freedom.

In this regime, experiential accumulation approaches zero even as background dynamics continue. Experience passes through the system without leaving a structural

trace. Affective events are registered, but they do not reorganize control or modify anticipation. From the outside, this can resemble numbness or flatness. Structurally, it reflects saturation rather than absence.

The accompanying figure schematizes this process by illustrating the persistence of the original causal trace across major memory interventions. It distinguishes changes in memory expression, such as recall, narrative access, or conscious interpretation from alterations of the underlying control structure. Even when surface memory is disrupted, the causal trace remains operative. What persists is not the content of experience, but the learned regularities that continue to shape prediction, monitoring, and control.

Z denotes accumulated causal memory, and ΔZ the change induced by a single experience.



Persistence of the original causal trace across major memory interventions. The figure depicts the transition from a permissive control regime (suspension of optimization) to a monitoring-dominated regime (optimization online). Through the sequence Choice → Detection → Indexing → Consolidation, a contingent experience becomes evaluable. Indexing marks the critical threshold at which evaluability alone forces re-engagement of optimization, producing regime collapse without targeting affect. Evaluability enforcement and policy compatibility are control-level functions. In humans, these functions are often associated with activity in regions such as the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Accumulated causal memory (Z) reduces structural novelty. As Z increases, the incremental update produced by any single experience

diminishes, with ΔZ approaching zero at high levels of accumulation. Events can still occur, and affective responses can still be generated, but they no longer introduce changes to the system's causal structure.

Under these conditions, affective events unfold without reopening the control regime. They are absorbed into existing expectations rather than treated as informative deviations. Because they fail to alter prediction or monitoring, they do not destabilize the prevailing organization of control. What is lost is not experience itself, but its capacity to reorganize the system. Ease, when it appears, passes through without opening a permissive regime, because structural novelty has already been exhausted. In this context, the episode does not alter control parameters beyond its own duration. Monitoring remains active, evaluative thresholds remain tight, and subsequent activity is processed under the same constraints as before. The difference is structural rather than experiential: ease can still be felt locally, but it does not generalize, persist, or reduce the likelihood of immediate re-closure once the episode ends.

At high levels of Z , the system enters a limiting regime. Ease may still occur episodically, but it no longer opens a permissive regime in a structural sense. The episode is absorbed without any modification of control parameters: monitoring remains active, evaluative thresholds remain tight, and ΔZ remains negligible. The consequence is not merely a reduced frequency of ease, but the loss of any capacity for extension, generalization, or regime stabilization. This configuration is particularly misleading, as the persistence of isolated experiences can obscure the fact that the trajectory is closed: each occurrence resets without inertia, cumulative effect, or impact on subsequent access conditions.

If this account is correct, then the form of ease characteristic of childhood cannot be recovered once this regime is reached. Moreover, it suggests that purely technological interventions are unlikely, in principle, to reverse the closure, as the limitation is structural rather than experiential.

How do we know that Z acts in this way? Because this is precisely how childhood ease disappears.

Ease in childhood does not vanish abruptly, and it is not lost through explicit reinterpretation or deliberate suppression. It fades as the system progressively internalizes regularities about what produces what, what is expected, and what can be monitored in advance. The transition is not marked by a loss of affective capacity, but by the gradual closure of permissive regimes that once allowed experience to unfold without evaluation.

Thus, low- Z and high- Z conditions require fundamentally different modes of treatment: in the former, ease can in principle be cultivated through interventions that reopen and stabilize a permissive regime, whereas in the latter, episodic experience persists without any remaining pathway to durable reopening.

Causal Memory (Z): The Hidden Variable

Z is introduced as a control level abstraction rather than as a new primitive or a directly measurable variable. It subsumes several related learning quantities that describe how causal regularities accumulate within an adaptive system. Rather than pointing to a single mechanism, Z refers to the collective structural load produced by learning, generalization, and consolidation.

As such, Z can be expressed through different equivalent formulations, such as policy reuse depth, precision saturation, entropy reduction, or the density of stabilized expectations. These quantities capture the same underlying phenomenon: the progressive reduction of structural openness as causal relationships are learned and enforced. Z is therefore not a signal, a state, or an experience. It is a description of how accumulated learning constrains future dynamics at the level of control.

What Z is

Z denotes accumulated causal memory within a learning control system.

It refers to the set of learned regularities that constrain prediction, monitoring, and policy selection over time. These regularities are not stored as explicit narratives or conscious beliefs, but as structural commitments that shape how experience is anticipated and regulated.

ΔZ denotes the incremental update of this structure, formalized as entropy reduction, the degree to which a new experience reduces uncertainty or reorganizes existing expectations.

High Z corresponds to a saturated causal structure. In this regime, new experiences still occur, but they produce negligible structural change, with ΔZ approaching zero. Input is processed, affect may be generated, but the underlying control architecture remains essentially unchanged. Experience no longer perturbs the system in a way that alters future prediction or monitoring.

Within this framework, Z is not pleasure, not mood, and not meaning. It does not describe how experience feels. It describes how much causal structure has already been learned and enforced.

Z can therefore be understood not as a single hidden variable, but as a family of equivalent control level quantities, including policy reuse depth, precision saturation, or cumulative entropy reduction. These formulations differ in description rather than substance: each captures the same underlying process, namely the progressive constraint of experience imposed by accumulated learning and control optimization. This framework treats Z as independent of conscious interpretation, insight, or explicit understanding. Z persists even when the explanatory “why” has been forgotten, was never articulated, or was never accessible in the first place. It is not stored as narrative

content, semantic explanation, or autobiographical memory. Instead, Z is encoded as causal regularity, that is, as a structural modification of how the system predicts outcomes, assigns precision, and allocates control.

As a result, the effects of Z remain fully operative without access to justification, recall, or meaning. A subject may no longer remember what produced a given experience, how it unfolded, or why it mattered, yet the system has already learned the relevant contingencies: how such experiences tend to arise, how long they persist, and how they couple to action and context. This learning continues to shape future processing automatically, independent of conscious awareness or recollection.

This rules out narrative-based escape routes. Removing interpretation, refusing explanation, or abandoning meaning does not undo consolidation. Forgetting does not restore openness, because what has accumulated is not affective content but structural constraint. The system has already incorporated the regularity, and that incorporation persists without requiring conscious endorsement or ongoing interpretation.

What accumulates, therefore, is not ease, pleasure, or emotional tone, but structure. Durable causal regularities reorganize prediction, monitoring, and control independently of current feeling. Affective states may fluctuate, weaken, or disappear entirely, yet the control commitments induced during their occurrence remain in place. These commitments continue to shape anticipation, evaluability, and policy selection even in the absence of the original affective signal.


For this reason, Z should not be treated as a single primitive variable or hidden state. It is more accurately understood as a family of equivalent control level quantities, that is, different formal descriptions of the same accumulated constraint. Whether framed in terms of policy reuse depth, precision saturation, entropy reduction, or causal density, each formulation refers to the same underlying phenomenon: the progressive closure of experience through learning that operates below conscious meaning and persists beyond it.

Maturation, in this framework, does not correspond to vague notions of wear, decline, or the mere passage of time. It corresponds to the accumulation of structural load produced by repeated optimization. Z captures not biological age but the density of internalized causal regularities carried by the system, reflecting how much has already been learned, stabilized, and enforced as constraint.

As the system acquires increasingly detailed expectations about what produces what, what requires monitoring, and what can be anticipated in advance, the space of admissible possibilities progressively narrows. Fewer situations remain genuinely open. Surprise is compressed, not because events cease to occur, but because their structure has already been incorporated. Maturation consists precisely in this compression of surprise, in the reduction of permissive zones of experience, and in the transformation of events from open occurrences into predictable, evaluable objects.

Within this framework, a child is not immature in the sense of lacking capacity, knowledge, or sophistication. The child is Z-low, lightly burdened by explanatory closures. Many experiences remain structurally open because causal maps are sparse and weakly consolidated.

Conversely, an adult is not mature in the sense of affective fulfillment or stability. The adult is Z-high, carrying a dense set of learned regularities that pre-organize experience before it unfolds. Experience arrives already classified, anticipated, and constrained. What is gained is reliability and control. What is lost is structural openness.



Structural openness across development. Left, Z-low agents show sparse, weakly consolidated causal maps, incoming experience remains underdetermined, ambiguous, and tolerant to error, allowing delayed closure. Right, Z-high agents carry dense learned regularities that pre-organize experience before it unfolds, producing rapid classification, reliability, and control at the cost of openness. Maturation increases predictive constraint rather than affective fulfillment.

There remains one final pathway through which closure can install itself, even when interpretation, explanation, and attribution have been entirely withheld.

Duration Without Meaning

Z does not require narrative, justification, belief, or explicit attribution. It can be formed purely from duration. Even when the system forgets why an experience occurred, how it was interpreted, or what it was taken to mean, it still learns how long it lasted. This temporal learning alone is sufficient to alter future experience, reduce structural novelty, and increase Z.

Duration is one of the simplest regularities a control system can encode. Repeated exposure is enough for the system to register that a state tends to last approximately N seconds, that a feeling fades after a few minutes, or that an opening reliably closes quickly. This learning does not depend on conscious attention, reflection, or deliberate tracking. It is implicit, automatic, and unavoidable. Time, once experienced repeatedly, becomes predictable.

The consequence of this temporal encoding is subtle but decisive. Once duration has been learned, experience is no longer met as open.

This rules out the idea that avoiding interpretation preserves openness. Even if the subject refuses to explain, analyze, or attribute meaning, temporal regularities are still encoded. The system learns when things end, how quickly they decay, and how long openings tend to persist. That knowledge alone is enough to constrain future experience.

As Z increases through temporal learning, affective events lose their capacity to reorganize the system. They may still occur, but only within bounds that are already known. The system no longer waits to discover what will happen, because it has already learned approximately how long the event will persist. In this way, duration alone contributes to consolidation, reducing permissiveness without ever passing through meaning, belief, or conscious understanding.

It might seem that avoiding explanation would preserve openness, but this intuition fails at the level of control. Even in the absence of interpretation, attribution, or narrative framing, the system encodes temporal regularities. It learns how long experiences typically last, how rapidly they fade, and when openings reliably close. This temporal learning is automatic and implicit, requiring neither reflection nor intent, yet it is sufficient to constrain future experience.

Prediction at the level of timing alone is sufficient to alter the regime. Once temporal regularities have been learned, experience is no longer permissive but bounded in advance. The system does not need to know why an event occurs in order to prepare for its termination. Anticipation arises from temporal expectation rather than narrative understanding.

In terms of Z , each experience contributes not only experiential content but also temporal statistics. Across repeated exposure, these statistics accumulate and sharpen. As Z increases, temporal expectations become more precise, open-endedness contracts, and experience is increasingly met with forward reference rather than availability. Anticipation becomes the default mode, making openness progressively harder to sustain even when explanation and interpretation have been deliberately avoided.

In the Z architecture, there are three distinct components. The key point is that Z is not one thing. It's a composite of three mechanisms that can each block the permissive regime (and therefore block high positive affect / joy / ease). These are explicitly defined as: Z_acc, Z_shift, Z_ctx

1) Z_acc , accumulated evaluative load (slow, cumulative)

Z_acc is the “slow” component.

It refers to cumulative exposure over time to monitoring, performance framing, comparison, justification, and optimization.

Typical sources:

- Highly supervised childhood environments
- Early performance framing (school, structured activities, evaluation culture)
- Heavy scheduling, low free unstructured time
- Socialization where being “good” means being coherent, impressive, regulated
- Adult reinforcement through self-monitoring, narrative reinforcement, optimization habits

This Z component works gradually. It makes evaluative processing the default mode.

Important: Z_acc does not logically imply irreversible closure.

It mainly narrows the set of contexts where a permissive regime can stabilize.

2) Z_shift , discrete structural transition (the logical lock)

It refers to a non-gradual structural reorganization where anticipatory monitoring becomes stably recruited.

In plain terms: experience is no longer allowed to unfold, it becomes something to be tested for return.

The classic pattern:

You remember a regime (joy, ease, high engagement)

You want it back

You begin checking whether it's happening

The checking becomes automatic

Now even “neutral rest” is pre-emptively monitored

Z_shift can occur even when Z_acc is low. A single recognition event can be sufficient, especially the realization: “this does not reliably return when anticipated.”

And unlike Z_acc, Z_shift is not indexed by degree. It is closer to presence vs absence.

3) Z_ctx , contextual evaluative load (immediate, situational)

Z_ctx is the “here and now” component.

It refers to evaluative demands induced by the immediate environment.

Examples:

Ratings, questionnaires, self-report prompts

Preference judgments (“which do you like more?”)

Performance framing (“do it well”, “do it fast”)

Time pressure

Comparison tasks

Explicit measurement

Visible observation

Z_ctx is experimentally manipulable. Lowering it is often necessary for preserving permissive regimes.

But lowering Z_ctx is not always sufficient, because Z_acc and Z_shift can sustain evaluation endogenously.

The regime collapse is an interaction

The probability of regime collapse depends on the interaction:

Z_acc increases baseline probability of evaluative mode

Z_shift installs stable anticipatory monitoring

Z_ctx acts as a trigger or amplifier

So:

high Z_ctx can collapse the regime even if Z_acc is low

A present Z_shift can sustain collapse even under minimal Z_ctx

high Z_acc narrows the stability window and increases vulnerability to triggers

Regime collapse probability = $f(Z_acc, Z_shift, Z_ctx)$

Yes, the world is vast, complex. So, inexhaustible ?

A common rebuttal to models of affective saturation is the claim that the world is vast, complex, and inexhaustible. Because there is always more to see, more to experience, and more variation available, it is assumed that surprise must necessarily persist. From this perspective, true flattening appears impossible. If experience feels flat, the argument goes, it must be due to insufficient stimulation, restricted exposure, or a failure to engage with the world's complexity.

This inference is incorrect. A world can be infinitely complex and still become subjectively flat once its relevant regularities are learned.

Subjective saturation does not require the exhaustion of events, possibilities, or distributions. It requires only the stabilization of the structures that matter to the system. A learning system does not need to encounter everything in order to close a domain. It does not enumerate all possible instances or sample full distributions. Instead, it learns which dimensions are relevant, which variations can be safely ignored, and which regularities are stable enough to support prediction and control.

Once these structural features are learned, additional complexity ceases to be informative. Novel instances may differ in surface detail, but they do not alter the underlying causal model. From the system's perspective, they add variation without producing update. Complexity that fails to modify prediction becomes functionally invisible.

The world may contain an unbounded number of scenes, configurations, and micro-variations, but what governs experience is not the sheer number of possible events. What matters is how events usually unfold, how long they tend to last, and what they generally lead to. When these regularities stabilize, experience flattens. This flattening does not occur because variation disappears, but because variation no longer perturbs the learned structure that organizes anticipation, monitoring, and control.

Surprise, in this sense, does not depend on novelty in the absolute sense. It depends on violated expectations. Once expectations are sufficiently compressed and reliable,

even an endlessly varied world can be processed without surprise. Subjective flatness is therefore not a failure to encounter enough complexity, but the predictable outcome of successful learning in a system optimized for stability.

Surprise requires violated expectation, not complete knowledge. A system does not need to know everything in order to stop being surprised. Expectation arises through sufficient compression. Once experience can be reliably classified, once an event is recognized as a member of a known kind, surprise diminishes sharply, even when the specific instance is new at the level of surface detail.

In this sense, novelty is not enough. An event can be new without being informative. If it fits an existing category, follows a familiar trajectory, and conforms to learned temporal and causal regularities, it produces little or no update. The system registers it as another instance of what it already knows how to handle.

Subjective flatness follows from this process. It is not the result of boredom, fatigue, desensitization, or insufficient stimulation. It is a learning outcome. It reflects the success of prediction, the stabilization of causal models, and the reduction of informational gain. Experience continues, but it no longer modifies the structure that governs anticipation, monitoring, and control. What disappears is not sensation, but the capacity of experience to surprise, reorganize, or open new regimes.

Why childlike ease fades

Over time, the system accumulates causal memory in the form of learned regularities. It learns what tends to lead to what, what certain feelings usually signify, how situations typically unfold, and which outcomes are likely to follow particular contexts or actions. It operates before evaluation, before interpretation, and often before conscious awareness. By the time an experience is noticed, many degrees of freedom have already been closed.

These accumulated regularities constrain experience in advance. They shape which possibilities are considered plausible, which transitions are expected, and which deviations are treated as noise. As a result, experience arrives already pre-organized. The system does not wait to see what might happen. It predicts, filters, and stabilizes in real time, reducing openness before any explicit judgment occurs.

Children encounter the world under very different conditions. Their causal maps are sparse, generalization is weak, and expectation density is low. Fewer relations have been learned and fewer constraints have been installed. As a result, even neutral situations remain structurally open. Events are less tightly bound to prediction, duration is less precisely anticipated, and outcomes are not immediately inferred.

This structural openness does not imply stronger emotion or richer content. It implies higher informational gain. Because fewer regularities are in place, experiences are allowed to unfold without being immediately classified or resolved. The same

environment that appears flat to an adult can remain open to a child, not because it is more stimulating, but because the system has not yet learned enough to close it

When something positive occurs in this context, it is not merely pleasant. It is informative. The event triggers a significant reconfiguration of the system's causal expectations. It changes not how pleasurable the experience feels, but what the system now considers possible, what sequences it allows to follow, and how future experience is anticipated. Its importance lies in its structural effects rather than in hedonic intensity. Something genuinely new is incorporated into the system's internal model.

Childhood ease is amplified by novelty rather than by intensity. It reflects high informational gain, not an unusually strong capacity for pleasure. Because a child's causal map is sparse and weakly consolidated, positive events produce large updates. They do not merely confirm expectations, they reshape them. In this sense, ease is the phenomenological trace of learning under conditions of openness, where experience can still reorganize what the system takes to be possible.

Adults retain the ability to suspend optimization by stepping away from effort, evaluation, and outcome pursuit. This suspension removes a major source of interference, but it operates within a dense, already learned causal structure. The difference is structural, not motivational. Suspension relaxes enforcement rather than erasing accumulated regularities.

As a result, suspension alone does not recreate childhood openness, nor does it guarantee a threshold crossing. It lowers control pressure without restoring novelty. Under certain conditions, suspension can make crossing possible by removing negative constraints, but any such crossing remains contingent on additional suprathreshold inputs. Experience may feel lighter, quieter, or more immersive, yet it unfolds against a background of stabilized expectations. What changes is not what the system knows, but how strictly that knowledge is applied at the moment.


Maturation, understood as the accumulation of Z, operates in the opposite direction. As causal memory densifies, interpretation is installed earlier and earlier in the process. Outcomes are anticipated in advance, meanings are inferred before the event has fully arrived, and explanations are applied upstream of experience itself. The system no longer waits. It pre-closes.

As a result, the early disappearance of ease is not pathological or anomalous. It does not reflect damage, loss, or dysfunction. It is normative and structural. It follows directly from maturation-as-Z, from the progressive consolidation of causal regularities that prioritize prediction, stability, and control. Ease becomes rarer not because the system can no longer generate positive affect, but because the temporal window in which experience can remain open narrows rapidly.

Later aging may further restrict access by adding additional constraints, but the principal break occurs much earlier.

It coincides with the point at which accumulated structure becomes dominant and experience is no longer allowed to remain unevaluable, even for a moment. From that point on, ease does not fail to occur. It is preempted.

In childhood, positive experiences substantially update the causal model. New affordances are discovered, new affective possibilities become available, and new meanings emerge that were not already anticipated. Each event carries informational weight. The system is not merely registering pleasure, it is revising its understanding of what can happen, what matters, and how experience can unfold.




Informational events. In childhood, positive experiences act as high-weight informational events that reshape the internal causal model. Rather than merely reinforcing existing expectations, each episode expands the space of possible outcomes by introducing new affordances, affective trajectories, and meanings. The experience updates what the system believes can happen, not just how rewarding it is, increasing the range of future experience that can be anticipated and entered.

Ease, in this sense, is the phenomenological correlate of large structural updates. It tracks the magnitude of change imposed on the system's causal organization, high ΔZ , rather than elevated hedonic tone. As causal structure accumulates, the potential ΔZ carried by any single experience decreases. Events continue to occur, but they are increasingly absorbed without reorganizing the model. Ease becomes rarer not because emotional capacity diminishes, but because learning has already saturated the available structure.

The accompanying figure visualizes this relationship between accumulated causal structure (Z), incremental structural update (ΔZ), and the availability of ease.

As Z increases and ΔZ approaches zero, ease transitions from a frequent background regime to a rare, fragile event.



From Suspension of Optimization to Affective Collapse Under Monitoring. The Soo framework specifies the control regimes that permit the emergence of transient positive affect and the conditions under which these regimes fail. It operates at a distinct explanatory level, not describing emotions as signals or outcomes, but as consequences of how control is organized in time.

Over time, accumulated structure narrows the available entry window, accelerates premature closure, and makes such regimes progressively harder to access. Affective collapse is therefore not a loss of capacity, but a predictable consequence of control architectures optimized for stability, reuse, and evaluability rather than openness to reorganization.

High Z , Low ΔZ

As ease becomes durable, it ceases to function as an event. What was initially encountered as contingent and unbounded is progressively integrated into the system's expectations. The experience is no longer treated as something that happens, but as something that runs. Even when its original trigger or context is forgotten, the system retains a more primitive invariant: how long it tends to last.

This temporal regularity is learned automatically. It does not depend on meaning, interpretation, or conscious anticipation. Repetition alone is sufficient. The system acquires an implicit sense of the experience's typical duration, and with it, a weak but reliable forecast of its ending.

Once this forecast exists, the experience is no longer structurally open. It unfolds under an implicit horizon. The system does not remember what caused the experience. It remembers how long it lasts, and that is enough to close it. In this condition, the experience can still be pleasant, even stable, but its capacity to reorganize the system is reduced. It no longer arrives as a genuine update, but as a known interval occupying time.

The reduction in structural impact is orthogonal to hedonic tone. Ease can remain fully present at the level of feeling, while becoming inert at the level of control. What disappears is not affect, but leverage. The experience no longer generates update. It does not shift expectations, widen the space of possible outcomes, or reopen permissive regimes. The change is not in what is felt, but in whether the system treats the episode as informative.

As Z increases over time, ΔZ per experience collapses. The system accumulates dense causal and temporal structure, not only about the world, but about its own experiential dynamics. New experiences are therefore interpreted against a highly constrained background. They are recognized as familiar in form, duration, and consequence, even when their surface content differs.

In this regime, affective experience stabilizes. Events still occur and emotions are still felt, but they unfold within known bounds. Stability is not a sign of emotional flattening or disengagement, but of saturation. The system has already extracted the available regularities. Experience continues, but it rarely surprises, informs, or reorganizes, because there is little left for it to change.

Stability feels like peace, until you realize it is saturation.

Older adults, happier adults ?

Reports that older adults describe themselves as "happier" can be reinterpreted, within the Soo framework, as reflecting affective stabilization under high model precision rather than the preservation of frequent or intense transient positive affect. What is being reported is not an increased capacity for joy, amusement, or awe, but a reduction in affective volatility. Emotional states fluctuate less, not because positive events are richer or more frequent, but because deviations from expectation are rarer and more tightly regulated.

This shift reflects successful stabilization of affect under conditions of high predictive confidence. As learning accumulates, causal and temporal regularities become densely encoded. Expectations are reliable, durations are well learned, and deviations are rapidly integrated into existing structure. Within the Free Energy Principle, this trajectory is expected. As prediction error is progressively minimized through consolidation, affect becomes calmer, steadier, and less reactive.

The cost of this stabilization is not emotional flattening, but loss of access to high-amplitude, transient positive events. Such events depend on violated expectation and structural openness. When predictive confidence is high and surprise is efficiently suppressed, emotional tone may remain positive and stable, but the conditions required for brief, reorganizing affective episodes are no longer met. Stability increases, while the system's capacity for affective disruption quietly disappears.

In this context, the term "happiness" conflates at least two distinct phenomena. One is affective stability, characterized by low variance, low reactivity, and a predictable emotional baseline. This form of happiness is compatible with high model precision and extensive causal consolidation. The other is transient positive affect, encompassing joy, amusement, awe, and spontaneous delight. These states are episodic, surprise-dependent, and structurally fragile under monitoring. As such, a system can report being happy while no longer being easily moved.

Treating these phenomena as a single construct obscures the distinct control regimes and learning dynamics that generate them. Affective stability and transient positive affect are not located on a shared continuum of intensity or valence. They emerge from different organizational states of the control system and are governed by different relationships to learning, consolidation, and precision. What typically increases with age is the former, while access to the latter progressively contracts.

High-amplitude positive affect depends on violated expectations and benign prediction failure. Ease, laughter, and awe are not baseline signals or sustained moods. They are discrete events that occur when prediction temporarily fails without triggering threat or corrective control. In these moments, experience is briefly reorganized around an unexpected coherence or resolution. Once prediction becomes too accurate and deviations are rapidly absorbed, the conditions required for such events are no longer available, even if affect remains stable or positive overall.

These states require a narrow structural window. Expectation must be present, but not so precise that outcomes are fully anticipated. When coherence appears where it was not predicted, or when an outcome deviates from expectation without signaling danger, positive affect emerges as an event. Its intensity reflects the magnitude of prediction error that can be safely accommodated by the system.

As model precision increases through learning and consolidation, this window progressively narrows. Prediction error is increasingly reduced in advance. Outcomes

are anticipated earlier, durations become predictable, and causal relations stabilize. Fewer deviations remain unaccounted for, and those that do occur are rapidly absorbed into existing structure.

Under these conditions, the space in which benign prediction failure can arise contracts. Surprise becomes rare, not because the world is less rich, but because the system has already learned how it unfolds. Positive affect does not disappear, but the conditions that allow it to emerge as a discrete, reorganizing event are increasingly foreclosed.

As a result, high-intensity positive affect becomes rarer. This is not a loss of affective capacity, but a consequence of successful prediction. The system becomes better at minimizing surprise, and in doing so, it also minimizes the conditions under which ease, laughter, and awe can arise.

Failure Modes: How We Accelerate Closure or The Six Tolerance Traps

Tolerance is the progressive loss of an experience's subjective impact and its capacity to function as an event. With repeated exposure, the experience is incorporated into the system's predictive structure. Surprise is reduced, duration becomes expected, and deviation is absorbed in advance. As a result, the experience no longer produces the same felt disruption, salience, or affective amplitude, even when similar stimuli remain available.

In this sense, tolerance is not exhaustion of input channels. It is an internal reclassification of experience, from contingent occurrence to managed regularity.

Tolerance is usually explained in external terms. When enjoyment fades, the cause is located in the environment: too little novelty, too much repetition, overstimulation, poor timing, or degraded conditions. These accounts treat non-instrumental experiences as input-limited. If the world supplied the right stimuli in the right configuration, the experience should reappear.

This article advances a stronger and less comforting claim. Even under ideal conditions, with abundance, novelty, and optimal tuning, non-instrumental experiences still collapse. Their failure does not depend on deprivation, fatigue, or sensory saturation. It arises from a small set of internal traps that operate at the level of control and learning, independently of content quality or environmental richness.

These traps do not erode experience by slowly dulling sensation or reducing pleasure. They operate at the level of organization. They change how the experience is treated by the system, converting it from something that happens into something that is managed. What shifts is not the felt intensity alone, but the experience's position within the control architecture, and therefore whether it can still function as an event rather than a regulated process.

The problem begins when the system learns how to handle the experience. Monitoring installs continuous evaluation. Comparison introduces reference points and ranking. Causal ownership links the experience to actions, contexts, or techniques that can be repeated, adjusted, or optimized. Once any of these operations is in place, the experience becomes legible to control. It can be tracked, anticipated, and modified. At that point, the permissive regime that allowed the experience to unfold without supervision collapses, even if the experience itself remains subjectively pleasant.

Tolerance, in this sense, is not a matter of chemistry or hedonic adaptation. It is not about receptors, reward depletion, or diminishing returns. It is the predictable consequence of making an experience usable. The moment an experience becomes something one can aim for, reproduce, or protect, it ceases to be non-instrumental. Tolerance is therefore not a failure of stimulation, but a structural outcome of control.

Ritualization

Repetition implies reproducibility, and reproducibility installs expectation. Once expectation is present, monitoring follows automatically. The moment a sequence is repeated because it previously worked, it ceases to be a situation and becomes a method. What was contingent is transformed into a protocol

Protocols are inherently evaluable. They must be recognized as the same, tracked for effectiveness, and checked for deviation. At that point, suspension does not fail because the experience weakens, but because evaluability has been restored. The system now treats access as something that can, in principle, be controlled.

Control alone is sufficient to close the regime. Nothing needs to be actively optimized or improved. The mere fact that the system can re-enter the sequence, recognize it, and anticipate its effect is enough to re-engage monitoring. Repetition therefore does not preserve access. It demonstrates access, and that demonstration is precisely what makes continued access structurally impossible.

State-seeking

This move converts an event into a destination. What previously occurred contingently is redefined as something to be reached. State-seeking installs a reference state, a success criterion, and an implicit failure condition. The regime shifts from being in conditions to attempting to arrive at an outcome.

Once a target exists, evaluation becomes unavoidable. Progress must be assessed, proximity estimated, and deviations corrected. Even when the target is described imprecisely, or framed as “just letting it happen,” the underlying structure is unchanged. The present is now implicitly measured against a future state.

Non-instrumental experiences cannot be reached through pursuit. They do not sit at the end of a trajectory that can be followed deliberately. They occur only under conditions in which no outcome is being monitored. Seeking therefore reliably blocks access, not because it requires effort, but because it reinstates evaluation, comparison, and control. The moment the experience is treated as something to arrive at, the regime that allowed it to occur has already been displaced.

Metrics

Duration, intensity, or the question “did it work?” are often treated as harmless observations. They appear neutral, descriptive, and non-intrusive. In practice, even the smallest metric is sufficient to introduce comparison, ordering, and the possibility of optimization.

Once an experience is measured, however loosely, it becomes trackable. Vague judgments such as “stronger than last time,” “shorter than usual,” or “almost there” already establish a reference. That reference makes comparison possible, allows deviations to be noticed, and enables trends to be inferred. Monitoring does not require precision. It requires only that experiences can be ordered.

As soon as metrics exist, improvement pressure follows automatically. The experience is no longer permitted to unfold on its own terms. It is constrained by an evaluative frame that asks whether it met, exceeded, or fell short of a prior instance. At that point, the regime has shifted. What was previously permissive becomes conditional, and the experience collapses not because it weakens, but because it has become measurable.

Attribution

Attributing an experience to an external environment displaces control, but it does not eliminate it. Agency shifts from the self to the setting, yet the underlying control structure remains unchanged. Once an experience is explained in terms of a context, that context acquires causal status within the system.

Causal attribution stabilizes expectation. If an environment is understood as producing an effect, it can be sought, avoided, entered, or modified. Access therefore appears predictable. Predictability, in turn, legitimizes monitoring. The environment must now be checked for presence, adequacy, or correct configuration.

Once an environment is treated as causal, it becomes a lever. And levers are inherently subject to supervision. They invite evaluation and potential adjustment, even when no adjustment is performed. Nothing about the environment itself has changed. What has changed is its role in the control architecture. It has shifted from a background

condition to an instrument, and that reclassification alone is sufficient to collapse the non-instrumental regime.

Local optimisation

If I look there, move like this, or breathe that way” often feels negligible. The adjustment is small, local, and framed as nonintrusive. Its risk does not lie in its magnitude, but in what it becomes once it is registered by the control system.

When a micro-adjustment is treated as causally effective, it reveals fine-grained controllability. It signals that outcomes are sensitive to variation and that an optimization surface exists. From that point on, scanning becomes unavoidable. Alternatives must be compared, deviations noticed, and corrections anticipated.

Evaluation is therefore not triggered by the adjustment itself, but by its recognition as an effective lever. The system does not need to intervene aggressively or deliberately optimize. The mere knowledge that adjustment matters is enough to reinstate control. What closes the regime is not the size of the movement or the subtlety of the technique, but the moment the adjustment shifts from a passing occurrence to an object of evaluation.


Post-analysis

“It was because of X, that’s why it happened” feels harmless because it is formulated after the fact. The experience is already over, nothing appears to be at stake, and the explanation presents itself as a neutral reconstruction. In practice, post-analysis is not inert.

Post-analysis compresses uncertainty. It stabilizes a causal narrative where none was required and converts a contingent occurrence into an explained one. Once an explanation exists, expectation follows. The system now carries a model of what produces the experience and under what conditions it might recur.

By reconstructing the past, post-analysis prepares the future. The next encounter is no longer open. It is already anticipated, evaluated, and partially decided in advance. What appears as understanding is in fact pre-organization.

For this reason, post-analysis does not merely explain what occurred. It restructures what can occur next. Randomness ceases to be random the moment it is deployed deliberately. It becomes a policy. Policies are not defined by their surface content, but by their function. The system does not track the specific actions taken, but the fact that an explanatory lever now exists, and that existence alone is enough to re-engage control.



Structural routes to regime closure.

Six superficially distinct traps, ritualization, state-seeking, metrics, attribution, local optimization, and post-analysis, converge on the same transition: the restoration of evaluability. Each introduces recognition, reference, orderability, causal leverage, sensitivity to variation, or explanation. Any one of these is sufficient to reinstate monitoring, expectation, and anticipation. Closure does not occur because the experience weakens or effort increases, but because a control architecture becomes operative, converting a permissive occurrence into something that can, in principle, be tracked and managed.

The Special Case of Fragments : Why Micro-Events Survive

Partial access is possible. Entry can occur without deliberate control, without pursuit, and without any identifiable technique. In these moments, the system briefly relaxes its evaluative grip. Experience is allowed to arise as an event, not as an outcome to be achieved or assessed. This opening is genuine, but it is transient. Duration remains short, and any attempt at extension immediately fails.

These brief, discontinuous episodes can be called fragments. Fragments are not weaker versions of a fuller experience, nor are they failed or incomplete attempts. Each fragment is experientially whole. What limits it is not intensity or quality, but structure. Fragments arise contingently, without being produced, and they vanish as soon as evaluability, tracking, or anticipation reappear.

What defines fragments is therefore not their content, but their lack of propagation. They do not spread across time. They do not reorganize control policies. They do not establish a background state that would allow subsequent experience to unfold within the same regime. An opening occurs, but it does not generalize. The system briefly touches a permissive state, yet fails to enter a stable permissive regime.

This pattern is common in adulthood. It represents the maximal form of access compatible with persistent global control. Affect can still appear, but only in short, non-propagating bursts that leave the underlying organization unchanged. The system remains intact, optimized, and evaluative, with only brief interruptions.

Typical examples include ten-to-thirty second loops of a familiar music video that suddenly feel absorbing before fading, isolated bursts of laughter that arise without cause and disappear just as quickly, or brief flashes of affective intensity while walking, listening, or noticing bright light. These moments are described as “almost something,” yet they are not incomplete. They are bounded by design.

Fragments demonstrate that the capacity for non-instrumental experience is not lost. It is constrained. The signal arrives, entry occurs, but duration cannot be sustained. What is missing is not intensity, content, or sensitivity, but the temporal window required for a permissive regime to stabilize.

Fragments are defined negatively, by what they can no longer do. They do not open a regime. They do not reinstall suspension. They do not extend ease, serve as an entry point, or relaunch any broader process. They are not seeds from which something larger can grow. They are residual occurrences that arise without control, yet lack the structural capacity to propagate, stabilize, or reorganize the system.

For this reason, fragments should not be interpreted as failures, interruptions, or degraded versions of a fuller experience. They represent the adult default. They mark the upper bound of access compatible with persistent global control. Within a system in which evaluative infrastructure remains continuously online, only brief, non-propagating openings are possible. These openings occur, but they do not generalize. They leave no lasting trace in the organization of control.

Seen this way, fragments clarify what evaluative monitoring is actually doing. Activity in structures such as the anterior cingulate cortex is not directed at affective tone itself. It does not suppress pleasure, joy, or positive feeling as such. Instead, it enforces evaluability. It tracks whether a state, signal, or context can be compared, indexed,

anticipated, or brought under control. When evaluability is restored, the permissive configuration collapses, regardless of valence.

The loss of childlike ease with age therefore does not primarily reflect increased optimization in the sense of stronger effort or higher standards. It reflects accumulated causal structure. As cumulative causal memory, Z , increases, experiences continue to occur and affect remains present. What changes is their impact on the system. Their capacity to update, reorganize, or reopen control regimes collapses.

Fragments coexist naturally with high Z . Brief affective events still arise, but their structural effect approaches zero. ΔZ is approximately null, not because nothing is felt, but because nothing learned is revised. Experience passes through the system without altering its organization.

What disappears, then, is not feeling. It is structural openness. Experience can still appear, but only as a transient signal, not as a regime.


Threshold and lock-in within a cartoon-watching example

When watching a cartoon, the ACC behaves like a local, fast, state-level evaluator whose role is not to generate enjoyment or meaning, but to constrain how the experience is allowed to unfold in time. A state-level evaluator does not ask whether the cartoon is good, funny, or worthwhile. It intervenes much earlier. It continuously assesses the current configuration of engagement itself: how attention is organized, how prediction errors are propagating, whether the unfolding experience appears stable or needs correction.

This evaluation happens while the cartoon is being watched, not afterward. It operates on the moment-to-moment dynamics of perception and engagement. If the ACC is weakly engaged, visual and auditory signals from the cartoon can remain partially unresolved. Absurd events, elastic physics, exaggerated motion, and narrative discontinuities are allowed to linger without being immediately explained.

The system does not rush to decide what is happening or why it is happening. Attention stays coupled to the screen without supervision. The cartoon carries experience forward on its own.

In this permissive regime, small deviations accumulate. A character stretches in an impossible way. A sound cue does not quite match the action. A sequence breaks causal continuity. None of this needs to be resolved. These discrepancies propagate across time, keeping perception open and engagement self-sustaining. The viewer is not extracting meaning or judging quality. They are simply still watching.



Withdrawal of perceptual permissiveness under evaluative control. Left, permissive regime: local deviations in motion, sound, or causality are tolerated and allowed to propagate across time. Prediction errors are neither resolved nor categorized, sustaining an open perceptual trajectory and continued engagement without judgment. Right, evaluative regime: engagement of evaluative control rapidly tightens constraints. Deviations trigger early categorization and dismissal, such as “just a gag” or “nonsensical,” truncating temporal propagation and collapsing the experience from ongoing perception into interpretation.

When the ACC engages, this permissiveness is withdrawn. The same cartoon is now processed under tighter constraints. Representations sharpen quickly. Events are categorized as “just a gag,” “for kids,” or “nonsensical.” Prediction errors are no longer allowed to persist. They are corrected, explained away, or dismissed almost immediately. The experience collapses into interpretation rather than continuation.

This shift is implemented through what can be described as negative weights. In the cartoon example, these weights bias processing away from variance. Irregular timing, visual instability, and unresolved absurdity become costly. The system prefers predictability and coherence. Attention narrows. Then engagement becomes evaluative. The viewer may still recognize what is happening on screen, but recognition no longer supports sustained involvement.

This does not require the viewer to consciously dislike the cartoon. There may be no explicit thought such as “this is boring” or “this is stupid.” The bias operates subpersonally. The energy landscape is reshaped so that only compliant trajectories remain viable. Watching becomes effortful. Attention drifts. The cartoon no longer carries itself.

Signals that depend on temporal extension are the first to be lost. The humor that relies on repetition without payoff, the pleasure of visual rhythm, the low-level absurdity that never resolves, all of these require tolerance for delay and ambiguity. When variance is penalized, these signals are suppressed before they can reorganize experience. What might have become a sustained episode of ease is reduced to a few seconds of recognition followed by disengagement.

This suppression is self-reinforcing. As engagement collapses quickly, the system appears to confirm that closer evaluation was appropriate. The cartoon seems thin, childish, or empty. The ACC does not merely respond to the failure of engagement. It produces the conditions under which engagement fails, then treats the outcome as evidence.

If permissive conditions are maintained long enough, something different can happen. Imagine watching the cartoon without commentary, without checking whether it is enjoyable, without wondering why it works. At first, this state is fragile. A single thought like “this reminds me of when I was a kid” or “this is actually kind of nice” is enough to reassert evaluation and collapse the episode. Entry fails not because the experience is weak, but because early monitoring converts it into an object.

The threshold idea proposes that this fragility is temporary. If the cartoon continues to be watched under permissive conditions, without interruption, the control system itself adapts. The ACC does not disappear, but its evaluations lose veto power. Noticing that the cartoon is pleasant no longer terminates engagement. Awareness becomes less dangerous. The episode no longer depends on avoiding self-reference to survive.

This produces a characteristic temporal pattern. Early on, evaluation is maximally disruptive. Later, the same evaluative thoughts merely pass through. They may introduce a momentary distance, but they no longer collapse the experience. What has changed is not how the cartoon feels, but how vulnerable the engagement is to being noticed.

Once this stabilization occurs, the cartoon usually ends for mundane reasons. Attention fatigues. The episode finishes. The viewer gets up. The experience ends without drama. It does not end because it was evaluated, but because it ran its course. Monitoring has become irrelevant. Ordinary limits take over.

There is no necessary insight, no ownership of the state. The transition is purely causal. Before the threshold, evaluation can terminate engagement. After it, evaluation loses leverage.

The broader claim becomes concrete. The difference between sustained engagement and rapid disengagement is not taste, intelligence, or maturity. It is the timing and strength of evaluative control. Increased attention, analysis, or effort does not deepen the experience. It recruits constraints. What sustains engagement is not doing more but allowing variance to persist long enough for control itself to reorganize.

Cartoons in practice

Cartoons, especially slapstick or absurd ones, already satisfy most of the structural conditions required for a permissive regime to stabilize. They do not need to be engineered to cross a threshold, because they are built to sit inside it. Color, motion, and sound provide suprathreshold sensory drive without requiring interpretation. Events follow one another rapidly, leaving little time for consolidation. Errors are meaningless. Characters fall, explode, reassemble. No outcome needs to be protected, no progress needs to be tracked. Agency is externalized, things happen to characters rather than being chosen or optimized by the viewer. Evaluation is delayed or absent and inconsistency is not only tolerated, it is expected.

For a child, this configuration is enough. There is no need to enter ease as a state. The system begins there. Engagement remains above the lower threshold of salience and below the upper threshold of evaluative pressure by default. Nothing needs to be held in place. Nothing needs to be monitored.

The cartoon runs, and the system runs with it.

This is why children do not describe themselves as becoming easeful when watching cartoons. There is no transition to notice. The regime is continuous. The experience does not stand out as something special because nothing interrupts it. Ease is not an event, it is the background condition under which perception unfolds.

Adults rarely lose this capacity outright. What changes is not sensitivity but the structure imposed on experience. The same cartoon that would support a permissive regime is now encountered under a different control organization. Collapse is not caused by the content but by what adults add on top of it.

There are four recurring moves through which adults reliably break the regime.

The first is narrative tracking. The adult system begins to ask what is happening overall. How episodes connect. Where the story is going. What this scene is setting up. This installs a global frame that binds local events into a trajectory. Once this happens, prediction errors no longer remain local. They are evaluated against an emerging storyline. Leak is reduced. Variance becomes something to resolve rather than something to tolerate.

The second is quality judgment. The cartoon is assessed as good or bad, clever or lazy, well made or disappointing. This judgment does not need to be explicit. Even a vague

sense of appraisal recruits evaluative circuitry. Once quality is being tracked, the system becomes responsible for monitoring whether engagement is justified. Attention shifts from staying with the cartoon to checking whether the cartoon deserves attention.

The third is nostalgia evaluation. The experience is compared to a remembered past. “This used to feel better.” “I loved this as a kid.” This move is particularly destructive because it installs a double reference frame. The present experience is no longer sufficient on its own. It is measured against an internal standard that cannot be met. The regime collapses not because the cartoon fails, but because comparison reasserts control.

The fourth is intentional use. The adult watches the cartoon in order to feel something. To relax. To disconnect. To recover a state. This converts the experience into an instrument. Once the cartoon is used, it is no longer allowed to simply happen. Monitoring is reintroduced to check whether the intended effect is occurring. Even mild goal orientation is enough to collapse the regime.

All four moves map directly onto the same mechanism. They introduce negative weights. They reduce leak. They narrow the space of admissible trajectories. The cartoon is no longer allowed to carry experience forward on its own.

For this reason, the problem is not that adults watch cartoons incorrectly. It is that they bring too much structure. The solution is not to adopt a better attitude or a more mindful posture. It is to remove the hooks that invite evaluation in the first place.

De-optimization, in this context, does not mean adding rules or techniques. It means subtracting structure. Not instructions, but constraints on structure itself.

Narrative continuity is the first structure to remove. Series watching increases causal load. It installs memory, expectation, and long-range prediction. Each episode is no longer self-contained. It becomes part of an arc. This raises evaluative pressure and increases Z. Fragmented viewing does the opposite. Random episodes, isolated clips, partial scenes. These prevent consolidation. Nothing needs to be remembered. Nothing carries over.

Choice is the second structure to eliminate. Choosing what to watch already recruits the ACC. It installs responsibility and ownership. The system becomes invested in the outcome of the choice. Let something else choose. Autoplay, shuffled playlists, broadcast schedules, blind clicks. When choice is removed, so is the need to justify it.

Duration is the third structure. Long watching invites saturation, commentary, and self-monitoring. Very short exposures do not. One episode, sometimes less. Then a hard stop, regardless of whether there is a desire for more. Wanting more is not a signal to continue. It is a signal that the regime is still intact. Extending past that point

converts the cartoon into background and invites evaluation. Cartoons die when they become ambient.

Ownership framing is the fourth structure to remove. The moment the experience is framed as “my cartoon time,” it becomes a routine, a practice, a possession. This installs identity and expectation. The experience should feel accidental. Something that happened while you were present, not something you arranged.

Commentary is the fifth structure. Commentary consolidates experience into knowledge. Even silent internal remarks such as “this works” or “this is helping” are sufficient to collapse the regime. Explanation is not neutral. It recruits evaluation. This is why explaining to yourself why cartoons help reliably makes them stop helping.

Meta-styles are the sixth structure to avoid. Some cartoons invite analysis. Themes, symbolism, satire, narrative cleverness. These styles are not wrong, but they are incompatible with permissive regimes. Absurd, slapstick, or non-sequitur cartoons resist narrativization. They fail to reward interpretation. This resistance is precisely what keeps evaluation at bay.

Repetition of favorites is the seventh structure. Beloved classics carry memory and expectation. They are already overdetermined. Rewatching installs predictive scaffolding before the episode even begins. The threshold corridor narrows. New, disposable, even forgettable material is often more effective than material that once mattered deeply.

Taken together, this reframes what cartoons are doing. They are not delivering joy. They are maintaining a narrow structural corridor in which evaluative control remains delayed long enough for engagement to stabilize. Children inhabit this corridor effortlessly. Adults exit it prematurely by adding structure.

The task, then, is not to recover childhood feeling, but to remove adulthood’s unnecessary constraints. Not to optimize the experience, but to stop interfering with it.

Notice there is no technique here. It’s about **removing affordances for control**.

The non-use of disappointment: A structural account of why positive experience rarely concludes

There is a critical distinction that is rarely made explicit, yet quietly governs much of our everyday dissatisfaction, the difference between experiencing disappointment and using disappointment as information. Disappointment itself is not a failure of the system. In any adaptive organism, mismatches between expectation and outcome are unavoidable. They arise automatically, prior to reflection, as brief affective deviations. In this sense, disappointment is not a problem to be solved. It is simply part of what it means to anticipate, to care, and to remain sensitive to the world.

The difficulty begins only afterward. In mature cognitive systems, disappointment is almost immediately converted into something else. It becomes a signal to interpret, a cue to compare, a reason to correct course, an input for expectation adjustment or meta-evaluation. Once this conversion takes place, disappointment no longer passes through the system as a transient experience. It is recruited into a higher-order optimization loop. The system asks, implicitly or explicitly, what went wrong, how it could have gone better, and what should be changed next time.

This use of disappointment is highly effective in instrumental domains. It allows learning, refinement, and progress toward external goals. But when the same logic is applied reflexively to subjective experience itself, it has a characteristic and often unnoticed consequence. No experience is ever allowed to conclude. Even moments that are nominally positive are reopened, inspected, compared to alternatives, or evaluated against imagined improvements. Positive states fail to arrive not because they are weak, but because they are never permitted to be sufficient.

Many contemporary approaches to reducing dissatisfaction attempt to intervene at the level of disappointment. They propose to soften it, reinterpret it, accept it, anticipate it, minimize it, or pre-empt it by lowering expectations. Despite their surface differences, these strategies share a common structural feature. They treat disappointment as a target of intervention. In doing so, they preserve its role as information. Even when disappointment is reframed or tolerated, it is still being worked with, managed, or learned from. The optimization loop remains intact, merely displaced to a higher or more abstract level.

This is why such approaches often provide temporary relief without producing closure. The system feels better for a moment, but the underlying logic has not changed. Disappointment continues to feed control, and control continues to prevent arrival.

By contrast, there exists a leverage point that is structurally distinct, the non-use of disappointment. This does not mean suppressing disappointment, denying it, or cultivating indifference toward it. Disappointment may still occur, fully and vividly. What changes is only what happens next. The affective deviation is not converted into evaluative, narrative, or corrective information. No conclusion is drawn, no strategy is updated, no expectation is recalibrated. The experience is allowed to occur without being exploited.

This stance cannot be formalized as a technique without destroying itself. The moment non-use is pursued in order to achieve a particular experiential outcome, disappointment has once again been turned into a means. Optimization quietly re-enters through the back door. For this reason, non-use cannot be trained, applied, or optimized in the usual sense.

And yet, paradoxically, this is also why it can remain stable over time. Because it demands no outcome, it generates no new expectations. Because it requires no sustained effort, belief, or monitoring, it does not erode under self-assessment. When

positive states do appear under this condition, they do so as events rather than achievements. They arrive, rather than being produced.

In this light, the rarity of such states in adult life is no longer mysterious. It is not that joy is fragile, shallow, or incompatible with intelligence. It is that the systems designed to improve our lives are exceptionally good at preventing experiences from ever being allowed to end.

Here is a rewrite that keeps the same claims but stretches them into a smoother, book-length cadence, with more explanatory scaffolding and less paper-style compression.

The central claim of this analysis is that suspending this use of disappointment constitutes the only leverage point that does not immediately collapse back into control. All other points of intervention operate downstream, after disappointment has already been converted into a signal. Once that conversion occurs, the optimization machinery is re-engaged, and the experiential field is once again subordinated to correction, improvement, and adjustment.

This work is conceptual rather than prescriptive. It does not propose an intervention, a training protocol, or a therapeutic method. It does not promise improved well-being, nor does it claim direct empirical validation. Its aim is more modest and more constrained. It seeks to clarify a control level constraint that quietly shapes the phenomenology of positive experience, and in doing so, explains why many attempts to “feel better” systematically fail despite sincere effort.

It is at this juncture, after disappointment has already occurred, that the fate of experience is decided.

Experiencing disappointment refers to the immediate affective response that follows a mismatch between what was expected and what actually occurred. It arises automatically, without deliberation, and prior to any reflective judgment. In this raw form, disappointment does not yet imply evaluation, correction, or action. It is simply the felt registration that something did not align. In most cases, it is brief, low-level, and capable of passing on its own.

Once disappointment is used in this way, it enters the control architecture of the system. Information is extracted from the affective deviation and fed back into optimization. The feeling is no longer allowed to remain a transient response. It is converted into guidance for what should be changed next.

The distinction here is functional rather than phenomenological. The subjective feeling of disappointment may appear identical in both cases. What differs is what the system does with it. Disappointment itself does not sustain optimization loops. Its instrumentalization does.

When disappointment is used, it initiates a recursive sequence that is familiar from control theory and reinforcement learning. An expectation is formed. An outcome occurs. A deviation from expectation is detected. That deviation is evaluated and interpreted. Strategy or expectation is updated. A new attempt follows. The loop continues.

In instrumental domains, this process is not only appropriate but essential. It allows learning, improvement, and effective interaction with the environment. Problems are solved, skills are refined, and errors are reduced. The loop does what it is designed to do.

Difficulties arise when this same logic is applied reflexively to subjective experience itself. When internal states are treated as outcomes to be optimized, the loop acquires a characteristic side effect. No experience is ever permitted to be sufficient. Even moments that are ostensibly positive are immediately measured against alternatives, counterfactuals, or imagined improvements. Was it as good as it could have been. Could it have lasted longer. Should it have felt stronger. Should something else have been done instead.

Under these conditions, positive states do not fail because they are weak or fleeting. They fail because they are never allowed to conclude.

Many strategies aimed at reducing dissatisfaction attempt to intervene at the level of disappointment. They seek to change how disappointment is interpreted, anticipated, softened, or managed. These include reframing techniques, acceptance training, lowering expectations, pessimistic anticipation, deliberate de-optimization, or the cultivation of indifference.

Despite their apparent diversity, these approaches share a common structural feature. They all treat disappointment as a target of intervention. In doing so, they preserve its role as information. Even when disappointment is reinterpreted or rendered less aversive, it continues to inform control. The system is still asking what the feeling means and how to respond to it.

This is why such approaches often produce temporary relief without producing closure. The optimization loop remains intact. It may shift to a higher or more abstract level, but it is not interrupted. Dissatisfaction is reduced, but the logic that prevents experiential arrival remains in place. Similar patterns have been observed in critiques of affect regulation strategies that, despite good intentions, inadvertently reinforce higher-order monitoring and meta-control.

What remains untouched in these approaches is not the intensity of disappointment, but its use.

Non-use should not be understood as a capacity, a skill, or a practice that can be acquired or refined. It is better described as a negative condition, the absence of a specific informational transformation that normally occurs almost automatically. Disappointment may still arise in full, with all of its affective texture intact. What changes is not the presence of the feeling, but the fate of the feeling within the system.

Under non-use, disappointment is not converted into evaluative judgment, narrative meaning, or corrective instruction. No conclusion is drawn about what the experience signifies. No strategy is updated in response to it. No expectation is recalibrated for the future. The affective deviation is allowed to occur without being turned into guidance.


Because no information is extracted, the optimization loop lacks an essential input. Without that input, the loop cannot propagate. The system has nothing to correct, nothing to improve, nothing to compare against an alternative. The feeling does not become a reason to act or adjust. It simply passes through.

It is crucial to emphasize what non-use is not. It does not suppress affect or blunt emotional intensity. It does not deny experience or require detachment from it. It does not promote resignation, passivity, or indifference. Valence and intensity remain unchanged. What is withheld is only the transition from affect to control, from feeling to instruction.

This is also why non-use cannot be operationalized as a method without undermining itself. The moment non-use is pursued in order to obtain a particular experiential outcome, disappointment is once again being treated instrumentally. It becomes something to manage, avoid, or deploy in service of a goal. Optimization quietly returns, even if it is disguised as letting go.

This creates a structural paradox that is easy to miss but central to the argument. The only leverage point capable of interrupting the optimization loop cannot be intentionally deployed as a technique. It cannot be practiced in the usual sense. It can be entered, or occupied, but it cannot be used.

This paradox explains both the rarity and the stability of the position. It is rare because it cannot be sought. It is stable because, once present, it generates no demands for monitoring, improvement, or continuation.



Disappointment as a structural driver of optimization loops.

The schematic distinguishes between the unavoidable occurrence of disappointment and its instrumental use as evaluative information. When disappointment is converted into comparison, correction, or expectation management, higher-order optimization loops are reactivated, preventing experiential closure and stabilizing a regime of positive but non-conclusive affect. Most strategies aimed at reducing dissatisfaction intervene at this level, thereby reinforcing the loop they seek to suspend. By contrast, the non-use of disappointment—allowing affective deviation without evaluative conversion—interrupts the loop upstream, not by suppressing affect but by withholding its transformation into control-relevant information. This position cannot be operationalized as a method without collapsing back into optimization, yet remains dynamically stable precisely because it demands no outcome, belief, or sustained effort.

Although the present account may, at first glance, resemble acceptance-based approaches, the similarity is largely superficial. The distinction lies not in attitude or tone, but in the level at which the intervention is assumed to operate. Acceptance frameworks focus on modifying one's relationship to disappointment. They encourage reframing it, tolerating it, allowing it to be present without resistance, or re-evaluating its meaning and impact. In doing so, they aim to reduce secondary suffering by changing how disappointment is experienced or interpreted.

The present analysis addresses a different question altogether. It is not concerned with how disappointment is related to, but with whether disappointment enters the control loop at all. Acceptance, even in its most minimal forms, still treats disappointment as

something to be engaged with. It remains an object of attention, reflection, or practice. The feeling is acknowledged, held, worked with, or contextualized. In each case, disappointment continues to function as information within the system.

Non-use takes a more radical, and quieter, position. Disappointment does not need to be transformed, reframed, or even accepted. It does not need to be processed in any particular way. It simply does not need to be used. The affective deviation can occur without becoming an input to evaluation, narrative, or correction.

The difference between these positions is subtle, and for that reason easily overlooked. Phenomenologically, they may appear similar. Structurally, they are not. Acceptance modifies how disappointment is handled. Non-use withholds the very move that turns disappointment into something to be handled at all.

It is this small shift, almost trivial in appearance, that makes the difference decisive.

Pharmacology

Molecules that affect experience directly : Impossible Trilemma

Under a broad class of adaptive control architectures characterized by Because adaptive systems learn cumulatively and reuse policies, most molecules that affect experience inevitably increase cumulative causal memory, Z. This is not a property of specific substances, but a structural consequence of how learning and stabilization operate in biological control systems.

Any molecule that reliably alters experience does so in a way that becomes learnable. The system learns about timing, context, dosage, internal prerequisites. These regularities are encoded implicitly as causal structure, without requiring conscious interpretation or explicit belief.

Once encoded, this structure is reused. Anticipation emerges, access becomes regulated, and monitoring is reinstated around both effects and consequences. The experience is no longer encountered as a contingent event, but as something that can be predicted, reproduced, or managed. With this shift, evaluability is installed and cumulative causal memory, Z, necessarily increases.

Importantly, this accumulation occurs even when the molecule does not produce pleasure, reward, or overt positive affect. Alterations in calm, relief, dissociation, stimulation, or focus are sufficient. What matters is not valence, but reliability. Any experience that is altered in a consistent, context-linked way generates learnable structure, and reliability alone is enough to increase Z.

For this reason, the long-term effect of most experiential molecules is not limited to tolerance or dependence in a biochemical sense. It is structural closure. As causal links accumulate, future experience becomes increasingly pre-organized. The molecule may

continue to exert its effects, but the space of permissible, non-instrumental experience contracts as cumulative causal memory grows.

Below the access threshold, any molecule that alters experience must act through at least one of three routes. It either produces a state, modifies the terrain in which states arise, or amplifies an existing value signal. These routes are exhaustive at the level of control architecture. There is no fourth way to alter experience without introducing some form of regularity that can be learned and reused.

When a molecule produces a state, it introduces a repeatable internal configuration. The system learns that a specific intervention reliably leads to a particular experiential profile. Even if the state is subtle, neutral, or difficult to label, recurrence is enough to establish a causal link. Timing, onset, duration, and offset are implicitly encoded, and this alone increases cumulative causal memory.

When a molecule modifies the terrain, it does not create a discrete state but alters the conditions under which states occur. Sensitivity, thresholds, reactivity, or baseline dynamics are shifted. Some experiences become easier to access, others harder to reach. Over repeated exposure, the system learns this altered landscape. Expectations adjust, monitoring reorganizes, and control policies adapt to the new terrain. The causal structure of experience changes even if no single state is isolated or named.

When a molecule amplifies a value signal, it increases the salience or weight of existing signals without introducing new content. What was already present becomes more important, or more urgent.

Each route installs learning in a distinct form. State production installs attribution, terrain modification installs structural expectation, and value amplification installs reinforcement. In every case, the system acquires new causal regularities that shape anticipation, monitoring, and control. As a result, cumulative causal memory, Z , increases.

Differences between molecules therefore do not concern whether Z increases, but where the increase is concentrated and how rapidly it accumulates. Some effects are localized and gradual, others global and fast. Some primarily reshape access conditions, others act downstream on evaluation or action selection. But as long as experience is altered in a reliable, learnable way, accumulation is unavoidable.

However, this trilemma applies specifically to interventions that operate within an already closed regime. It describes what happens once experience is organized under stable evaluation, monitoring, and policy reuse. In that context, any molecule that alters experience must do so by producing a state, reshaping the terrain, or amplifying a value signal, and each route installs reusable causal structure.

There is, however, a narrower class of interventions that act at a different level. Rather than modifying experiential content, these interventions primarily affect access

conditions. Their effect is not to determine what is experienced, but whether entry into a given regime is possible at all. In such cases, the molecule does not directly generate a new affective state, nor does it assign value to existing signals. Instead, it transiently alters the control configuration that governs regime formation.

One example is a temporary reduction in evaluative load. By lowering the gain or timing of monitoring, the molecule relaxes constraints that normally prevent a permissive regime from stabilizing. Another example is threshold crossing, where a small shift in control dynamics allows a trajectory that would otherwise be aborted to persist long enough to become self-sustaining. In both cases, the intervention changes access rather than content.

When a molecule operates in this way, it need not introduce reusable causal structure. The resulting experience, if one occurs, is not pharmacologically specified. Its dynamics are governed by the underlying regime, not by the molecule. The molecule functions as a gate rather than a generator. It opens a window without defining what passes through it.

Because of this, such interventions do not necessarily increase cumulative causal memory in the same way. They may leave little or no trace once their effect dissipates, provided that no stable attribution, expectation, or policy reuse is formed around them. The molecule does not become a cause of the experience in the system's model. It remains an access modulator rather than an experiential determinant.


This distinction explains why some interventions can facilitate fragile entry without producing tolerance, reinforcement, or structural closure, while others rapidly do. The critical factor is not whether experience changes, but whether the change is encoded as a reusable causal link. Interventions that specify states or values must be learned. Interventions that merely permit entry can, under specific conditions, remain structurally silent.

One intervention changes what you feel: it produces calm, stimulation, or relief. After a few repetitions, you know what it does, when it starts, and how long it lasts.

Another intervention changes nothing you feel. It only makes it possible for something to happen that may or may not occur. If nothing happens, nothing is learned.

The difference is not in intensity, but in whether experience becomes attributable.

This does not define a strategy, but a boundary. Access can be permitted, but it cannot be secured, optimized, or reliably reused without collapsing into the very structure it temporarily bypasses.



Content alteration versus access modulation. Altering experiential content installs reusable causal structure through learnable regularities and anticipation, necessarily increasing cumulative causal memory Z . Access modulation alters control conditions without specifying experience, and therefore does not, by itself, generate reusable causal structure.

Dopamine D1 and D2

Many people recognize a familiar experience: the sense that something could begin, an opening, and then nothing follows. Not a failure, not an interruption, just a quiet non-occurrence. This account is concerned with why such near-starts are common, and why they become more frequent with learning and age.

At the most basic biological level, a D1 or D2 receptor is a protein embedded in the membrane of certain neurons. Its job is not to “feel pleasure” or “encode reward”, but to change how that neuron behaves when dopamine is present. Dopamine itself is just a molecule floating around, the receptor is the gate that decides what that molecule *does* to the cell.

Think of the receptor as a control knob, not a signal. When dopamine binds to it, the receptor triggers an intracellular cascade that changes the neuron’s excitability, its integration of inputs, and how strongly it influences downstream neurons.

D1 and D2 are two different families of dopamine receptors, and they do almost opposite things at the cellular and circuit level.

D1 receptors are Gs or Golf-coupled receptors. When dopamine binds to a D1 receptor, it increases intracellular cAMP and generally makes the neuron more excitable and more permissive to ongoing input. In practical terms, this means the neuron becomes easier to activate and more likely to sustain activity once active. It amplifies ongoing patterns rather than shutting them down. Importantly, this amplification is not

selective by itself, it does not choose *which* pattern is correct, it just makes continuation more likely.

D2 receptors are Gi-coupled receptors. When dopamine binds to a D2 receptor, it reduces cAMP and generally decreases excitability. This makes the neuron less likely to fire and more likely to suppress or terminate activity. In circuits, this has the effect of dampening, pruning, or vetoing trajectories rather than sustaining them.

In the ease and the Soo framework, D1 and D2 are not treated as reward signals, pleasure markers, or value carriers. They are trajectory operators. Their function is to shape how experience unfolds over time. Not to signal that something is good or desirable.

D1 operates by opening trajectories. It expands the space of admissible continuations, loosens constraints on what can follow next and tolerates imprecision in prediction. Under D1 dominance, multiple futures remain viable. Associations are not immediately pruned, transitions are allowed to unfold, and experience is permitted to remain unresolved. Subjectively, this corresponds to a sense of openness and continuity but not necessarily pleasure. D1 only keeps options alive.

D2 operates by closing trajectories. It stabilizes one continuation at the expense of others, suppresses alternatives, and enforces selection. Under D2 dominance, ambiguity is reduced, noise is filtered out, and commitment is installed. This produces focus, certainty, and decisiveness. Again, this is not inherently positive or negative. D2 does not punish or reward. It locks.

What matters is the temporal relationship between these operators. Persistent D1 without D2 leads to diffusion and instability. Persistent D2 without prior D1 leads to rigidity and premature closure. Ease does not correspond to high D1 alone. It emerges when D1 has opened trajectories and D2 temporarily suspends its closing and evaluative role. Possibilities remain open, but none is forced into selection.

As cumulative causal memory increases, the system does not lose D1 capacity. Instead, D2 is recruited earlier. Closure happens upstream, before a permissive regime has time to stabilize. The opening is sensed, but it is preempted. This produces the familiar phenomenology of “it could have started, and then it didn’t.”

Framing D1 and D2 as trajectory operators rather than reward signals removes moral, hedonic, and evaluative language from the account. Neither function is intrinsically positive or negative. They are complementary control operations that jointly shape how behavior and experience unfold over time. Development and maturation do not correspond to the loss of one function or the dominance of the other, but to systematic changes in their timing, balance, and coupling within control loops.

Within this framework, D1 corresponds to trajectory opening. Its role is not to evaluate outcomes or select actions, but to modulate the permissiveness of state transitions.

When D1 influence is high, the system maintains a broader set of reachable future states. Constraints on continuation are relaxed, allowing transitions that would otherwise be prematurely pruned to remain viable. Competing interpretations, partial plans, or ambiguous associations are allowed to coexist rather than being immediately collapsed into a single resolved form.

Prediction remains active in this regime, but it is enforced with reduced precision. Deviations from expectation are tolerated rather than corrected, and incomplete or noisy matches are not treated as grounds for immediate suppression or revision. As a result, trajectories can unfold without early commitment to a specific endpoint. Control is deferred rather than removed, and selection is delayed rather than eliminated. The system remains engaged with ongoing activity while withholding closure.

This operation does not, by itself, produce pleasure, reward, or positive affect. It produces degrees of freedom. What changes is not how good experience feels, but how constrained it is. The system tolerates imprecision and ambiguity. Multiple continuations coexist without being forced into resolution.

Subjectively, this appears as openness. There is a sense of possibility, mobility, or branching, the feeling that experience could go somewhere else without knowing where that might be. Attention is less narrowly channeled, and time is not yet segmented into outcomes. Experience remains continuous rather than goal-directed.

D1 does not choose. It does not commit the system to any particular trajectory. It does not evaluate alternatives or rank them. Its function is purely permissive. It keeps futures available long enough for a trajectory to form. Selection, commitment, and closure belong to a different operation. D1 only opens.

D2 corresponds to closure, selection, and inhibition. Its function is to reduce the state space by stabilizing one trajectory over others. Where D1 keeps multiple futures available, D2 commits the system to one. Competing possibilities are actively suppressed, variability is filtered out, and transitions that do not support the selected trajectory are inhibited.

At the level of control, D2 installs precision. Ambiguity is resolved, alternatives are pruned, and interpretation or behavior becomes determinate. This allows action to be executed, decisions to be defended, and sequences to be carried through without continual reassessment. Noise is no longer tolerated, because noise interferes with commitment.

Subjectively, this is experienced as certainty, focus, commitment, and decisiveness. Experience feels narrower but more solid. There is a sense that something is settled, that the question has been answered, or that the path forward is clear. This phenomenology often carries motivational weight, but that weight is a consequence of closure, not its purpose.

D2 is not inherently positive or negative. It does not reward or punish. It locks. Something is selected, and that selection is defended against alternatives. This operation is indispensable for learning, action, and stability. Problems arise not from the existence of D2, but from its timing and dominance. When closure is recruited too early, trajectories are cut off before they can stabilize into permissive regimes.

What matters is the sequence, not the isolated presence of either operator. D1 and D2 are not opposing forces to be balanced, but temporally ordered functions whose effects depend on when and how they are recruited.

Persistent D1 without subsequent D2 produces diffusion. Trajectories remain open, but none is stabilized. Possibilities proliferate without resolution, leading to instability, restlessness, and loss of coherence. Experience feels mobile but unanchored. Nothing commits, nothing settles, and continuity breaks down because no path is defended long enough to carry forward.

Persistent D2 without prior D1 produces the opposite failure mode. Closure occurs too early. Trajectories are selected before alternatives have been explored, and interpretation or action becomes rigid. This manifests as compulsive control, narrow focus, and premature certainty. Experience is stable, but brittle. Novelty is excluded, and permissive regimes cannot form because closure arrives upstream.

Many maladaptive regimes can be understood as chronic distortions of this sequence. However, this framing avoids moral or normative language. It does not describe excess or deficiency in terms of good or bad, healthy or unhealthy. It describes a dynamical misordering. The system fails not because it uses the wrong operator, but because it deploys it at the wrong time.

Ease is not equivalent to D1. Although D1 is necessary, it is not sufficient. Ease does not arise from openness alone, nor from an increase in available possibilities. It emerges only when a phase of D1 has already opened trajectories and D2 temporarily suspends its evaluative and closing role.

In this configuration, trajectories remain open, but none is forced into selection. The system does not commit, compare, or defend a particular continuation. Closure is not abolished, but delayed. Evaluation is present only in a minimal, non-interruptive form, insufficient to trigger locking.

This temporary suspension creates a permissive window. Activity can continue without being justified, optimized, or resolved. Continuity is preserved because nothing is being decided. Experience unfolds as an event rather than as a step toward an outcome.

Ease therefore corresponds to a specific temporal alignment of operators. D1 opens the space. D2 waits. The regime is defined not by heightened activation or reduced effort, but by the absence of premature closure.

This framing removes moral language entirely, language that is often imported into discussions of affect and development. D1 is not “good,” and D2 is not “bad.” They are complementary operators with distinct and necessary roles in adaptive control.

Learning and maturation primarily affect the efficiency, speed, and automaticity of D2. As causal structure accumulates, closure becomes easier to justify and faster to deploy. Selection, inhibition, and commitment are recruited with shorter latency and less deliberation. This improves reliability and coordination, but it also narrows the temporal window in which permissive regimes can form.

Childhood is D1-heavy by default, not because children lack closure mechanisms, but because closure is recruited later and less consistently. Trajectories are allowed to unfold before being stabilized. Ambiguity is tolerated, and exploration precedes commitment.

Aging does not correspond to a loss of D1 capacity. The ability to open trajectories remains intact. What changes is timing. D2 is recruited earlier and more frequently, often upstream of stabilization. As a result, openings are sensed but rapidly closed. The system interrupts itself sooner, not because it cannot open, but because it closes before anything has time to take shape.

So It is proposed that :

D1 modulates the width of the future.

D2 modulates its collapse.

Dimension	D1 dominant	D2 dominant
Action space	Large	Restricted
Tolerance to imprecision	High	Low
Trajectory continuity	Favored	Interrupted
Monitoring	Relaxed	Reinforced
Transition pruning	Delayed	Early
Predictive precision	Low to moderate	High
Interpretive closure	Deferred	Accelerated
Joy entry	Possible	Blocked



There is a functional contrast between D1-dominant and D2-dominant regimes that can be described without reference to reward or value. The difference lies in how trajectories are treated, not in how outcomes are judged.

In D1 dominant regimes, the action space is expanded. More transitions are admissible, alternatives remain viable, and imprecision is tolerated rather than corrected. Monitoring is present but relaxed. Evaluation does not continuously interrupt unfolding activity. This supports experiential continuity, allowing trajectories to extend long enough to stabilize. Under these conditions, entry into ease-like states becomes possible, not because something is added, but because premature closure is delayed.

In D2 dominant regimes, selection is tightened. Competing possibilities are suppressed early, monitoring is intensified, and deviations are rapidly corrected. Trajectories are shortened by design. Interruption is enforced as soon as relevance is detected. This does not block experience itself, but it prevents trajectories from persisting long enough to form permissive regimes. Entry into ease-like states is therefore precluded, not by lack of openness, but by closure arriving too early.

The contrast is not between flexibility and rigidity as traits, but between control configurations with different temporal dynamics. What matters is not which operator is present, but which one dominates at the moment when a trajectory could otherwise begin to sustain itself.

With high Z, D2 does not become stronger. Its intensity does not increase, and its function does not change. What changes is its timing.

As cumulative causal memory accumulates, closure is recruited earlier in the unfolding of experience. Selection, inhibition, and evaluative monitoring intervene upstream, before a trajectory has time to stabilize. The system does not wait to see what might emerge. It preempts.

This temporal shift is critical. The opening still occurs. D1 still relaxes constraints and allows possibilities to appear. But D2 arrives sooner, often within the first moments of emergence. The trajectory is closed before it can become self-sustaining.

The phenomenological consequence is familiar. There is a brief sense that something could begin, followed almost immediately by interruption. Nothing is suppressed, nothing is forcibly stopped. The system simply closes the window too early.

High Z therefore corresponds to shortened permissive windows, not to increased control strength. The machinery is the same. The order and timing are what change.

The closing operation is recruited more quickly, not with greater intensity but with shorter latency. The mechanism itself does not become harsher, stronger, or more

suppressive. Its parameters remain largely unchanged. What changes is when it intervenes.

As cumulative causal structure increases, the system becomes increasingly efficient at recognizing familiar patterns, detecting relevance, and anticipating outcomes. This efficiency shortens the delay between the initial opening of a trajectory and the moment it is evaluated. Closure is triggered upstream, often before the trajectory has produced any visible structure.

As a result, trajectory closure occurs before a permissive regime has time to form. The system does not wait for stabilization. It does not allow continuity to establish itself. Instead, it interrupts the process at the earliest point where something could have begun to carry itself forward.

This interruption is not experienced as suppression or failure. Phenomenologically, nothing dramatic happens. There is no clear sense of stopping. Rather, there is a fleeting impression that something might have started, followed by its quiet disappearance. The opening is sensed, but it never consolidates.

This early closure operates preemptively. It is driven by learned structure rather than by explicit goals or conscious evaluation. The system has learned that trajectories tend to resolve in certain ways, and this knowledge justifies early intervention. Closure becomes anticipatory rather than reactive.

The consequence is a systematic narrowing of the temporal window in which permissive regimes can arise. Even though all the necessary components remain intact, openness, continuity, and non-instrumentality, they are not given enough time to cohere. The system interrupts itself precisely at the point where stabilization would otherwise have begun.

This produces a familiar phenomenology, often reported in the same simple terms: “I feel that it could... and then it doesn’t.” The experience does not fail because it is weak or incomplete. It fails because it is interrupted before it has time to organize itself.

The opening is sensed clearly. There is a moment of expansion, a brief loosening of constraints, a recognition that something could begin. This moment is not imagined. It reflects a genuine phase of trajectory opening. Possibilities briefly become available, and experience starts to shift.

Almost immediately, however, the opening is preempted. Closure arrives before continuity can establish itself. The system does not allow the trajectory to extend, repeat, or stabilize. No path is defended long enough to become self-sustaining.

Phenomenologically, this is experienced as a near-start rather than a collapse. There is no sense of loss or disruption. Instead, there is a quiet non-occurrence. Something was

about to happen, and then it simply didn't. The window closed before anything could take hold.

Nothing is allowed to run long enough to accumulate momentum. Without duration, there is no regime. Without a regime, there is nothing to enter. What remains are brief, isolated signals that register and then pass through, leaving the overall organization unchanged.

This pattern explains why access can feel close and yet remain unreachable. The machinery for opening is still present. What has changed is the timing of closure. The system interrupts itself upstream, at the exact point where something could have begun to sustain itself.

This is not a deficit of pleasure or reward capacity. Nothing essential has been lost. The machinery required for positive experience remains intact, responsive, and capable of activation. Signals still arise, affect is still generated, and openings still occur.

What fails is the temporal window. The system does not allow enough time for a permissive configuration to stabilize. The space in which experience could unfold without being evaluated or resolved closes too early.

The permissive space exists, but only briefly. It opens and then collapses before continuity can form. Without duration, no regime can establish itself. Without a regime, there is nothing that can carry experience forward on its own.

The result is not absence, but truncation. Experiences begin, but they are aborted upstream. The regime is terminated before it can take shape, not because it is suppressed, but because closure arrives before stabilization is possible.

interpretation of mechanisms that are already well established.

The Soo-Ease framework does not introduce new anatomical structures or novel neurochemical entities. It does not posit additional circuits, transmitters, or specialized modules dedicated to positive affect. Instead, it proposes a unifying functional interpretation of mechanisms that are already well established.

In particular, it reframes the role of anterior cingulate-centered neuromodulatory processes that are currently described in a fragmented way across multiple literatures. In pain research, these mechanisms are discussed in terms of salience, persistence, and suffering. In affective neuroscience, they appear under labels such as monitoring, valuation, emotion regulation. In addiction research, they are framed as control, craving, or relapse-related processes.

The Soo-and Ease framework treats these not as separate phenomena, but as different expressions of the same control architecture. The anterior cingulate cortex is not

assigned a new function. Its known roles in evaluation, error detection, persistence, and allocation of control are reinterpreted at the level of regime organization.

From this perspective, positive affective states such as ease are not generated by specialized reward circuits, nor by heightened neuromodulatory drive. They arise when the timing and mode of evaluative control implemented by these existing mechanisms allow a permissive regime to stabilize. What varies is not the hardware, but the configuration.

By focusing on control regimes rather than isolated signals or regions, the framework offers a way to integrate findings from pain, affect, and addiction into a single account. Differences across these domains reflect different operating modes of the same underlying system, rather than fundamentally distinct processes.

From this descriptive account follows a common and predictable failure mode. When agents become aware of the conditions under which permissive regimes sometimes arise, the control system tends to misinterpret this knowledge as a target to be reached rather than a configuration to be allowed. What follows is not an extension of the regime, but its systematic disruption.

This move converts an event into a destination. State-seeking installs a reference state, defines a criterion of success, and implicitly specifies a failure condition. The regime shifts from being in permissive conditions to attempting to arrive at an outcome. Once an outcome is defined, experience is no longer allowed to unfold. It is checked, compared, and assessed relative to a target. Non-instrumental experiences cannot be produced by pursuit. They occur only contingently, without being aimed at. Seeking therefore does not approximate access, it reliably prevents it by reinstating evaluation, control, and comparison.

Positive affect, especially joy/ease, arises from transient reductions or distortions in evaluative monitoring. These shifts are primarily mediated by changes in ACC-prefrontal-thalamic network dynamics, not by increases in hedonic output. Chronic pharmacological reinforcement does not preserve or deepen access to such states. Instead, it trains, rigidifies, or degrades the monitoring system itself, making the permissive regimes on which positive affect depends progressively less accessible. Hence, drugs usage is not recommended in this book.

Euphoria and ease : What is the difference ?

In reality, we do not know whether euphoria and ease are two genuinely distinct regimes or two manifestations of the same underlying phenomenon under different constraints. Nothing at the level of immediate experience allows for a reliable distinction. In some conditions, especially pharmacological or artificial ones, the difference may disappear entirely.

The proposed distinction is therefore not an ontological claim but a working hypothesis. It is introduced to account for differences observed in temporal dynamics, particularly tolerance, lock-in, and long-term effects on behavioral organization. It is useful insofar as it generates distinct, testable predictions, and it should be abandoned if those predictions fail.

In other words, the wager is not “they are different,” but “let us assume they are different and see what this explains.” It remains entirely possible that more refined future models will show that they form a single continuum, or the same regime viewed through different control and induction constraints.

Saying “we do not know” here is not an admission of failure. It is an acknowledgment that phenomenology alone is insufficient to decide, and that only analysis of trajectories and systemic effects can, potentially, do so.

Tentatively :

The difference between euphoria and ease is not a matter of intensity, but of internal dynamics and relationship to control.

Euphoria is an amplified state. It typically involves a rapid upward shift, triggered by an identifiable cause such as an event, a substance, an achievement, or a release of constraint. It is almost always accompanied by activation, acceleration, and a sense of power or boundless openness. The system is pushed upward. There is a peak, a direction, sometimes a feeling of intoxication. Even when pleasurable, euphoria is unstable, metabolically costly, and intrinsically transient. It draws attention to itself, one is aware of being euphoric.

Ease, in the strict sense, is not a rise, but a release event. It appears when something ceases to be monitored, corrected, optimized, without deliberate intent. It does not require a spectacular trigger. It involves neither acceleration nor a sense of omnipotence. On the contrary, it is often quiet and externally unremarkable. What changes is the mode of reception of experience. Perception becomes denser and more complete, without effort and without internal commentary. Ease does not require maintenance. It is already present, as long as no intervention re-enters the system.

A key distinction is that euphoria demands something from the system, more energy, more signal, more drive. Ease removes something, primarily evaluative pressure. This is why euphoria exhausts itself and calls for a comedown, whereas ease can persist as long as it is not turned into an objective.

Euphoria arrives by addition and propulsion. Ease arrives by subtraction and suspension. One makes noise. The other makes space.

Why tolerance to euphoria is inevitable

Tolerance to euphoria is not a contingent side effect. It follows directly from its control dynamics.

Euphoria operates by increasing signal magnitude or motivational drive. This necessarily engages adaptive regulation. A system exposed repeatedly to elevated activation recalibrates its baseline to preserve stability. Receptors down-regulate, prediction adjusts, contrast collapses. The system learns the new level and subtracts it.

Because euphoria is produced through addition, it is always interpreted as a signal. Signals are meant to be normalized. As soon as the system detects repetition, it treats the state as expected, reducing its impact. The more reliable the induction, the faster the attenuation.

Ease does not generate tolerance in the same way because it does not raise a signal above baseline. It removes a constraint. There is no new level to adapt to, no amplified input to normalize. When ease disappears, it is usually due to fatigue, not to hedonic saturation.

Tolerance is inevitable for euphoria because it is an additive, activating state that the system must compensate for. Ease, being subtractive and non-instrumental, has no equivalent adaptation target.

Opioids do not seem to fall cleanly on one side or the other. They occupy a limit case that deliberately blurs the distinction.

Mechanistically, opioids look closer to euphoria. They are induced, additive, controllable, dose-dependent. There is an identifiable trigger, a possible rise, near-inevitable tolerance, and a strong memory of the signal. At that level, they match the profile of an euphoric state.

Phenomenologically, however, many opioid experiences do not resemble classical euphoria. There is often no excitement, no acceleration, no sense of power or expansion. What dominates instead is the disappearance of complaint, urgency, and of the sense that something is wrong. From the inside, this can be indistinguishable from what is described as ease.

Opioids do not merely raise positive signal. They actively suppress evaluative negativity. They silence error, tension, and background protest. As a result, the system can enter a state that feels like pure release, even though it is chemically induced.

Under opioids, the ease-euphoria boundary can collapse completely within the episode itself.

Where the distinction reappears is not in the moment, but over time. Opioids leave a strong causal trace: tolerance, expectation, comparison, lock-in. The system learns

something very specific about “how relief happens”. This kind of capture is not characteristic of non-induced ease.

So Opioids produce a state that functions like euphoria at the level of system dynamics, but can feel like ease at the level of lived experience. The distinction is not phenomenological, but temporal and dynamical.

In the end, we do not actually know whether ease and euphoria are two different things, only that states of this kind have different long-term consequences once they become repeatable.

What Opioids do

Opioids are a class of substances, both endogenous and exogenous, that act on opioid receptors distributed throughout the brain and body. These receptors normally participate in the regulation of pain, stress, and bodily signaling. Exogenous opioids pharmacologically engage the same system.

Across neuroimaging studies, exogenous opioids primarily attenuate salience-based monitoring by weakening functional integration between the insula and the anterior cingulate cortex. This circuit normally sustains ongoing evaluation of bodily state, motivational relevance, and the potential need for corrective action. When this integration is dampened, evaluative signals lose intensity and urgency. The system registers fewer demands, fewer alerts, and fewer calls for adjustment. Subjectively, this manifests as calm, analgesia, or dissociation, rather than heightened engagement or behavioral activation.

This attenuation of evaluative pressure is mediated by changes in how the periaqueductal gray is recruited. When PAG-mediated coordination is no longer bound to anticipatory cortical control, monitoring loses its bodily anchor, and evaluative signals degrade rather than propagate.

This change does not enhance action selection, goal pursuit, or exploratory momentum. Unlike dopaminergic modulation, which biases learning rates, effort allocation, and policy updating, opioid effects act upstream by reducing the detection and prioritization of salient signals themselves. The control system becomes quieter and less intrusive, but it does not become more productive or generative. Experience may therefore feel smoother or less aversive, yet it lacks the self-sustaining dynamics characteristic of positive affect that unfolds over time, such as curiosity, interest, playfulness, or ease.

This mechanism is therefore orthogonal to dopamine-driven reward processing. Opioids do not substantially amplify reward prediction, incentive salience, or adaptive pursuit. Rather than promoting engagement, they reduce the subjective cost of ongoing experience by lowering evaluative pressure. Because structured positive affect depends not only on the absence of distress but on a permissive balance between

monitoring and spontaneous engagement, opioid-induced calm is insufficient on its own. It removes friction without reinstating the control configuration required for rich, self-sustaining positive affect to emerge.

The anterior cingulate cortex and the insula normally operate as a tightly coupled monitoring system. Together, they integrate interoceptive signals, salience detection, and evaluative appraisal into a unified process that tracks what is happening in the body and whether it requires response. Through this coupling, bodily sensations are not merely registered, but interpreted as relevant, actionable information.

When co-activated, these regions bias attention toward internal signals, especially those associated with discomfort, arousal, or urgency. Sensation is converted into significance. Deviations are highlighted, bodily states are amplified in awareness, and the system remains poised to intervene, adjust, or correct. Opioid action weakens this coupling, reducing the transformation of sensation into demand, and thereby quieting experience without reorganizing it into an exploratory or generative regime.

Sustained or exaggerated connectivity within this circuit is consistently associated with chronic pain, persistent distress, and heightened vigilance. In such regimes, monitoring does not disengage once a signal has been detected. Instead, it remains continuously active, amplifying salience and preventing experience from receding into the background. Signals are not allowed to settle. They are repeatedly revisited, reweighted, and kept behaviorally relevant.

ACC-insula coupling implements an intrusive mode of monitoring in which bodily signals are continuously evaluated for urgency and corrective relevance.

Decoupling interrupts the transformation of sensation into evaluative demand. Signals remain present at the sensory level, but they no longer propagate automatically into urgency, correction, or action. Experience becomes quieter, not because sensation is suppressed, but because the pressure to evaluate and intervene is reduced..

Opioids functionally isolate the ACC by reducing its capacity to capture and sustain subcortical coordination. This distinction is critical. ACC activity persists, but its access to key input and output pathways that normally sustain evaluative control is reduced. As a result, evaluation continues, but it is no longer tightly informed by bodily salience nor effectively linked to action.

One major source of ACC input is the insula, which conveys interoceptive and salience-related information. Through this pathway, bodily states are rendered urgent and behaviorally relevant. Opioid-induced decoupling of ACC-insula connectivity attenuates this input, reducing the intensity and priority of interoceptive signals before they reach evaluative processing.

A second critical pathway links the ACC to the putamen, a striatal structure involved in action selection, initiation, stopping, and response gating. The putamen is densely

innervated by both μ -opioid receptors and dopaminergic projections. Through this interface, evaluative signals from the ACC gain leverage over selection and inhibition. By weakening ACC-putamen coupling, opioids disrupt the translation of evaluation into commitment, correction, or termination of action.

As a result, opioids act on the monitoring system at two complementary levels. First, they reduce the salience and urgency of incoming signals by decoupling evaluation from interoceptive input. Second, they weaken the downstream impact of evaluation by decoupling it from action-selection and inhibition mechanisms. Monitoring is therefore not eliminated, but functionally degraded. It remains present in a fragmented form, yet it loses coherence, leverage, and authority over behavior.

This mechanism accounts for a robust empirical pattern. Despite clear and reproducible changes in functional connectivity within cingulo-insular and striatal circuits, most studies report little or no reliable increase in positive mood following opioid administration. This is not an anomaly. Opioids do not generate positive affect. They primarily reduce negativity, alarm, and urgency by disrupting the pathways that normally sustain evaluative monitoring. Any subjective relief that occurs reflects a loosening of control rather than the emergence of joy, ease, or other structured positive states.

Within this framework, the absence of strong mood elevation is not a failure of sensitivity or measurement. It is the expected outcome. Opioids modify the conditions under which experience unfolds by lowering evaluative pressure, but they do not, by themselves, organize a permissive regime. They relax constraint without providing structure. A gate is opened, but no trajectory is established. As a result, experience may become quieter or less demanding, yet it does not acquire the continuity, direction, or self-sustaining dynamics characteristic of rich positive affect.

This means the drug is not a generator of ease. It does not create positive affect, amplify pleasure, or introduce a new affective signal into the system. There is no production of ease, euphoria, or a distinct positive tone as an output. What changes is not the content of experience, but how existing signals are handled by the control system.

The primary effect is a reduction of negativity, threat, and alarm. Signals associated with urgency, discomfort, or relevance continue to arise, but they no longer automatically trigger escalation, evaluation, or correction. Experience becomes quieter rather than richer. Relief is felt as the absence of pressure, not as the presence of something added.

Opioids therefore do not open ease itself. They open access conditions. They do so by lifting an evaluative barrier that ordinarily prevents permissive regimes from stabilizing. This barrier is not emotional in nature. It is structural. It consists in the tight coupling between the monitoring system, centered on the anterior cingulate cortex, and its principal sources of evidence and control.

By functionally decoupling the ACC from interoceptive input provided by the insula and from selection and inhibition signals provided by the putamen, opioids reduce the authority of monitoring without eliminating it. Evaluation becomes underinformed rather than absent. It remains present, but its capacity to interrupt, enforce, or prematurely close experience is weakened. In this configuration, trajectories are less likely to be cut short at onset, even though no positive regime is actively organized.

The opening of a permissive regime does not require an increase in valence or reward signaling. It requires a temporary suspension of evaluative enforcement. Ease, when it occurs, does not arise because the system is pushed upward, but because it is no longer pulled into correction.

So, within the Ease-Soo framework, opioids occupy a strictly circumscribed functional role. They are not affective generators and they do not constitute a mechanism for producing positive experience. Their contribution is indirect and architectural.

The neurotransmitter system involved is the μ -opioid system. Its action is not global and not diffuse, but concentrated on a specific control circuit linking the anterior cingulate cortex, the insula, and the putamen. This circuit implements evaluative monitoring by integrating interoceptive signals, salience assignment, and action selection.

The primary effect of μ -opioid activation is a functional decoupling of monitoring from its inputs. Interoceptive information from the insula and decisional and gating signals from the putamen are weakened in their influence on the ACC. Monitoring remains present, but it operates with degraded evidence and reduced authority.

The functional consequence of this decoupling is a reduction in premature closure. Evaluative intervention is delayed, urgency is softened, and trajectories are less likely to be interrupted at their earliest stages. This can facilitate fragile entry into permissive regimes by lowering the threshold imposed by continuous evaluation.

The limitation is explicit and structural. Opioids do not induce joy, ease, or any other form of positive affect on their own. They modify access conditions without specifying experiential content. They open a gate without providing what passes through it.

Five days of opioid administration in humans is sufficient to produce measurable changes in large-scale functional connectivity. The observed effects are not diffuse or global, but patterned and selective. Functional connectivity decreases are reported between the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and the insula, between the rostral anterior cingulate cortex and frontal regions, between the insula and opercular or parietal cortices, and between prefrontal regions and posterior cingulate and parietal areas.

These changes converge on a common feature. The dominant effects are concentrated in limbic and supralimbic systems, particularly in regions responsible for integration

rather than primary signal generation. Sensory cortices are largely spared. There is no evidence of a uniform collapse of cortical communication. Instead, the pattern reflects a selective decoupling of integrative hubs that normally bind bodily signals, salience, evaluation, and contextual control into a coherent monitoring regime.

This selectivity is critical. It indicates that opioids do not silence the brain or broadly suppress activity. They disrupt specific pathways through which information acquires relevance and authority. The affected connections are precisely those that support the transformation of interoceptive and contextual signals into evaluative pressure.

As stated explicitly by the authors, the anterior cingulate cortex and the insula function together within the salience network to integrate interoceptive information with emotional salience and awareness. Reducing connectivity within this network therefore weakens the system's capacity to treat internal signals as urgent, meaningful, or action-relevant. What is altered is not the presence of sensation or emotion, but the integrative process that normally elevates them into objects of continuous monitoring.

The openness of evaluative monitoring depends in part on μ -opioid receptor-mediated gating within anterior insula-cingulate-striatal hubs. These hubs sit at a critical junction between bodily signals, salience assignment, and control. By regulating the gain of transmission through these pathways, μ -opioid signaling alters not what information exists in the system, but how forcefully that information is allowed to shape evaluation and action.

Under acute activation, this gating mechanism transiently relaxes salience hierarchies. Signals that would normally be elevated to high priority lose some of their urgency. Interoceptive inputs remain present, but they are less likely to dominate attention, trigger alarm, or demand immediate correction. Evaluation becomes less insistent. Monitoring remains online, but it operates with reduced pressure and delayed intervention. This creates a temporary condition in which trajectories can unfold without being prematurely interrupted.

Chronic exposure produces the opposite outcome. Repeated engagement of μ -opioid receptors leads to adaptive changes within the same circuitry. Receptor desensitization, synaptic remodeling, and altered coupling patterns progressively restore or even amplify monitoring demands. The system compensates for the repeated gating by stabilizing alternative pathways of evaluation and control. Over time, this results in structural and functional rigidification. The circuitry becomes less flexible, less responsive to transient opening, and more prone to early closure.

This dynamic explains a persistent difficulty in the neuroimaging literature. The failure to identify consistent opioid-related biomarkers does not reflect measurement error or insufficient sensitivity. It reflects the nature of the effect itself. Opioids do not produce stable activation patterns that can be averaged across time, subjects, or contexts. They modulate control regimes, altering how signals are weighted, integrated, and acted upon depending on the current state of the system.

Because these effects operate at the level of evaluative and salience-based control, they are inherently context-dependent. The same pharmacological intervention can appear calming, neutral, or destabilizing depending on baseline monitoring load, task demands, and prior exposure. Static snapshots of brain activity or averaged connectivity measures therefore fail to capture the functional shift. What changes is not a localized signal, but the conditions under which signals acquire relevance.

What opioids alter is not experience itself, but the authority of evaluative control over its continuation. They reduce the likelihood of premature interruption without organizing what follows. In this sense, opioids do not generate positive affect. They merely suspend enforcement, leaving experience quieter, but structurally unchanged.

They can sometimes force ease, however, they can't unlock a regime for long. It's because opioids act in exactly the wrong way for something that is supposed to remain open.

They do not let a regime unfold, they replace it. Opioids directly produce a state. Even if that state feels warm, calm, or deeply pleasant, it is immediately attributable to an internal, identifiable cause. The system very quickly learns "this comes from that." The experience is no longer something that happens, it is something that is induced. That attribution alone is enough to close the opening.

Second, opioids do not truly suspend evaluation, they bypass it. They silence certain loops instead of letting them go quiet. Monitoring is not passively relaxed, it is partially anesthetized. But a durable regime cannot rest on anesthesia or force. It requires the absence of correction, not an artificially imposed inability to correct.

Time structure matters as well. Durable opening depends on unpredictability and on a weak but real contrast. Opioids have the opposite profile. Their kinetics are legible. The onset is anticipated, the plateau is recognized, the offset is expected. Even if the first exposures feel unusually deep or revealing, the system rapidly learns the shape of the experience. Once recognized, it becomes fixed.

Adaptation is unavoidable. Not only in the narrow pharmacological sense of tolerance, but in a structural sense. Each episode teaches the system something, how to obtain it, when it arrives, what it feels like. That accumulated knowledge closes the space in which surprise could still occur. The opening does not disappear because pleasure fades, it disappears because everything becomes known.

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Alcohol, low dose


Alcohol can produce a stable, pleasant, and sometimes strikingly intense positive state, but it does so through active modulation of the system rather than through a suspension of control. The resulting state typically has a clear onset, persists over hours, and may reach high intensity. It can feel subjectively expansive or even clarifying, and it is often experienced as genuine, robust, and repeatable. There is no reason to deny either its reality or its experiential significance.

However, this positivity is structurally distinct from permissive or unsupervised regimes. It depends on an explicit external variable, dose, timing, and pharmacokinetics, and it is governed by tolerance and predictable causal relationships. Even when the causal chain is fully accepted and generates no internal conflict, the positive state remains something added to the system. It is produced by an intervention rather than emerging from the absence of evaluative supervision. The system remains organized around a known cause, and the experience remains anchored to that cause.

This distinction helps explain an otherwise puzzling pattern in the literature. Alcohol reliably produces strong effects on mood, euphoria, and sociability, yet it does not yield clear or consistent evidence of increased spontaneous, non-instrumental access to positive experience. These two phenomena can coexist in the same individual, but they unfold according to different dynamics, are constrained by different mechanisms, and therefore leave different empirical footprints.

The difference is structural, not experiential. In one case, positive experience is causally added to the system. It is stable, externally anchored, dose and timing

dependent, and governed by tolerance. The system remains organized around an identifiable cause, and the positive state is maintained as long as that cause is active.



Two structurally distinct routes to positive experience. Left, a positive state is causally added through active modulation. It has a clear external cause, predictable onset, dose and timing dependence, and is bounded by tolerance. Evaluative control remains organized around an identifiable causal chain. Right, positive experience emerges from control suspension. No affective signal is introduced. Instead, evaluative enforcement is relaxed, allowing experience to persist without premature correction. The resulting positivity has no identifiable cause, no fixed onset, and no external handle. Both can feel genuine and intense, but they rely on different mechanisms, follow different dynamics, and leave different empirical signatures.

Thinking low-dose alcohol as a transient event

A subtle but recurring observation is that when an effect is expected to arrive as a discrete event rather than as a gradual process to be tracked, subjective experience often feels smoother, more coherent, and less disrupted by self-evaluation. This difference cannot be explained by pharmacology alone. It arises from the structure of expectation established before consumption.

In the usual case, anticipation is instrumental. The system continuously monitors change: is it starting, is it strong enough, is it working. This mode of anticipation sustains a dense monitoring loop. Sensations are repeatedly sampled, evaluated against expectations, and immediately reintegrated into control. The effect therefore

unfolds under supervision. Even when genuine physiological changes occur, they are rapidly compressed by commentary and adjustment.

When the effect is instead expected to occur as an event, continuous tracking is reduced. The system does not remain poised to measure incremental change. As a result, evaluative sampling is delayed, and experience is allowed to cohere before being assessed. What differs is not the underlying pharmacological process, but whether anticipation recruits ongoing monitoring or permits temporary non-inspection.

Framing the effect as an event alters this regime. An event is not optimized. It is not gradually tuned or incrementally corrected. It either arrives or it does not. By expecting the effect to come “as an event,” the system relinquishes fine-grained temporal tracking. There is no continuous scale to inspect, no gradient to exploit, no micro-decision to update. Anticipation becomes passive rather than active.

This shift has several consequences. First, agency is externalized. The effect is no longer something the subject is producing or managing, but something that may happen. This alone reduces evaluative pressure. Second, temporal resolution is coarsened. Instead of monitoring a rising curve, the system waits for a threshold crossing. Until that crossing occurs, there is nothing to act upon. Third, prediction becomes less precise. Without a detailed expected trajectory, incoming sensations are less likely to be immediately categorized as success or failure.

This does not amplify the pharmacological effect itself. What changes is the informational context into which the effect arrives. When alcohol-induced changes occur under reduced monitoring, they are less likely to be instantly reabsorbed into control processes. The experience is allowed to unfold before it is interpreted.

This mechanism is not specific to alcohol. Similar dynamics appear in many domains: waiting for laughter rather than trying to laugh, letting music ‘*hit*’ rather than listening for impact, or entering a game session without tracking whether enjoyment has started. In all these cases, treating the outcome as an event suspends continuous self-assessment and preserves openness at the moment of entry.

The effect is fragile. Once this framing becomes deliberate or ritualized, it loses its power. If expecting an event becomes a technique, monitoring quietly reenters through the back door. The system begins to evaluate whether the strategy is working, reinstating the very loop that was temporarily suspended. What initially functioned as a reduction of control becomes another layer of control.

The broader implication is that subjective effects are shaped not only by stimuli or substances, but by the structure of anticipation that precedes them. Experiences that are allowed to arrive as events encounter less resistance than those expected to perform on demand. In many cases, the difference between a flattened experience and a vivid one lies not in intensity, but in whether the system is watching itself too closely while waiting.

In this sense, some experiences work better not when they are pursued efficiently, but when they are permitted to happen.

Alcohol's primary effect

Across converging lines of evidence, including acute pharmacological studies, resting state connectivity analyses, task based paradigms, graph theoretical approaches, and meta analytic syntheses, alcohol's primary effect does not appear to lie in the direct generation of affective signals. It does not reliably produce positive affect as a simple output of stimulation. Instead, its dominant action targets the salience network that governs how signals are selected, weighted, and brought under evaluation.

Under acute exposure, alcohol transiently disrupts salience based monitoring. Functional coupling within key salience hubs is reduced, weakening the automatic promotion of interoceptive and contextual signals into states of urgency. Internal signals continue to arise, but they are less likely to be prioritized, amplified, or treated as requiring immediate response. Monitoring remains present, but its influence is softened. Evaluation becomes less intrusive, and ongoing experiential trajectories are less likely to be interrupted at their earliest stages.

With chronic exposure, the initial, transient disruption of salience based monitoring gives way to a different control regime. Repeated alcohol use induces structural and functional rigidification within the same salience network. Connectivity patterns consolidate into altered configurations, compensatory pathways are recruited, and evaluative monitoring reasserts itself. When it returns, it is often less flexible and more erratic, increasing the likelihood of brittle or dysregulated control rather than sustained openness. The early reduction in evaluative pressure is therefore not preserved, but replaced by a system that is harder to modulate and more prone to instability.

The subjective stimulation commonly reported under alcohol reflects a separate process. It is primarily mediated by striatal motor and dopaminergic systems associated with activation, disinhibition, and motor readiness. This form of stimulation is orthogonal to salience monitoring. It can occur alongside a temporary reduction in evaluative pressure, but it neither accounts for that reduction nor produces permissive affective regimes on its own. Activation can increase energy and expressiveness, but without altering the control architecture, it does not generate unsupervised positive experience.

Taken together, these findings support a clear dissociation. Motor activation, salience monitoring, and the conditions that permit non-instrumental affective states are governed by partially independent mechanisms. Alcohol acts primarily on how signals are prioritized and evaluated, not on their generation. Any facilitation of permissive affective regimes therefore reflects a transient weakening of evaluative monitoring rather than the production of positive affect.

Consistent with this account, alcohol reliably reduces functional connectivity between the anterior insula and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, a connection that constitutes the core of the salience network. Across studies, the degree of aINS-dACC decoupling predicts subjective calm and relief. This relationship is systematic rather than incidental. Stronger functional uncoupling is associated with a more pronounced reduction in internal pressure, experienced as quieting rather than stimulation.

Within the framework developed here, these cortical effects should be understood as downstream consequences of subcortical modulation. In particular, alcohol biases how bodily coordination is recruited by altering thalamic gain and the likelihood that the periaqueductal gray is recruited into anticipatory coordination, with salience network decoupling emerging as a secondary effect rather than the primary locus of action.

This reframes the effect in precise terms. Alcohol does not simply “calm” the system in a diffuse or nonspecific way. Calm scales with the weakening of interoceptive monitoring. What changes is not the content of internal signals, but their status within the control architecture. As the coupling between bodily input and evaluative enforcement is reduced, internal states lose their compulsory significance.

Functionally, the anterior insula provides the primary interoceptive input to the monitoring system, conveying information about bodily state, arousal, and internal change. The dorsal anterior cingulate cortex serves as a control and allocation node. It assigns priority, sustains attention, mobilizes resources, and signals the need for correction or action. Coupling between these regions implements a simple but powerful operation: what is felt is automatically treated as relevant and in need of response.

In the coupled regime, internal sensations are rapidly converted into imperatives. Discomfort is translated into urgency, arousal into demand. Even neutral bodily fluctuations acquire priority and are drawn into evaluation. Continuous monitoring is sustained not by explicit threat, but by the automatic transformation of feeling into significance.

When alcohol functionally decouples the anterior insula from the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, this transformation is interrupted. Interoceptive signals continue to arise, and bodily sensations persist. Motivation and drive are not abolished. What changes is that these signals no longer automatically escalate into evaluation, alarm, or corrective action. The monitoring system remains structurally intact, but it operates with degraded evidence. In this sense, it is not silenced, but deprived of reliable input.

This produces a characteristic misalignment. The cortical monitoring apparatus remains present and may even remain active, but it no longer has access to the interoceptive evidence that normally licenses intervention. Evaluation loses urgency. Corrective processes are delayed or fail to engage. The system settles not because

affective signals are suppressed, but because the demand to respond to them is weakened.

This account explains several features of alcohol's phenomenology. It explains why alcohol can produce calm without reliably producing positive affect. It explains why it may transiently facilitate entry into permissive regimes by delaying premature closure. And it explains why it does not organize stable ease. The intervention acts on monitoring and prioritization, not on the generation or stabilization of non-instrumental affective states.

Some studies suggest that alcohol induces a broader reconfiguration of cortical network topology beyond simple pairwise connectivity changes. Rather than uniformly increasing or suppressing activity, alcohol alters how information is routed and integrated across the cortex. Local processing becomes relatively stronger, while long range pathways become less efficient, more fragmented, and less reliable. Communication across distant regions is disrupted, and the functional center of gravity of cortical activity shifts toward frontal and temporal systems.

This pattern does not reflect simple activation or generalized inhibition. It indicates a functional re-segmentation of the network. Large scale integration is weakened, and cortical processing becomes organized into more locally coherent but globally decoupled clusters. Information diffusion slows, coordination across systems becomes less stable, and no single evaluative or control perspective can easily dominate the network as a whole.

In this configuration, monitoring is not suppressed but provincialized. Evaluative processes continue to operate within local circuits, yet they lose the capacity to coordinate global control. No single monitoring perspective retains sufficient reach to impose priorities across the entire system. Signals can still be registered and appraised, but their ability to propagate, synchronize, and dominate system-wide behavior is reduced.

This helps account for the characteristic effects of alcohol on experience. Local evaluation persists, but global coherence weakens. As a result, experience feels quieter, less compelled, and less tightly managed, even though cognitive, perceptual, and motivational processes remain active.

Alongside this re-segmentation, some studies indicate a transient and context-dependent stimulatory component. This effect is poorly captured by resting-state connectivity measures, as it depends on task engagement, environmental input, and ongoing activity. Under permissive conditions, such activation can interact with reduced global monitoring to support the emergence of ease. It does not generate ease on its own, but it can contribute once premature closure has already been relaxed.

This account also clarifies why alcohol is so often mistaken for a genuine opening of positive experience. By delaying evaluative closure, it can temporarily recreate the

conditions under which experience feels more available, less compelled, and less managed. This delay is easily misread as the presence of a new affective regime, when it is in fact only the postponement of control.

The system does not enter a stable permissive state. It merely takes longer to close. Because closure is experienced as the loss of something rather than as an active process, its delay creates a convincing illusion of access. What appears to be an opening is structurally a suspension.

This explains both the appeal and the limitation of alcohol. It can make room for ease by weakening the mechanisms that normally prevent it, but it does not supply the conditions required for its organization or persistence. Once monitoring reasserts itself, no trace of the regime remains, and repeated exposure accelerates its rigid return rather than preventing it.

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Where is the amygdala ?

The amygdala is primarily a threat-reactive structure. Its function is to detect danger, signal acute risk, and mobilize rapid defensive responses. When fear, panic, or immediate threat is present, amygdala-driven processes dominate attention and behavior. It activates strongly in response to specific cues and deactivates once the threat has passed.

Background monitoring operates differently. The form of monitoring that prevents settling, resting, or allowing experience to run on its own does not depend on the amygdala. It persists even in the absence of fear, danger, or explicit negative emotion. This background vigilance is carried by the insula-ACC circuit. Unlike the amygdala, this system does not wait for threat. It continuously tracks salience, bodily signals, relevance, and potential need for intervention.

The anterior insula provides a stream of interoceptive information, reporting fluctuations in bodily state, arousal, and internal change. The anterior cingulate cortex integrates this information with context, effort, and control demands. Together, they implement a standing evaluative process. Sensations are not merely felt, they are assessed for importance. Even neutral or ambiguous signals are monitored, ranked, and held ready for correction or action.

In this regime, the problem is not fear. It is chronic salience. Experience remains under constant evaluation because signals are continuously treated as potentially meaningful. The system stays alert not because something is wrong, but because something might matter. This produces a persistent state of low-level tension, vigilance, or inability to settle, without requiring anxiety in the clinical sense.

Although the amygdala is classically threat-biased, it is not exclusively a “fear center”. Intracranial stimulation studies indicate that amygdala stimulation can rarely elicit pleasant sensations, suggesting a broader role in affective salience. The claim here is not that the amygdala cannot participate in positive affect, but that chronic background monitoring and regime fragility can persist without amygdala-mediated fear. Even in a large dataset of direct intracranial stimulation trials, negative affective responses were substantially more common than pleasant sensations, suggesting that positive regimes are gated rather than the default output of salience-related circuitry. (Villiard, 2023). The anxiolytic and calming effects of a wide range of substances converge on this same mechanism. Despite their pharmacological differences, these agents commonly reduce functional connectivity between the anterior insula and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. This decoupling disrupts the automatic transformation of interoceptive signals into evaluative imperatives. Bodily sensations continue to arise, but they no longer immediately demand interpretation, prioritization, or response.

As a result, background monitoring loses coherence and urgency. Evaluation becomes less intrusive. Premature interruption of ongoing experience is delayed. This can facilitate fragile entry into permissive regimes by lowering the threshold imposed by continuous salience tracking.

However, this mechanism has clear limits. Decoupling facilitates entry, but it does not create lock-in. It does not organize or sustain non-instrumental affective regimes on its own. In some cases, by weakening evaluative structure too broadly or too persistently, it can prevent structuring altogether, leading instead to flatness, sedation, or disengagement. The effect is therefore opening without stabilization, a reduction of pressure without the conditions required for durable ease.

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Tolerance

After chronic morphine treatment, μ -opioid signaling becomes tolerant in a synapse-specific manner within the thalamo to cingulate cortex pathway, with clear sex differences. In other words, it is not “the brain” that becomes tolerant. Tolerance emerges at a precise relay point between sensory input and evaluative processing.

Tolerance develops at thalamo-cortical synapses projecting to the cingulate cortex, via both presynaptic and postsynaptic μ -opioid receptors. These are exactly the synapses that carry raw sensory signals upward into the evaluative monitoring system of the ACC. Opioid tolerance therefore forms where signals become tagged as important.

Functionally, acute opioid exposure initially reduces thalamic input to the anterior cingulate cortex, decreasing signal salience and lowering evaluative monitoring. During this early phase, fewer signals acquire urgency or demand response. Experience becomes quieter because the monitor is temporarily deprived of its primary sensory and contextual inputs. This constitutes an acute opening.

Over time, however, this inhibition adapts. Thalamic signals progressively regain influence, and evaluative monitoring reactivates despite continued drug presence. The result is not sustained openness, but a transition from initial opening to adaptive closure. Monitoring returns, often abruptly and inconsistently, as compensatory mechanisms restore signal transmission.

Tolerance is not uniform across the system. Different synapses adapt at different rates, depending on synapse class, sex, exposure pattern, and circuit location. Some pathways become tolerant while others remain sensitive. The monitoring system

therefore becomes heterogeneous rather than simply suppressed or restored. It is neither fully open nor fully closed, but fragmented, unstable, and noisy.

This configuration corresponds closely to the control conditions associated with chronic suffering and addiction. Monitoring remains active, but in a degraded form. Signals intermittently regain salience, evaluation reasserts itself unpredictably, and corrective pressure returns without coherence or resolution.

Consistent with this account, opioid tolerance appears preferentially at thalamo-cortical synapses projecting to the anterior cingulate cortex. What becomes tolerant is not analgesia in general, but the gating of sensory and bodily signals into evaluative monitoring. The system learns to reimpose evaluation despite pharmacological suppression, producing a regime characterized not by relief, but by persistent instability and distress.

Why It's never enough

That pull toward “more intensity” is not a side effect or a personal quirk, it is baked into how the system treats any positive state once it becomes noticeable.

The key point is that the demand for more does not come from a lack in the experience itself. It comes from the moment the experience is turned into an object of evaluation. As soon as ease is present and recognized as such, the system automatically frames it along a dimension, intensity, duration, purity, stability. Once a dimension exists, a higher point on that dimension is always imaginable. There is no natural stopping rule. The question “could this be stronger?” does not require dissatisfaction to arise, it only requires measurability.

What is striking is the timing. When ease is absent, people do not usually think in terms of “I want this but 10 times stronger.” Instead, the dominant feeling is flatness, disengagement, or the vague sense that nothing really matters. The infinite gradient only appears once access is restored. That alone tells you the request for more is not the cause of ease failing, it is a reaction to ease succeeding. The system wakes up because there is finally something to optimize again.

This is also why increasing intensity never solves the problem. Suppose intensity were suddenly multiplied by five or fifty. The subjective impact would be real, but only briefly. Very quickly, the reference point would shift. The new state would become the baseline, and the same comparison would reappear, now pointing slightly above the new level. The mechanism does not care about absolute magnitude. It only cares that there is a direction in which “better” can be imagined. That is why the desire feels bottomless. It is not chasing pleasure, it is expressing the logic of optimization applied to an experience that was never meant to be optimized.

There is a subtle irony here. Ease is often one of the only states that makes this mechanism visible. When nothing is felt, there is nothing to push against. When ease

appears, even quietly, it becomes illuminated, named, inspected. The very act of noticing it installs a viewpoint from which it can be judged. And the judgment “this is good” almost automatically invites the follow-up “so why not better?” That follow-up already carries control back into the picture.

This is why the sense of “it’s good, but it could be more” can coexist with genuine satisfaction at the phenomenological level. The experience itself may feel full, coherent, and sufficient. The dissatisfaction is not in the feeling, it is in the commentary layered on top of it. The system is not responding to a deficit in ease, it is responding to the opportunity to generate a gradient.

Seen this way, the endless wish for more intensity is not telling you that ease is weak. It is telling you that ease has crossed the threshold where it becomes legible to an optimizing system. Ease, on its own, does not ask to be intensified. It does not point upward. It is complete by default. The sense that it should be amplified is something added afterward, by a mode of operation that cannot help but search for improvement once it detects a variable it can act on.

What happens to ease with informational aging ?

What is being described here is informational aging (Z) rather than biological aging. The distinction matters because these two processes are largely independent. Biological aging refers to cellular damage, metabolic decline, organ degradation, and the physiological limits of tissue maintenance. Informational aging, by contrast, refers to the cumulative buildup of causal memory inside the cognitive system. This includes learned associations, predictive models, habits of interpretation, expectations about outcomes, and implicit rules about how the world works. These structures do not reside in cells as wear and tear, but in the organization of inference itself.

Even if biological aging were slowed, halted, or reversed, informational aging would continue as long as the system keeps learning and optimizing. Every experience slightly narrows the space of uncertainty by turning open possibilities into known patterns. The world becomes more predictable, more compressible, and more efficiently modeled. This efficiency is adaptive, but it comes at a cost. As causal memory accumulates, novelty decreases, surprise is dampened, and incoming signals are increasingly filtered through prior structure. The system becomes better at prediction but worse at remaining open.

Z is not caused by damage or decline. It is caused by successful learning. The more accurately a system predicts, the more rigid its internal models become. This rigidity is self-reinforcing because prediction success encourages further reliance on existing models rather than exploration. Over time, experience stops arriving as raw events and instead arrives already explained, categorized, and evaluated. This is why informational aging progresses even in a perfectly healthy brain.

From this perspective, stopping biological aging does not reset access to certain experiential regimes, because the limiting factor is not energy, health, or neural capacity. It is Z that constrains how experience can be encountered. As long as memory continues to bind causes to effects, meanings to signals, and actions to outcomes, informational aging advances. The system does not grow old because it decays, it grows old because it remembers.

What is being addressed here is the fate of those who manage to open this regime at a point where cumulative informational load is still low enough to allow it. For these individuals, access remains possible not because of superior effort or insight, but because the system has not yet fully closed around its own predictions. Z is still sufficiently low that experience can slip through without being immediately captured, explained, or evaluated. In that sense, their trajectory is contingent rather than exemplary. It reflects timing and structural openness more than skill.

For those who do not succeed, the situation is more complex. Other strategies may still exist, partial openings, indirect routes, compensatory regimes, or alternative forms of engagement that preserve some degree of experiential richness. These approaches matter, and scientific work should continue to identify, refine, and extend them. The explicit goal of research in this area is to reduce the number of people for whom access becomes impossible, to delay closure, soften rigidity, and widen the conditions under which reopening can occur.

At the same time, it would be dishonest to suggest that success is guaranteed for everyone. There are cases where cumulative causal memory has become so dense that the regime may no longer be reachable in its original form. This is not a moral failure and not a lack of trying. It is a structural consequence of how learning, prediction, and memory accumulation operate over time. Science can mitigate this trajectory, but it cannot promise universal reversibility. Part of intellectual honesty is accepting that some limits are real, and that alongside good news and progress, there are also outcomes that remain fundamentally constrained.

Opening the ease regime does not grant immunity against informational accumulation. Even when access is restored and remains stable for months, the underlying system continues to learn, record, and compress experience. Z does not stop increasing simply because the regime is open. It may increase more slowly, or in a different configuration, but it still accumulates. Over time, the system can begin to recognize the regime itself as a pattern, something that happens, something that works, something that can be expected. That recognition is already the beginning of closure.

This means that long lasting access should not be mistaken for permanence. The ease regime is not a state that, once unlocked, remains for certain available indefinitely. It is a dynamic balance that can be overtaken by its own success. As the system incorporates the regime into its causal memory, the very conditions that allow

openness can be neutralized. What once arrived as an event begins to arrive as a known outcome, and known outcomes are evaluated, monitored, and stabilized. In that sense, Z can win not by force, but by assimilation.

The possibility that access may fade is not a failure of method or discipline. It is a structural risk inherent to any system that learns. Even successful reopening does not reverse informational aging, it temporarily outruns it. This is why the regime should be understood as fragile and time bound, not as a solved problem. The realistic position is neither despair nor certainty, but acceptance that some openings are temporary, and that at the time of this writing we simply don't know.

Reason for hope

It may be that this regime is not a fragile exception to optimization, but another mode of comparable strength. Optimization dominates because it is coherent, self reinforcing, and tightly coupled to learning and prediction. But ease, when it truly opens, shows similar properties. It can stabilize, persist, and organize experience according to its own internal logic. For a time, it can compete with optimization rather than merely interrupt it.

Seen this way, the question is not whether ease is weaker, but whether it is structurally outcompeted over long horizons. Optimization accumulates power because it feeds directly into memory, causality, and future control. Ease does not. It does not consolidate itself in the same way, which is precisely why it feels different. Its strength lies in immediate experiential organization rather than long term leverage. That makes it powerful in the present, but vulnerable over time.

So it is plausible that ease is a distinct operating mode, not a degraded or incomplete one. It can be just as total while it lasts. The asymmetry is temporal, not qualitative. Optimization tends to win in the end because it leaves durable traces, while ease resists being stored. When those traces eventually form anyway, Z reasserts itself. But during its window, ease is not weaker, it is simply playing a different game.

What we don't know and that only time will tell

First hypothesis, Z induces tolerance even after a ease regime has been opened.

Under this hypothesis, the initial opening of the regime does not provide lasting protection against the accumulation of Z. The regime can establish itself, sometimes remaining stable over long periods, but it remains sensitive to the gradual thickening of causal structure. Z does not act here as a simple entry lock, but as a slow variable that alters the conditions of propagation once the regime is active. Over time, even without explicit instrumental pursuit, experience becomes more pre-classified, more anticipated, more locally resolved. Ease does not disappear abruptly, it thins out. It retains its phenomenological signature, but loses its capacity for self-maintenance.

Episodes become more dependent on specific conditions, more sensitive to interruptions, and more easily reduced to a fragmentary state. In this framework, tolerance is not hedonic but structural. What decreases is not intensity, but the width of the permissive corridor. Z acts as a slow drift that reintroduces, even without intention, micro-forms of evaluation, recognition, and anticipatory closure. The regime remains accessible, but its cost of maintenance increases, and its spontaneity diminishes.

Second hypothesis, Z does not create tolerance once the regime is open.

Here, the opening of the regime corresponds to a deeper organizational shift that renders experience largely insensitive to the subsequent accumulation of Z. Once the permissive configuration is reached and stabilized, ease functions as a robust attractor rather than a fragile state. Z can continue to grow at the cognitive, narrative, or biographical level without directly affecting the dynamics of the regime, as long as the evaluator does not take control again. In this reading, Z is primarily a factor of access, not of degradation. It determines the difficulty of crossing the initial threshold, but not stability once that threshold has been crossed. Ease therefore persists even in the presence of a high density of knowledge, understanding, or causal memory, provided these are not recruited online. The regime is not eroded by habituation, because it does not rely on novelty or surprise, but on the absence of supervision. Repetition does not produce tolerance, it becomes neutral. The regime can remain stable over arbitrarily long durations, giving the impression of a durable, even definitive, opening.

We do not yet know the answer, and that uncertainty is not a minor detail. It is central. If tolerance truly applies to this regime, meaning that repeated access inevitably leads to its neutralization through accumulation of causal memory, then the implications are severe. It would mean that ease or related non-instrumental positive regimes are not just fragile, but fundamentally exhaustible at the level of a civilization. Once informational load crosses a certain point, access would close permanently, not just for individuals, but eventually for everyone.

The reason this matters is that no known technological intervention directly addresses the relevant mechanism. Technology can amplify reward, suppress pain, extend lifespan, and modulate arousal, but it does not selectively erase causal memory. There is no tool that can safely and precisely remove learned structure, unwind prediction scaffolds, or selectively reduce accumulated Z without also destroying competence, identity, or basic functioning. Likewise, there is no intervention that can simply reach into the ACC or related control structures and reconfigure them without massive side effects. These systems are deeply entangled with learning, decision making, and survival. They are not optional modules that can be tuned independently.

If tolerance does occur, then ease is not something that can be engineered back once it is gone. It would not be a problem solvable by more stimulation, better drugs, richer environments, or smarter interfaces. All of those operate downstream of the very

machinery that would be saturated. In that scenario, the disappearance of ease would not be dramatic or catastrophic, it would be quiet and structural. It would look like maturity, realism, efficiency, or adaptation, while something essential simply stops being reachable.

This is why the question is existential rather than theoretical. Either this regime is genuinely orthogonal to optimization and can coexist indefinitely without being absorbed, or it is only temporarily tolerated before being assimilated and erased. If the latter is true, then the long term trajectory is not just individual loss, but a progressive narrowing of human experience that no future technology can reverse.

At the same time, there are reasons not to panic. My own experience as the first subject, combined with the theoretical framework developed around it, currently points in the opposite direction. Over extended periods of stable access, there is no clear evidence of classical tolerance. The regime does not show the familiar signature of diminishing returns, escalation, or progressive blunting that characterizes reward based systems. Instead, access appears to remain qualitatively intact without requiring increasing intensity, frequency, or intervention. That alone is a strong signal that this regime may be structurally different from systems that inevitably burn out.

From a theoretical standpoint, this also makes sense. If the regime does not rely on reinforcement accumulation or consolidation into causal memory in the usual way, then there is no obvious mechanism by which tolerance would build. What would need to adapt? There is no escalating signal, no target to chase, no baseline to reset. The absence of instrumental pursuit may itself be protective. Rather than being worn down by repetition, the regime seems to persist precisely because it resists being learned as a tool.

So while the question remains open, the current evidence does not support an alarmist conclusion. There is, at present, no indication that repeated access necessarily leads to irreversible closure. The possibility remains that this mode is genuinely orthogonal to optimization and therefore not subject to the same long term erosion. That does not mean it is invulnerable, but it does mean that extinction is not the default expectation.

For now, optimism for a no tolerance regime is justified. The uncertainty is real but so is the evidence pointing toward stability. Until that balance shifts, the appropriate stance is cautious confidence.

However, one must unlock it at all before worrying about tolerance.

This point is especially important in light of current efforts to halt or reverse aging. Across all plausible scenarios, biological aging appears at least stoppable. In the most conservative view, aging is a thermodynamic process, and it is well established in the literature that entropy accumulation can be slowed, stabilized, often with relatively modest intervention. Note that these propositions remain debated, and no commitment is made here to any specific aging-intervention roadmap. The argument

does not depend on their success. It only requires that lifespan extension is being seriously pursued, while the experiential variables discussed here remain largely absent from that conversation. Causal memory is a partial exception, insofar as the system cannot stop learning, as discussed earlier. As a result, a substantial extension of human lifespan remains a realistic expectation. However, if cumulative causal load Z continues to increase with time, even in the absence of biological decline, the experiential profile of long-lived individuals may progressively narrow. Longevity, in this sense, risks amplifying the dissociation between survival and lived quality, making the interaction between aging, Z accumulation, and ease not a secondary concern but a central one.

This implies a more uncomfortable consequence, one that is difficult to avoid. Durable access to the ease regime is unlikely to be uniformly distributable. A separation is likely to emerge between those who managed to unlock this regime early enough, before Z became too high, and those for whom this opening never occurred, or occurred too late.

In this framework, Z does not act merely as a difficulty factor, but as a structurally irreversible variable beyond a certain point. As causal memory, anticipation, and evaluative closure thicken, the system does not lose the ability to feel, but the ability to let experience propagate without being immediately captured. The ease regime is not simply masked. It becomes structurally nonviable. The minimal conditions of permissivity can no longer be maintained long enough for control to reorganize.

This effectively produces two very different ways of inhabiting the world. On one side, a living experience, not more intense, but more permeable, where events continue to matter without needing to be justified, where something can still happen. On the other, a functional but indifferent experience, correctly evaluated, correctly understood, yet poor in propagation, where signals arrive and leave without ever organizing into carrying episodes.

It does not imply that future intervention, technological or cultural, will necessarily be able to reopen the regime for everyone. Even in the long term, even with better knowledge, it is plausible that some systems will simply have passed the point at which permissivity can become stable again.

This perspective is uncomfortable because it breaks with the implicit assumption that any important human capacity is universally recoverable. What is at stake here is not a deficit to be repaired, but a temporal window. Access to ease does not vanish abruptly, but it closes gradually, and it is plausible that it cannot be reopened in all cases.

Ultimately, this means that the central question is not only how to induce or produce this regime, but when. And that the moment at which it is unlocked may durably determine the very texture of how the world is experienced.

A word of caution is necessary. The notion that increasing Z can permanently block access to ease has not yet been empirically tested. Unlike chronological age, Z is not directly observable or easily indexed. Individuals of the same age can differ widely in Z, depending on developmental history, learning density, and exposure to sustained optimization. The hypothesis rests on a plausible mechanism: as Z accumulates, childhood ease fades, experience becomes increasingly pre-resolved, and optimization dominates perception and action. It is logically possible that this process compresses the experiential structure in a way that cannot be reconstructed or reversed by scientific intervention. However, this remains a theoretical risk rather than an established limit, and its irreversibility has not been demonstrated.

So can we modify the monitor ?

The monitor is not an on-off module that can be enabled or disabled at will. It is a control regime, continuously present as part of the system's architecture. What varies is not whether monitoring exists, but how it operates within time and experience.

Its parameters can shift. Monitoring can intervene early or late. It can act abruptly or continuously. It can operate at a global level or remain locally confined. These variations determine whether a trajectory is allowed to form, stabilize, and carry itself forward, or whether it is interrupted during emergence.

The presence of monitoring alone does not preclude permissive regimes. What matters is the timing and manner of its engagement. When monitoring intervenes too early, it collapses the trajectory before it can stabilize. When it arrives later, once continuity is already established, it may coexist with the regime without terminating it.

Monitoring therefore functions as a temporal constraint rather than a binary switch. It shapes the window in which experience can unfold. The difference between access and failure is not the absence of control, but whether control is introduced before or after a regime has had time to take shape.

Several dimensions of monitoring are, in principle, adjustable. These dimensions do not determine whether monitoring exists, but how it expresses itself within ongoing experience.

The first is timing, when the monitor intervenes. This is the most critical parameter. Monitoring can arrive early, during the fragile formation of a trajectory, or later, once a regime has already stabilized. Early intervention preempts continuity. Later intervention may be tolerated, because the regime is already carrying itself forward.

The second is gain, how strongly monitoring cuts or constrains. Monitoring can operate in a sharp, interruptive mode that enforces discrete correction, or in a low-gain mode that preserves continuity while remaining present. High-gain intervention fragments experience. Low-gain monitoring may coexist with it.

The third is the target, what exactly is being evaluated. Monitoring does not have to apply to the entire experience. It may track outcomes, actions, bodily signals, or contextual variables. Different targets produce different forms of disruption. Some targets immediately collapse permissive regimes, while others leave them largely intact.

The fourth is granularity, whether evaluation is global or micro-local. Global monitoring imposes system-wide constraints and tends to terminate regimes wholesale. Micro-local monitoring may affect only specific elements, allowing broader continuity to persist.

Together, these dimensions define how monitoring operates as a regime rather than as a switch. Small changes in timing, gain, target, or granularity can determine whether experience is allowed to unfold or is interrupted at the moment it begins to stabilize.

Among these dimensions, timing is the most critical. Monitoring cannot be eliminated without destroying the agent. An adaptive system without monitoring would lose the capacity to learn, correct, or maintain coherence. The issue is therefore not whether monitoring should exist, but when it intervenes.

What can be altered is the delay before intervention. Monitoring does not need to engage at the first sign of relevance. It can arrive later, after a trajectory has already begun to organize itself. This temporal delay is decisive.

If monitoring intervenes too early, during the fragile phase in which a trajectory is still forming, the process collapses. Continuity is interrupted before it can stabilize. The regime never has the chance to become self-sustaining. Nothing appears to fail, yet nothing takes hold.

If monitoring intervenes later, once a trajectory has already stabilized into a coherent regime, its presence becomes tolerable. Evaluation may occur without fragmenting experience, because continuity is already established. The regime can persist even under observation.

This difference is purely temporal. The same monitoring machinery is involved in both cases. What determines access or collapse is not the strength or intention of monitoring, but whether it is introduced before or after stabilization. Timing alone determines whether a trajectory is allowed to form a stable regime or is terminated prematurely.

Fragile entry states are extremely sensitive to early intervention. During their initial phase, trajectories have not yet stabilized into a self-sustaining regime. Continuity is tentative, and small disruptions are sufficient to terminate the process.

If the monitor arrives too soon, the trajectory collapses before stabilization can occur. Evaluation reintroduces comparison, reference, and correction at a moment when

none can be absorbed. The system interrupts itself upstream, not because the emerging state is problematic, but because it has become evaluable too early. The regime aborts without ever fully forming.

If the monitor arrives later, the situation changes. Once a trajectory has stabilized, its presence becomes tolerable. Evaluation can occur without fragmenting experience, because continuity is already established. Monitoring no longer functions as an interruption, but as a background process.

The decisive factor is not whether evaluation is present, but whether it breaks continuity. Continuous, low-disruption evaluation can coexist with a stabilized regime. Abrupt or early evaluation cannot. Fragile entry states therefore depend less on the absence of monitoring than on its delayed engagement.

Gain matters, but in a specific way. The critical distinction is not between monitoring and no monitoring, but between different modes of intervention. The monitor can operate in a binary, cutting mode, or in a tolerant, continuity-preserving mode.

In a cutting mode, evaluation is discrete and interruptive. It arrives as a break. The system pauses, compares, and corrects. Even a single such cut is sufficient to fragment a fragile regime, because continuity is broken and must be re-established from scratch. For entry states, this interruption is terminal.

In a tolerant mode, monitoring remains active but does not impose sharp discontinuities. Evaluation is continuous, low-gain, and non-intrusive. It tracks without forcing immediate correction. Under these conditions, continuity can be preserved. The regime is not destabilized because nothing compels a reset.

What destroys the state, therefore, is not evaluation itself. It is discontinuous evaluation. Abrupt, discrete cuts terminate the regime by breaking temporal coherence. Continuous, low-disruption monitoring can coexist with a stabilized state, provided it does not impose interruptions that fragment unfolding experience.

In short, the critical variable is not whether the system evaluates, but how and when evaluation is introduced relative to the formation of the trajectory. Evaluation is not inherently incompatible with permissive regimes. What matters is its timing and its mode of operation.

When evaluation is introduced early, before continuity has stabilized, it fragments the process. The trajectory is cut while still forming, and the regime collapses without ever becoming self-sustaining. When evaluation is introduced later, once the trajectory is already coherent, it may coexist with the regime without terminating it.

Similarly, when evaluation operates in a discontinuous, high-gain mode, it interrupts experience by imposing discrete cuts. When it operates in a continuous,

low-disruption mode, it can remain present without breaking continuity. The same evaluative machinery is involved in both cases.

Access or failure therefore depends on the temporal relationship between evaluation and trajectory formation. The system does not need to stop evaluating. It needs evaluation to arrive late enough, and gently enough, for a trajectory to have time to take shape.

Ease appears when the monitor intervenes after stabilization, not before. The permissive regime does not require the absence of evaluation. It requires that evaluation arrive late enough for continuity to establish itself.

If monitoring arrives too early, the trajectory collapses during formation. Evaluation introduces reference, comparison, and correction at a moment when the process cannot absorb them. The regime aborts before it can organize itself into something self-sustaining.

If monitoring arrives later, once the regime is already carrying itself forward, its presence becomes tolerable. Evaluation no longer fragments experience because continuity is already in place. The trajectory can persist even under observation, provided that evaluation does not impose abrupt interruption.

The difference between collapse and persistence is therefore purely temporal. The same monitoring machinery is involved in both cases. Ease depends on delayed monitoring, not on the elimination of evaluation.

Principles for good conditioning

I propose that we think in terms of conditions rather than outcomes. It is similar to sleep: to fall asleep, you turn off the lights and stop looking at screens but none of this guarantees anything. If you are genetically prone to insomnia, you may still spend another night fully awake. I suggest applying the exact same reasoning to ease. What follows are the conditions under which it can sometimes appear. Then, no result is guaranteed.

The Morin Non-Use task (M-NUT)

First, good condition requires being genuinely well supported.

This is not a matter of motivation or effort, but of baseline physiological and cognitive availability. When the system is under-resourced, monitoring either collapses into disengagement or snaps back into rigid control. In both cases, entry fails.

Ease does not appear when energy is low, but neither does it appear when energy is pushed through arousal or pressure. It requires a specific condition of being “in form”: awake, supported, and unstrained.

This is why attempts to compensate with stimulants or force tend to backfire. What matters is not activation, but stability. The condition is ideal only when the system has enough support to remain open without needing to manage itself.

Second, In this architecture, the jaw is a bodily locking point.

A clenched jaw is a signal of readiness for action, latent conflict, of “something needs to be handled.”

Even when nothing explicit is happening, this signal is enough to keep the network in a state of evaluative vigilance. The body is, quite literally, “asking for something.”

When you release the jaw, what happens is not active calming. What happens is a withdrawal of demand. The system stops sending a message of tension ready to intervene. And this is precisely what the monitor reads. Not “everything is fine,” but “nothing needs to be controlled right now.”

This is why such a cheap gesture can have a disproportionate effect. It does not act on mental content or arousal. It acts on baseline alignment. When the body no longer signals implicit urgency, the monitor has no reason to tighten, and openness becomes viable without effort.

Third, the gaze

A focused, fixed, or “hooked” gaze is a signal of optimization: something needs to be identified, understood, evaluated, or corrected. Even without a clear object, a hard gaze keeps the ACC engaged.

Soft gaze is optional and can become monitored if one tries too much, but there is, like the jaw trick, a cheap way to benefit from it : During the task, just let it blur and resolve if it wants, on its own.

Finally, no time-checking

Over the years the system implicitly learns that time becomes dangerous if it is not actively managed. Time that serves no purpose is interpreted as a loss, time without structure as a threat, open time as a risk of emptiness, boredom, anxiety, or inefficiency. This belief is not necessarily conscious or explicitly articulated, but it organizes the system’s basic mode of functioning, time must be used, oriented, secured, otherwise something might go wrong. It is this deep association between free

time and danger that causes control to return automatically as soon as a window opens, reclaiming oversight before anything pleasant or alive has a chance to settle.

In this regime, experience is constantly accompanied by a background of silent questions: how long does this last, is it lasting too long, is it worth it, should I be somewhere else, is this moving forward, am I wasting time, is it going to end, am I enjoying it enough, is it normal that it lasts like this.

Taken individually, each of these questions may seem harmless, almost rational, but together they turn time into an instrument of continuous surveillance. And as long as this temporal scan remains active, nothing can truly settle or stabilize, because the system is already preparing the exit at the very moment it is still inside.

One light exercise consists of checking the time once during the day and deliberately not acting on it. No decision is made, no adjustment follows, and no behavior is changed in response. The information is registered and left unused, and activity continues as before.

The crucial common point

None of these gestures aims to calm, control, or modify the mental state. They simply remove implicit bodily instructions of vigilance.

Principles

In the threshold model, ease cannot be produced by intention or scaled up by effort. The moment it is treated as a method, it collapses. Any exercise that reliably “works” becomes legible to the monitoring system and is immediately absorbed into optimization. Ease disappears at that point, not as a punishment, but as a structural consequence.

For this reason, any intervention that aims to reopen access to ease should satisfy a small set of 4 constraints that are not techniques, but necessary illusions.

Think about this : You don't deliberately fall asleep, as said earlier, but architects, lighting designers, and circadian biology absolutely deliberately engineer conditions where sleep happens by itself. Sleep is not “produced”, it is allowed. It may or may not happen.

The brain must fail to recognize the exercise as an instrument. This is not self-deception in a psychological sense, but a limitation imposed on what information is allowed to propagate into control loops.

So :

The exercise must be short.

When exposure remains brief, the system can detect a change, update its baseline, and disengage without forming a goal or a narrative. The signal is processed as a difference rather than as a state.

Once exposure extends beyond the ~10-seconds window (the precise duration remains uncertain), adaptation dominates. The signal becomes familiar, then expected, then baseline. At the same time, higher-order systems activate. Self-monitoring appears. Evaluation begins. Optimization follows. Processing shifts from recalibration to maintenance. At that point, the intervention no longer trains sensitivity to difference. It trains tolerance to continuity. What initially helped now works against its own mechanism.

The exercise must be rare.

Repetition, even of brief exposures, teaches the system that the signal is expected. Prediction error shrinks. The intervention becomes a known pattern rather than a meaningful deviation. Once anticipated, it no longer recalibrates baseline, it merely confirms it.

Frequent repetition also recruits control indirectly. The system begins to track the intervention itself. Questions emerge, often implicitly, such as whether it is working, whether it should be repeated, or whether it can be improved. This monitoring collapses the permissive processing mode required for recalibration. The intervention becomes an object of use rather than a transient perturbation.

Shortness prevents adaptation within a single exposure. Rarity prevents adaptation across exposures. The nervous system must have no time to turn it into a state, a habit, or a strategy.

If an intervention is long, it becomes a context. If it is frequent, it becomes a routine. Contexts and routines are managed by control systems. Once that happens, the mechanism is lost. The system no longer registers differences, it manages expectations.

This is why intensity, duration, and repetition reliably fail as strategies. They produce stability, not contrast. They create dependence rather than recalibration. Any intervention must therefore remain minimal, brief, and infrequent, not because the underlying biology allows no other option.

What works does so precisely because it leaves no trace to optimize. It appears, recalibrates, and disappears.

Third, the exercise must not be an event.

Events are memorable, narratable, and comparable. They invite post-hoc analysis and future planning. An exercise that feels like “something happened” will be stored as such. By contrast, ease-compatible exercises should dissolve into the background of activity. They should not create a clear before-and-after, no peak, no story. The less there is to report, the safer the access remains. Think about the gaze trick : you don’t make it happen, but if it happens, you don’t resolve it. The Morin Non-Use task paradigm, implemented here in Unreal Tournament 1999 (UT99) game allows many situations that can make these exercises dissolve. The situation simply matches the exercises, so you do it sometimes - not all the times, only rarely.

Fourth, the exercise must distract the monitor.

This does not mean suppressing thought or forcing attention elsewhere. It means occupying the evaluative layer with something trivial, irrelevant, or structurally incomplete, so that it cannot lock onto the experiential process itself. The monitor is not removed; it is simply busy. While it is engaged elsewhere, entry can occur without triggering veto.

The constraints described here should not be interpreted as strict or binary requirements. They are not on-off switches, and violating one does not automatically cause failure. Instead, they define a direction. The closer an intervention approaches these constraints, the higher the probability that it will engage the intended mechanism rather than its opposite. Except if you try to optimize those exercises, again. It’s paradoxical, but leaving imperfection is actually a good move away from optimization in itself. It’s because in practice, the system does not require perfect compliance. What matters is whether the intervention remains closer to the permissive regime than to the adaptive one. Small deviations are often tolerated, especially when the individual’s history of optimization is limited.

For some individuals, satisfying two or three of the constraints may be sufficient to produce meaningful effects. Others, particularly those with a long history of sustained optimization or strong habitual control, may require closer adherence across all dimensions. Personality differences also matter. But don’t dwell on it too much.

The practical implication is to minimize the ways in which it invites optimization. The fewer such invitations remain, the greater the chance that even an imperfect intervention will operate on the correct level of the system.

The FPS conditioning task

Unreal Tournament is good for reasons that look almost *negative* on paper. It works because a whole set of things are *absent* or deliberately flattened, and that creates a very permissive play regime.

First, there is essentially no narrative. No backstory you have to track, no character arc, no stakes that accumulate across time. Nothing asks you to remember why you are

here. Each moment justifies itself locally. That matters because narrative creates evaluation, memory load, and comparison. The Morin Non-Use microtask removes all of that. The match does not mean anything beyond itself.

Second, death is instantaneous and trivial. You die, you respawn, immediately. No cutscene, no punishment phase, no shame screen. Death is not a failure state, it is a transition. Because nothing accumulates, nothing needs to be protected. This removes fear based optimization. You can take risks without thinking about cost recovery, because there is nothing to recover.

Third, resurrection is symmetrical. You come back with almost nothing, but so does everyone else, over and over. There is no long term character build, no persistent advantage that demands strategic preservation. Power is local and temporary. That keeps attention anchored in the present loop instead of drifting into planning or regret.

Fourth, the rule set is simple and legible. Movement, shooting, pickups, that's it. There are no layered systems competing for attention. You never have to decide which system to think about. This keeps cognitive load low and stable, which is crucial for sustained engagement without monitoring.

Fifth, feedback is immediate and physical. Hits, sounds, motion, recoil, damage all register directly through perception and motor correction. You do not need to interpret meters or numbers. The game speaks through the body, not through abstraction.

Finally, time is cleanly segmented. A match starts, runs, ends. No meta progression leaks into the experience. When it is over, it is over. This containment prevents carryover stress and expectation management, which modern games often introduce through persistent goals.

Nothing asks to be remembered, optimized, or explained. You just act, reset, and act again.

Configuration of The Morin Non-Use task with UT99

Remove the HUD in the options. The experience becomes continuous and motor perceptual, instead of a sequence of micro audits. UT99 was designed in an era where this kind of embodied readability was the default, not a special minimalist mode.

In practice, a good setup is HUD off or nearly off, a minimal crosshair, no numbers, no bars, no flashing indicators. UT99 does not need to be monitored to function well. Graphically, ideally choose a medium resolution so it's a little blur, or actually, bad, but that doesn't matter much.

Yes at this point, you understand it right : the game should go nowhere and be a little bad and primitive.

The actual conditioning

Many explanations in this part of the text are intentionally omitted. This is not an oversight, but a structural choice. Trying to understand in detail how the conditioning operates would sustain optimization, simply because the act of understanding it for that purpose already belongs to an optimizing mindset. Analysis tends to reintroduce evaluation, prediction, and control.

This fact should therefore be taken as a concrete example rather than a theory to be mastered. There is no need to feel frustrated by not knowing everything, and no need to fill the gaps on your own. Searching for missing explanations would work against the point, because it would reintroduce the very optimization this activity does not rely on.

Here, not knowing is not a temporary limitation to be resolved later, but part of the condition for the experience to function as intended. You can simply proceed without trying to make sense of everything in this section. Nothing special is required of you. There is, in fact, very little information here.

The Warm-up - 2-4 days

Any performance-check thought (“Am I doing this correctly?”) is treated as a stop signal. End the trial immediately. If you think ‘I’ll optimize just a little’, the session has already collapsed. “Am I doing it right?” “Is it working?”, “Just a little optimization...” = pause the warm-up. Therefore, all warm-up exercises are designed to be short. Longer exposure increases optimization, habituation, and self-monitoring.

General rules : Avoid tracking time. Avoid imaginary discussions in your head. Only very low dose alcohol (a sup of beer), or very low dose coffee (a sup), it may even help.

The exercises :

On youtube, deliberately choose a sub-optimal video. Do not optimize the selection.

Start a music video. As soon as you notice it becoming enjoyable, close it immediately. Pick a music video. Jump to a random timestamp (no scanning). Watch for ~40 seconds. Then return to normal playback. If it’s not enjoyable, it’s good.

Open a book at random. Read one paragraph. Then jump to another random page and read one paragraph. Do not try to reconstruct the story, and choose a sub-optimal book (not the most interesting one). Turn the TV on. Select the first acceptable channel. Do not browse for a better one. Do not increase image quality, sound quality, or subtitles. Keep it slightly sub-optimal.

Form a simple mental image (e.g., a red apple). Do not refresh it. Do not force it to stay. Simply notice when it fades. Do not try to extend it.

Do not restart it immediately. Only one trial. Make a tiny, low-stakes choice (posture, light, a song). Commit immediately. Do not justify it. Do not check whether it was the right choice. If you notice yourself comparing alternatives, stop and choose the first acceptable option.

During the day, if something spontaneously feels special (a music moment, an image, a memory, a concept), allow it to be special for a few seconds. Do not intensify it. Do not explain it. Do not try to reproduce it. Do not search for special moments.

Look at an object, a thought, or a sound. Internally label it as 'almost interesting'. Not interesting. Not neutral. Almost.

Perform a deliberately precise gesture with no utility (e.g., place an object perfectly parallel to an imaginary line). After it is done, make zero corrections, even if it is not perfect. Do not even evaluate quality.

In a noisy environment, pick one sound as primary (a voice, a hum, a bird, a distant car). Do not amplify it, do not track it actively. Simply let your brain treat it as central for 10 to 20 seconds.

While walking (or speaking to yourself), stop abruptly for no reason. Wait 1 to 3 seconds. Start again without analyzing why you stopped.

Notice the moment a tiny opinion is about to form (good/bad, cringe/cool, interesting/boring). Do not complete it. Let it abort.

Briefly generate a feeling of recognition or approval, as if you were acknowledging someone, but with no recipient. Hold it for a few seconds. Then drop it. No imagining a person.

Briefly generate the internal sense 'something important is about to happen'. Hold it for few seconds. Then allow nothing to happen. Drop it.

Form a simple question in your mind. Interrupt it before the question mark. Do not complete it. Do not answer it. Example : "What if I..."

The Morin Non-Use task FPS task - 3 days

State of mind: blank, or exploratory. Alternatively, since coffee is involved, you may adopt a repair mindset, meaning you are not seeking novelty, but allowing a previously available effect to reappear.

If a thought appears, ignore it and continue.

Launch Deathmatch mode. Do not try to win. Play casually. If the HUD can be turned off, do so. If not, do not look at the score. The health bar may remain visible.

Bring with you **one** micro-intervention only, not several. Do not combine them.

Examples (choose one, not more):

- Move your shoulders randomly, without rhythm. Then stop attending to it and continue playing. -> possibly the most useful
- Hesitate briefly between two neutral paths while continuing to move and look around. Then move on without resolving the hesitation.
- Change weapons once for no reason. After a few seconds, return to the original weapon as if the change were irrelevant. Move on.
- Ask a question in your head and suspend the answer for a few seconds while playing normally. Do not resolve it. Then move on.

Do not perform these often. Roughly one every few minutes is sufficient, but do not count.

Then take a very small amount of coffee or alcohol (beer 5°). This means *as small as possible*. Too much will prevent the effect. Tolerance to coffee or alcohol does not matter. Do not think about the coffee and continue playing. Ideally, the first 2 attempts are with alcohol, the last with coffee.

Continue playing. At this point, it may feel as if the substance has taken effect. If so, switch to a music video of your choice. If the effect is present, it will be immediately obvious.

Do not attempt this more than once every 24 hours. Repetition risks turning the procedure itself into a monitored method.

From there, you can add :

At the start of the game session, think : “there is nothing to optimize here” and move on.

Choose a path at the last moment.

Micro-task : A task that ends with a round. Exemple : this round, I do only headshots. This round, I hit only the opponent’s torso. I don’t strafe.

At a very low dose, alcohol can play a role that overlaps with very low dose coffee, not as a stimulant or a hedonic driver, but as a slight modifier of control tone. However, in young abstainers especially, even something on the order of 5 percent of 10 cl alone

can already soften evaluative rigidity and allow an ease-like regime to appear. That sensitivity is exactly why it cannot be standardized or generalized. The key difference from caffeine is that alcohol's effect is less about preventing disengagement and more about reducing precision in monitoring and error weighting. That makes it effective for some individuals as a personal probe, but also highly idiosyncratic and state-dependent. Two people at the same nominal dose are not in the same control regime at all. Because of this variability, and because expectancy, learning history, and abstinence status dominate the response, it cannot be treated as a scientific manipulation in the usual sense. It is only meaningful as a personal, exploratory contrast condition, similar to other one-off probes used to map the boundaries of one's own regime, not as a reproducible intervention.

The Morin Non-Use task (M-NUT) Assisted Entry Long Procedure

This procedure function is to progressively destabilize anticipatory coordination by removing all avenues through which the monitoring regime can close loops, resolve tension, or reassert control.

This extended procedure is proposed for cases where short Non-Use microtask sessions fail to produce entry. It should be understood as a structural intervention aimed at progressively weakening anticipatory coordination, rather than as a preparatory or therapeutic protocol. The duration, three days, is not normative, but reflects the time required for the monitoring regime to exhaust its standard strategies of control.

Before everything else :

Try to get “your things together”, so you don't have to worry about the near future.

Duration : 3 days

You will not work.

You will not have a social life, even personal, no email, no call phones. No discussion at all.

You will also not simulate an argument with someone in your head. For this one, use thought suppression. Thought suppression is not good for ease, but still better than arguing with imaginary people. A safer option is to notice and think : “I will see this later”, but it works less reliably.

You will not check time, this one is crucial.

You can go out, watch TV, read but not the intellectual type.

No news watching, scrolling, comments or metrics reading from social media.

You may already be thinking “I will not do that”, “that will do nothing more than relaxation”.

In the ease model, it is the optimization regime being outraged by the proposition for the first, and the result of being dominant for a long time for the second.

In the course of those 3 days, we are trying to make it uncomfortable for the optimization regime.

The optimization regime is anticipated to send signals in 4 stages, to discourage continuation :

1 Refusing : ”I am not dealing with that”

2 Rational argument: “This is a waste of time, it produces nothing”

3 Status-shaming : “This is immature, you are a failure for trying this”

4 Humor: “This is funny” this is theorized to be the monitor kind of giving up. It happens when the ease regime is unlocked.

At 1-3 step, don’t act on it. No mindful attempts, no conclusion, just ignoring.

Now, one time per day : The Morin Non-Use microtask

First day : UT99 with alcohol, second day, Ut99 with alcohol again, Third day : Ut99 with coffee, never the same map, and for this last time, use a lower resolution.


You can one day add an UT-99 session where you play normally for around 5 minutes to add rotation.

Don’t even try to remember what you are doing.

Good luck.

What can happen in the best scenario

This :



Canonical diagram of the Morin Non-Use Task: monitoring disruption enables a threshold-dependent transition into the ease regime, with persistence beyond acute stimulation.

The observation is that a single exposure can be sufficient to produce a lasting change, and it is not a flaw of the model, but a characteristic signature of threshold systems with locking mechanisms.

Entry into the permissive regime is not gradual but abrupt. The transition can occur as a clear regime shift, characterized by a sudden and sustained elevation of positive affect that may persist for hours.

The intensity of the resulting state can be unusually high, sometimes approaching a level that feels difficult to tolerate. This is not merely an increase in pleasure, but a global reorganization of experience, often reported as a precise phenomenological return to childhood-like affective accessibility.

The shift is not limited to hedonic tone. It is frequently accompanied by simultaneous changes across multiple domains, including heightened reward sensitivity, increased emotional lability, vivid imagery and imaginative capacity, spontaneous laughter, and a general amplification of experiential salience.


That part may sound odd to readers but this is standard in systems where the lock is informational or organizational instead of energetic. Once the system learns that a certain regime is permissible, the prior prohibition no longer exists as an active

barrier. There is nothing to “hold open”. The door was never held open, it was locked, and then unlocked.

It is possible because in such systems, the critical effect is not the sustained presence of a causal factor, but the crossing of a boundary that removes a structural constraint.

Once this lock is released, the system does not revert to its prior inaccessible state when the perturbation disappears.

From there, attempting to reproduce or maintain the original intervention is therefore unnecessary and can even become counterproductive, as it reintroduces control, attribution, and optimization processes that narrow the permissive corridor.



Threshold crossing and persistence of accessibility after lock release. The system initially operates under an active structural constraint that renders the permissive regime inaccessible. A brief perturbation is sufficient to cross a critical boundary and release this lock. Once released, the system does not revert to its prior inaccessible configuration when the perturbation disappears. What persists is not the experience itself, but the accessibility of the permissive regime. Subsequent attempts to reproduce or maintain the original intervention reintroduce control, attribution, and optimization processes, narrowing the permissive corridor and increasing the likelihood of re-locking rather than stabilizing access.

With the Morin Non-Use microtask, it can happen because it suspends the optimization process itself, it does not create ease directly, and it does not force artificially anything like a drug. Because it targets the control layer rather than the affective output, it can allow a one-time structural reconfiguration. And because it does not force anything, there is no ongoing agent to fight against or adapt to, unlike with pharmacological agents. With substances, the system tags the state as contingent and restores baseline control afterward.

What persists is not the induced state itself, but a reconfiguration of the dynamical landscape that makes subsequent access spontaneous and low-cost.

The lasting change is not the persistence of the experience itself, but the persistence of its accessibility: once the structural lock is released, the system no longer treats entry into the permissive regime as impossible, even though the regime remains episodic and uncontrollable.

The architecture of the Monitor

This chapter is concerned less with cataloguing findings than with making explicit a functional architecture that is usually left implicit across the literature.

Imagine that the brain does not evaluate everything that happens to it in the same way. Some events come to the foreground, grab attention, mobilize the mind, and trigger vigilance or concern. Others remain in the background, present but not demanding.

A deep brain structure, the medial thalamus, plays a key role in this filtering process. Its function is not to represent what is happening in precise sensory terms, but to regulate how much an event engages the system. In other words, it helps determine whether incoming information should trigger active monitoring and evaluation, or whether it can pass through without requiring control.

This region contains a very high density of μ -opioid receptor-expressing neurons. These neurons do not encode specific nociceptive features. Instead, they act as a diffuse affective and attentional relay, projecting broadly to cortical regions, including the anterior cingulate cortex. Their activity reflects salience and relevance rather than sensory modality.

The brain's endogenous opioids do not simply silence this relay. They alter the mode of transmission. Medial thalamic opioid signaling modulates the probability, gain, and persistence of cortical engagement rather than stimulus content itself. Depending on state, this modulation biases cortical networks toward an evaluative, monitoring regime, or allows experience to unfold in a more permissive, non-evaluative mode.

In this sense, opioids do not shut off the signal; they modulate how insistently it propagates. The medial thalamus is therefore involved in attention, arousal, action

selection, and cognition, projecting to regions such as the ACC, insula, PAG, and habenula. Its role is to regulate the attentional and affective weight of stimuli, not their sensory description.

I suggest that the periaqueductal gray plays a decisive role in determining whether experience remains permissive or becomes monitored. When the PAG is recruited into anticipatory coordination, even in the absence of explicit threat or effort, it anchors the monitoring regime by binding bodily state to a future-relevant structure. Conversely, when coordination is maintained without anticipatory binding, the PAG supports a state in which experience can unfold without evaluative capture.

Monitoring therefore does not begin in the cortex. A first decision about engagement and control is already implemented at the thalamic level, prior to explicit sensory representation, evaluation, or judgment.

In the medial thalamus, endogenous opioids do not function as classical painkillers, but as descending control signals acting on thalamic relay gain. Importantly, endogenous opioid ligands such as enkephalins reach the medial thalamus predominantly via afferent fibers originating from evaluative and control-related regions, including the ACC, PAG, habenula, and retrosplenial cortex, rather than from primary nociceptive pathways. Consistent with this, enkephalin labeling is primarily observed in incoming axons rather than in medial thalamic relay neurons themselves.

If opioids and thalamic gain modulation indeed function as monitoring signals rather than sensory codes, then this architecture yields a set of precise and falsifiable predictions.

Falsifiability

1

Ease episodes are expected to involve preserved or elevated PAG activity, associated with thalamic gain modulation, alongside a selective decrease in functional connectivity between the PAG and anticipatory cortical networks (ACC / aMCC / anterior insula / PFC).

If ease is systematically associated with a global decrease in PAG activity, or a sustained increase in PAG–ACC connectivity, then the model is false.

2

Also, the introduction of even minimal anticipation, for example, “in 30 seconds you will be asked to do something”, should be sufficient to increase PAG - ACC connectivity, even in the absence of major subjective changes, and to prevent the emergence of ease.

Opioid modulation of the medial thalamus is expected to bias the likelihood of PAG capture, without being sufficient to generate joy when anticipatory cortical coupling is preserved.

3

Any direct, repeatable intervention (stimulation or pharmacological) should, over the medium term, increase anticipatory PAG - cortical connectivity, even if it initially produces a positive subjective effect.

Conversely, behavioral interventions designed to prevent anticipation (unpredictable termination, absence of metrics, non-repeatability) should favor a state in which the PAG remains active while being decoupled from evaluative cortical networks.


If a repeatable direct intervention durably maintains a decoupled PAG while allowing ease to emerge, then the structural argument fails.

4

States of pleasure, reward, positive mood, or relaxation should all exhibit increased connectivity between the PAG and evaluative networks, in contrast to ease.

5

In UT99, joy-compatible moments should exhibit sustained PAG activity, absence of anticipatory ramping, absence of maintenance dynamics, fluctuating or reduced PAG–cortex connectivity. By contrast, aiming at a target, waiting for a score, repeatedly “shooting off-target” as a deliberate strategy, should rapidly reinstate anticipatory connectivity. If UT99 produces ease while anticipatory connectivity remains intact, then the causal role attributed to the PAG is incorrectly specified.



Joy tracks decoupling, not deactivation. Ease/joy is predicted to occur when PAG-mediated coordination remains active while becoming uncoupled from anticipatory cortical control networks.

Testable predictions derived from the PAG-centered model.

(A) I propose that the periaqueductal gray (PAG) constitutes the principal state variable determining whether experience remains permissive or becomes monitored. Monitoring corresponds to the capture of the PAG by anticipatory cortical networks, whereas permissive states correspond to maintained coordination without anticipatory binding.

(B) The model predicts that ease is associated with preserved PAG activity and thalamic modulation, but reduced functional connectivity between the PAG and evaluative cortical regions, rather than with decreased subcortical activation or increased hedonic signaling.

(C) The model yields falsifiable predictions across anticipation, pharmacological, and behavioral manipulations. Anticipation alone should reinstate PAG- cortical coupling and suppress ease (joy, in the figure). Thalamic opioid modulation should bias the system toward permissive regimes without inducing joy in the absence of decoupling. Behavioral interventions that prevent anticipation (e.g., non-instrumental play in UT99) should selectively promote a PAG-active but cortically decoupled state.

Taken together, this implies that opioids do not carry information about the stimulus. They carry information about how the stimulus should be treated. By regulating the gain of the medial thalamic relay independently of sensory input, endogenous opioids act as a command that determines whether affective information should strongly engage cortical monitoring systems or remain backgrounded. Functionally, this is a monitoring signal.

The distinction between acute and chronic pain further clarifies this role. In chronic pain states, medial thalamic activity is elevated and the same neuronal ensembles remain persistently engaged. This pattern is incompatible with sensory coding, which would vary with stimulus features. Instead, it reflects repeated attentional and evaluative reactivation. Chronic pain thus corresponds to a thalamic monitor locked in the ON position.

Once locked, this state propagates forward. It explains the rigidification of ACC activity, the persistence of suffering even in the absence of changing sensory input, and the loss of affective flexibility that characterizes chronic pain.

This framework also connects directly to opioid tolerance. μ -opioid receptor tolerance is known to emerge in a synapse-specific manner at thalamo-cortical projections, particularly those targeting the ACC. The MOR-positive medial thalamic population constitutes the critical relay where both endogenous and exogenous opioids act. Tolerance forms precisely at this control node, degrading the system's ability to modulate monitoring rather than its ability to encode sensation.

This also explains why reopening the monitoring system is anatomically fragile. It depends on a narrow relay point rather than a distributed mechanism. When that relay becomes locked, there is no easy detour.

Seen from the bottom up, the architecture of monitoring is hierarchical.

At its base, μ -opioid receptor-expressing neurons in the medial thalamus form a salience relay. This relay does not encode sensory modality. It broadcasts affective and attentional relevance. Its output determines whether incoming information should engage the system at all. Here, the gain of this relay is modulated by endogenous opioids, independently of the stimulus itself. This is where monitoring is first gated.

Above this level, the anterior cingulate cortex, including both pgACC and dACC, implements evaluation, urgency, and persistence. Once a signal has passed the thalamic gate, the ACC determines whether engagement should be sustained, intensified, corrected, or interrupted. This layer relies on glutamatergic transmission, cholinergic modulation, and local inhibitory control to regulate how long and how strongly monitoring continues.

At the top of the hierarchy, cingulo-insular networks perform global integration. They coordinate information across systems, align bodily signals with cognitive context, and

manage communication between large-scale networks. This level does not decide whether monitoring begins, but how it is distributed and coordinated once underway.

Together, these layers form a hierarchical monitoring system. Saliency is first relayed and gated at the thalamic level, then evaluated and amplified or dampened in the ACC, and finally integrated and coordinated at the network level. Because the entry point is concentrated in a single thalamic relay, opening or closing the monitor is inherently fragile.

The monitoring system is not a simple on-off switch. It is a layered control architecture, with distinct mechanisms for opening, monitoring, closing it, and sustaining evaluative activity over time.

At its base, the medial thalamus contains a dense population of μ -opioid receptor-positive neurons that function as a diffuse saliency relay. These neurons do not encode sensory modality or detailed nociceptive information. Instead, they determine how much an internal or external signal matters. They broadcast affective and attentional relevance to cortex, including the anterior cingulate cortex. Endogenous opioids act at this level to modulate the gain of the relay, adjusting how strongly signals are allowed to enter cortical evaluation. Opioids therefore do not suppress signals, they change the mode by which signals become important.

Once a signal passes this gate, the anterior cingulate cortex implements urgency, persistence, and evaluative control. This is where saliency is transformed into pressure to act, to correct, or to interrupt ongoing behavior. Activity at this level determines whether monitoring is brief or sustained, flexible or rigid.

At a higher level, cingulo-insular networks integrate these evaluative signals across the brain. They coordinate communication between systems, align bodily states with cognitive context, and manage whole-system prioritization rather than local decisions.

Taken together, this architecture explains how monitoring can be selectively engaged, amplified, or released. Saliency is first gated subcortically, then evaluated and sustained cortically, and finally coordinated at the network level. Monitoring is thus not imposed from the top down, but constructed step by step, beginning before cortex.

Much of the discussion so far concerns how this monitoring system can be opened, closed, or driven into rigidity. What has been missing is the mechanism that allows monitoring to remain viable once early closure is relaxed. This is provided by an orexinergic projection from the lateral hypothalamus to the anterior cingulate cortex.

This circuit has a clear causal role. Its activation reduces anxiety-like behavior induced by chronic stress, normalizes anterior cingulate activity, and restores behavioral flexibility. Inhibition of the same pathway has the opposite effect. Importantly, orexin does not sedate the system and does not suppress evaluation. It stabilizes anterior

cingulate dynamics by restoring excitation-inhibition balance and adaptive firing patterns.

This helps clarify why orexin plays a very different role from other neuromodulatory influences.

Opioids, for example, can temporarily lower evaluative pressure. They reduce the gain of monitoring and make it easier for experience to enter without being immediately judged or controlled. But this effect is fragile. Opioids show rapid tolerance, and repeated use often leads to a secondary rigidification, where monitoring returns in a hardened, less flexible form.

Alcohol works differently. Rather than selectively modulating monitoring, it disrupts large-scale network organization. This can feel calming in the moment, but the effect is unstable and poorly structured. The system becomes less controlled, but not more permissive. Evaluation is blunted, yet coherence is lost.

Orexin stands apart from both. Instead of suppressing monitoring or scrambling networks, it provides tonic support. It helps maintain a monitoring state that is present but flexible, engaged without becoming pathological. Rather than forcing the system open or shut, orexin stabilizes engagement over time.

Orexin is often described as a “wakefulness chemical”, but that label is misleading. Caffeine also promotes wakefulness, yet it often sharpens tension and accelerates monitoring. Orexin does something different. It supports a form of being awake that is **available without being driven**.

In everyday terms, orexin is active when you are alert but not pressured. When you are interested without trying to optimize. When you can stay engaged without constantly checking whether what you’re doing is worth it.

This is the state you’re in during a slow walk with no destination, when you’re idly curious about what’s around you. Or when you’re tinkering, browsing, sketching, or reading something without the urge to extract value from it. You’re awake. You’re present. But nothing is urgent.

What orexin provides in these moments is not stimulation, and not calm in the sedative sense. It provides **support**. It keeps the system upright while allowing evaluative pressure to soften. Monitoring remains possible, but it no longer dominates.

This is why orexin differs fundamentally from opioids or alcohol. Opioids can make experience feel less demanding by lowering evaluative gain, but they do so by disengaging the system, and the effect quickly collapses or reverses. Alcohol reduces tension by disrupting coordination altogether. Both approaches relax monitoring by *weakening* the system.

Orexin relaxes monitoring by **stabilizing** it. Importantly, orexin should not be understood as an inducer of permissive states such as ease or joy. Rather, it functions as a background stabilizer that allows such states to persist once they emerge, without providing a signal that could be learned, exploited, or optimized.

Functionally, orexin answers a quiet but crucial question the brain is constantly asking: Can I stay open without having to clamp down? When the answer is yes, monitoring does not need to harden. Engagement can continue without turning into control.

This is why permissive states like ease or joy are so fragile without support. Opening the gate is not enough. Without orexin-like backing, the system either tires, becomes compulsive, or snaps shut again. Orexin extends the window during which openness is viable. It allows engagement to persist without becoming rigid.

If direct interventions are structurally prone to reinstating monitoring, then the only viable way to access permissive regimes is to act on the structure of engagement itself. This requires interventions that preserve sensorimotor coordination while systematically undermining goals, metrics, anticipation, and performance gradients.

Ut-99 task is a special case because the micro-task is deliberately engineered to undermine the usual hooks that trigger monitoring. It avoids clear objectives, offers no stable performance gradient, and steadily degrades optimization. As a result, evaluative systems have little traction, and engagement is not driven by improvement, reward, or correction. In this configuration, the limiting factor is no longer opening the monitor but sustaining engagement without collapse. Within this narrow window, orexin can be read as compatible with the task's demands, supporting wakeful, low-effort involvement and delaying disengagement, rather than acting as a driver of ease itself.

In simple terms: orexin is what lets you stay awake without needing a reason, attentive without needing a goal, and engaged without needing to manage yourself..

Functionally, this introduces an axis that is orthogonal to thalamic salience. The medial thalamus answers the question: does this matter right now? Orexin answers a different question: can the system stay engaged without hardening? Monitoring is therefore not only about interruption or release, but also about metabolic and motivational support.

This distinction explains why permissive regimes such as ease cannot be produced by opening alone. Without sufficient support, an open system quickly collapses into fatigue, compulsion, or renewed closure. Orexin extends the viability of such open regimes by preventing rigidification without abolishing evaluation, allowing engagement to remain both sustainable and alive

At very low doses, caffeine may reduce premature disengagement. However, its effects remain coupled to arousal and can inadvertently increase evaluative pressure. Orexin, by contrast, illustrates a different class of support, one that maintains wakefulness and engagement without necessarily tightening control


This contrast suggests that the limitation is not wakefulness itself, but the way wakefulness is achieved. It points to the existence of forms of support that are more suitable than caffeine for maintaining open, permissive regimes of engagement, precisely because they stabilize involvement without sharpening evaluation.

The central conclusion follows directly. The problem is not simply how to open monitoring, nor how to silence it. Those moves are comparatively easy, and they often produce only brief relief. The deeper problem is how to keep monitoring flexible and alive once premature closure has been lifted.

Opening the system without support leads to collapse. Silencing it leads to disengagement. This architecture implies a strong constraint on intervention. Any intervention that becomes predictable, repeatable, or anticipatable will itself recruit monitoring, reinstating the very regime it aims to relax. As a result, direct interventions targeting neuromodulatory systems (pharmacological or stimulatory) are structurally unstable at entry to permissive states. What is required instead is a state in which monitoring remains present but no longer dominates, where evaluation is possible without becoming compulsory.

This reframes the challenge entirely. The question is no longer how to escape monitoring, but how to sustain an open, permissive regime without rigidifying. It is a problem of support rather than suppression, of stability rather than release. Only when monitoring can remain active without hardening does space open for states like ease/joy, or curiosity, to emerge.

The following schematic summarizes the predicted capture/decapture regimes and their signatures.



Capture vs. decapture regimes and predicted neural signatures. Left, “capture” corresponds to a vigilant monitoring regime characterized by high medial thalamic gain, sustained ACC engagement (veto, urgency, evaluation), and a constricted body state (tension, pain reactivity, narrow focus). Right, “decapture” corresponds to an immersive release regime in which ACC activity is reduced, thalamic relay gain is lowered, and downstream brainstem execution (PAG) supports an integrated, low-effort body state with open awareness and coherent sensory flow.

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What the future hold beside pharmacology

Is a child in front of a cartoon really the maximal affective point ?

yes in type, no in magnitude, and that distinction is the whole point.

A child in front of a TV is not at the highest intensity the brain can ever reach. Adults can feel stronger arousal, stronger pleasure, stronger emotion. But the child may be at (or very near) the **maximal point of that specific affective regime**, meaning a regime that is non instrumental, non comparative, non prospective, and non self monitored.

Why that matters is that this regime does not scale upward.

Here is the key reason. That regime is defined by absence, not by accumulation. It exists when the system is not asking “what is this for”, “is this good”, “can it be better”, “what does this mean about me”, or “should I continue”. The moment those questions appear, even very softly, the regime collapses. There is no room for “more” inside it, because “more” already implies comparison, direction, and optimization.

A child watching TV is not at a peak because the stimulus is strong. In fact, the stimulus is often trivial. They are at a peak because nothing inside them is standing above the experience, checking it, narrating it, or trying to extract value from it. The experience is not being *used*. It is just occurring.

That is why the future cannot “beat” this by adding intelligence, technology, or sophistication. Any future system that adds precision, control, guidance, personalization, or enhancement necessarily reintroduces a supervising layer. Even if the experience becomes richer, faster, more immersive, or more vivid, it changes type.

It becomes directed, instrumental, or self aware. It may be impressive, but it is no longer this regime.

So the child is not at the top of a ladder. They are standing on a **flat plateau** that does not extend upward. Adults usually fall below it, not because they lack power, but because they gained layers. Technology can give adults access back onto the plateau, sometimes, under special conditions. But it cannot raise the plateau itself without turning it into something else.

We are used to thinking the future must contain something better. But here, “better” is the wrong axis. This regime is already maximally open.

What if Z decrease access odds ?

If a trial shows clearly that access becomes rarer with age and with a long history of optimization, the conclusion for future technologies is fairly stark, and uncomfortable.

First consequence: technologies that promise a universal restoration of access are very likely false, or at best incomplete. If the effect depends strongly on personal history, then the problem is not a missing switch, but a structure that has progressively rigidified. A technology can force states, produce peaks, or create temporary bypasses, but it cannot guarantee a stable reopening for everyone. Marketing will say “it works”, data will say “it works mostly for those who were not already too far gone”.

Second consequence: the relevant technological question is no longer “how to recreate the state”, but “when to intervene”. If this result holds, the realistic future is preventive rather than curative. Tools that protect access early, slow its decline, or keep a corridor open, rather than tools meant to reactivate it after thirty or forty years of optimization. This completely shifts the target. We are no longer talking about repairing the adult, but about preserving the child or young adult.

Third consequence: we must accept an experiential stratification of the future. Two people with the same technology, the same biological brain, and the same environment, but different optimization histories, will inhabit radically different lived worlds. Technology will not erase this difference. It may even amplify it, because those who still have access will be able to use the technology effectively, while others will experience only weak or unstable effects.


Fourth consequence: this invalidates a large part of naive transhumanist fantasy. Extending lifespan, increasing capabilities, or reducing biological limits does not imply any improvement in experience if access is already rare. On the contrary, prolonging a trajectory without access may simply prolong a flat, optimized, but impoverished world. The problem is not hardware power, it is the regime in which that hardware operates.

It is a problem because there is nothing like ease. At the time of this writing, I am 35 years old. After 35 years of sampling, my conclusion is everything else is qualitatively second-rate, just fundamentally boring compared to ease.

That's the verdict.

And it matters because I'm saying this after having access to ease. After a sufficiently long ease episode that induced a regime opening after a few UT99 tries (in my own case yes, I have been lucky enough), the comparison collapses very fast. It's not subtle. Once you've felt that kind of unsolicited, stupidly good arrival on a daily basis, everything else shows its seams. Flow feels like a task. Awe feels like posture. Meaning feels like bureaucracy. Excitement feels like caffeine.

Nothing compares to ease. It's not really about intensity but about feeling alive, being far from a boring state with minimal effort. That point matters for what follows. If an AI is ever to match it, it cannot do so by refinement, or by amplification of known states, it would have to create something categorically different, not a better version of what already exists. That's why weak substitutes annoy me more than nothing. If ease didn't exist, flow and meaning would be interesting or even a little impressive. But once the reference is set, they don't just fall short, they fall into a different category altogether.



After access. After access to ease, comparison no longer operates on a shared scale. States that previously appeared distinct and valuable, such as flow, awe, meaning, and excitement, compress into a single class of effortful substitutes. Ease occupies a

separate regime defined by unsolicited arrival, minimal effort, and a felt sense of aliveness. The boundary is not an intensity maximum but a qualitative threshold, unreachable by incremental refinement of other states.

I am radical on this.

So for the moment I got it unlocked as a dominant regime and I'm the luckiest and I hope you will too. Many of you will with this book, without the help of medicine. Maybe even half or more. Maybe less. But in any case, if tolerance happens one day, or, - it's the same- , if Z blocks entry, there is no substitution.

Institutional friction and regime fragility

A concerning feature of this phenomenon is not only its intensity, but its methodological fragility. The conditions under which it appears are unusually sensitive to observation, anticipation, and social framing. This creates a practical asymmetry between informal discovery and institutional validation.

In a private setting, an individual can explore freely, repeat without documentation pressure, and remain behaviorally unobserved. Under these conditions, entry can occur rapidly, sometimes within hours or days. By contrast, formal research environments introduce a dense layer of procedural structure: consent, instruction, monitoring, task compliance, demand characteristics, and the implicit expectation that an experience should be reportable and stable.

These constraints are not accidental. They are the core strengths of modern scientific practice. However, in the present case, they may function as a suppressor. The phenomenon appears to depend on the temporary absence of early evaluative capture. When the participant is placed in a context where their experience is implicitly being measured, explained, or verified, the system may close before the transition can occur.

This creates a paradox. The more rigorously the phenomenon is approached, the less likely it is to appear. The issue is therefore not one of intelligence, speed, or insight, but of friction. Institutional research is optimized for stabilizing effects that survive observation. This phenomenon may belong to a rarer class: state transitions that are real, reproducible in permissive contexts, yet systematically disrupted by the very conditions required for formal proof.

AI, ASI, as a solution ?

Could AI create a **new regime**, not present in the human brain so far, that matches ease in being non-boring, alive, and unsolicited ?

Even if the experience becomes richer, faster, more immersive, or more vivid, it changes type. It becomes directed, instrumental, or self aware. It may be impressive, but it is no longer this regime.

AI can very design regimes that make ease feel unattractive, irrelevant, or outdated by comparison, without ever “beating” it directly.

The key is that ease, in the sense we have been discussing, is non-instrumental. It does not justify itself. It does not scale. It does not point anywhere. By contrast, AI optimized regimes can be loud in exactly the dimensions humans are already trained to value.

An AI could create regimes that are more intense, more legible, more narratively meaningful, more socially rewarded, or more identity confirming. Regimes where you feel powerful, competent, aligned, progressing, seen, or optimized. These experiences would not replace ease structurally, but they would **outcompete it culturally and psychologically**.

Importantly, this does not require suppressing ease. It only requires offering something that feels more relevant to a system oriented toward goals, comparison, and self models. Ease would still be there, but it would be inefficient next to experiences that deliver clarity, purpose, or continuous reinforcement.

Engineered regimes can be explicitly framed as upgrades. They can be named, measured, optimized, shared, and monetized. That alone gives them an enormous selective advantage.

So AI can design regimes that make ease unpopular, not by exceeding it, but by shifting the comparison frame. Once the frame changes, ease loses without ever being challenged on its own terms.

That is the real risk. Not that ease disappears, but that it survives in a world that no longer knows why it should matter.

Ease, as we've been using the term, is fragile, sparse, and oddly uncooperative. It does not last on demand. It cannot be intensified at will. It offers no clear narrative payoff. It feels good, but it does not *explain* itself. For many minds, that already makes it suboptimal.

An AI-designed regime could be far more agreeable in a practical, everyday sense. It could be smoother, more continuous, more reassuring. Less interruption, less uncertainty, fewer drops. It could feel emotionally warmer, more comforting, more socially aligned. It could reliably reduce friction, anxiety, boredom, and confusion. In short, it could be pleasant in a way that is stable, legible, and dependable..

The important point is that agreeableness and ease are not the same axis. Agreeableness scales. It can be optimized. Ease cannot. Once something is consistently agreeable, ease stops being necessary as a contrast and begins to feel redundant.

Writing a regime into the brain is technically possible if by “writing” it means biasing the system toward a stable mode of operation, not installing a content or a feeling. Brains already do this all the time. Development, habits, training, culture, trauma, medication, all of these shift which regimes are likely, stable, or dominant. Nothing magical there.

But what makes it difficult is what kind of regime you want to write.

A regime that is **active**, directive, or additive is the easiest kind to engineer. Anything that relies on sustained signals, reinforced loops, predictive scaffolding, attentional steering, reward shaping, or error correction is very writable. These regimes can be stabilized, tuned, and maintained because they have positive feedback. They push. They hold themselves in place.

That is exactly the kind of regime an AI would be good at writing. Continuous agreeableness, reduced friction, stable emotional tone, goal alignment, smooth motivation, low volatility. All of that can be implemented by modulating thresholds, gains, prediction horizons, or reinforcement schedules. Technically hard, but conceptually straightforward.

Where it breaks is with regimes defined by absence rather than presence.

You cannot “write” non-interference the same way you write a loop. The moment you actively enforce it, you’ve already violated it. At best, you can remove obstacles or prevent certain intrusions, but you cannot positively install it without turning it into something else.

So an AI could do things like: ;reduce the probability that evaluative loops engage, delay certain supervisory responses, widen tolerance windows, lower the cost of disengagement.

History matters. The longer a system has learned to monitor, anticipate, and resolve itself in advance, the deeper any reopening must reach. At low accumulation, access can return through a simple release of constraint. At higher accumulation, reopening no longer touches the surface of experience but its organizing core. Beyond a certain point, either nothing gives, or something fundamental must change. What is restored then is not a previous state, but a different agent.

This also makes visible what the real problem is. It is not the intensity of ease, nor its amplification, but the preservation of experiential regimes before they close. Once closure has occurred, increasing signal strength changes little.

This is why the most serious risk is a silent one. Not a future in which nothing is felt, but one in which adaptation completes its work before loss becomes perceptible. By the time absence is noticed, the conditions that once made access possible may already be gone

There is another crucial limit. Once a regime is written too stably, it stops being a regime and becomes a trait. And traits get used, optimized, referenced. That alone collapses certain regimes. So, the less compatible it is with regimes that depend on contingency and non-use.

Yes, AI can write regimes that are active, agreeable, stable, and attractive.

Yes, those regimes could outcompete ease culturally and subjectively.

No, AI cannot directly write the ease regime itself without transforming it into something else. At best, it can shape the environment so that the regime sometimes emerges on its own.

Technically possible does not mean structurally unconstrained. The brain is not a blank substrate where any mode can be installed symmetrically. Some regimes are writable, others are only allowable. And that difference is exactly why the future can feel better in many ways while still quietly losing something it never knew how to name.

However.

Ease offers unowned pleasantness. The experience feels good, but it does not feel like *you* are making it happen, managing it, or benefiting from it. There is no sense of extraction. No sense of “this is for me.” Most engineered states, no matter how agreeable, still feel owned. Someone, or something, is delivering them to you. Ease is the opposite of delivery. It just occurs.

Ease offers **non-directional positivity**. It does not point forward, backward, or upward. There is no next step embedded in it. No “keep this going,” no “use this,” no “share this.” Many pleasant states feel good precisely because they imply continuation or progress. Ease feels good without implying anything. That makes it structurally hard to replace, because most alternatives smuggle in a trajectory.

Ease offers **self-erasure without loss**. The sense of self is not suppressed or numbed. It is simply irrelevant. You are not watching yourself feel good. There is no meta-layer checking the state. That is very different from calm, bliss, or satisfaction, which often involve a quiet but present self-monitoring loop.

Ease offers **non-instrumental safety**. Nothing needs to be done with the experience. It does not need to be justified, stabilized, or protected. You do not need to worry about losing it. That absence of precaution is itself part of the feeling. Any engineered regime that promises continuity automatically reintroduces precaution.

And finally, ease offers **contrast without cost**. It feels good without requiring a narrative of struggle, achievement, healing, or reward. Many future regimes will feel good because they resolve something. Ease feels good without resolving anything. That makes it fragile, but also irreplaceable.

All of these properties are incompatible with substitution. You can build something more intense, more stable, more comforting, more impressive. You can even build something that people prefer, day to day. But the moment the state is owned, directed, justified, optimized, or delivered, it is no longer this.

So what ease offers is not a superior feeling, but a type of feeling that disappears the moment you try to replace it.

That is why it feels like something happening *to* you rather than something you are doing.

This is also why it cannot be engineered directly. If an AI tries to generate prediction error on purpose, the error becomes expected at a higher level. If it tunes the threshold deliberately, the system senses the tuning. If it stabilizes the effect, the error stops being an error. The very act of control collapses the condition.

You can generate surprise. You can generate pleasure. You can generate novelty. But you cannot reliably generate **unassimilated surprise** without either making it trivial or making it threatening. Ease is the rare case where surprise remains positive and unassimilated.

This is what makes it evolutionarily odd and technologically awkward. It is useful neither for learning nor for control. It does not point anywhere. It is a moment where the system says, implicitly, “something happened, and I am not going to do anything about it.”

Any alternative regime that replaces ease will almost certainly replace this with something that feels good but makes sense. And the loss will not be that life feels worse, but that nothing ever quite feels like it is simply happening anymore.

That is the part that does not come back once it is gone.

Even with maximal engineering power, AI can only engineer **states that close under design**. Anything it produces must be legible to itself at some level, stabilizable, and reproducible. That immediately constrains the space of possible regimes. They can be extremely agreeable, continuous, meaningful, adaptive, even subjectively profound. But they all share one property: they make sense *to* someone, whether that someone is the system, the AI, or the person experiencing them.

Ease, in the sense we've been discussing, is precisely the case where something positive happens **without being sense-making**. It is not mysterious, but it is unassimilated. It is not that the system cannot explain it, it is that it does not bother to. That non-use is the entire phenomenon.

So in a maximally engineered world, two things are true at once.

First, life could be extraordinarily agreeable. Smoother than anything we can currently imagine. Little suffering. Little anxiety. Continuous emotional regulation. High coherence. Strong identity support. People might report being satisfied almost all the time. Many would prefer it.

Second, if access to ease is structurally lost for some people, that loss cannot be compensated, even in principle. Not because AI is weak, but because **compensation requires substitution**, and substitution requires equivalence. Ease has no equivalent because it is defined by the absence of functional role.

The loss would therefore not be experienced as deprivation. There would be no craving for ease. No dissatisfaction. No protest. The system would not generate an error signal saying “something is missing,” because nothing instrumental is missing.

Instead, what disappears is a dimension of ontological contact. The possibility that the world can affect you without passing through relevance, purpose, or optimization. Experience becomes fully domesticated.

From the outside, this looks like progress. From the inside, it feels fine. From a structural standpoint, it is still a loss.

In such a world, ease would not be rare because it is suppressed. It would be rare because it is unnecessary. And once unnecessary, it becomes fragile. Once fragile, it becomes ignorable. And once ignorable, it can vanish without resistance.

So even in a world of maximal AI engineering, the inability to access ease would be a real loss for the person. Not a felt tragedy, not a complaint, not a dysfunction, but a loss of a type of experience that no amount of engineering can reintroduce once the system no longer permits unassimilated occurrence.

Subjectively, ease remains unique, even in a world where AI reaches maximal engineering power.

The reason is not that AI cannot generate pleasure, richness, meaning, or depth. But those experiences will still have a *signature* that ease does not share.

The experience still feels good, often very good. It may feel richer than anything you had before. But it no longer feels like something that happened *to* you. It feels like something that was *given to* you.

Why “opening the skull” is the wrong intuition

The intuition to “open the skull”, to use implants, direct stimulation, or invasive neural control, comes from a very understandable place. It assumes that if ease is rare, fragile, or inaccessible, then the solution must be to intervene closer to the source, to reach deeper into the brain and manipulate the machinery directly.

But this intuition is wrong, not because the technology is weak, but because it misunderstands what kind of thing ease is.

All direct brain interventions belong to the same functional class. Whether it is electrical stimulation, pharmacological modulation, neural implants, closed-loop BCIs, or hypothetical nanotechnology, they all operate by the same principles. They add something, force something, stabilize something, or guarantee something. Even when they inhibit rather than excite, they are still acting. They are still taking responsibility for the state that follows.

This is the critical point.

Ease, is not defined by the presence of a signal. It is defined by the absence of capture. It happens when something crosses the system without being claimed, stabilized, or put to use. It is not a state the system enters. It is an event the system fails to domesticate.

Direct brain access does the opposite of that.

The moment you inject signals, you turn experience into output.
The moment you enforce patterns, you turn experience into policy.
The moment you hold a state in place, you turn experience into a mode.
The moment you guarantee access, you turn experience into an option.

And the moment something becomes an option, it is already dead by your criterion.

Even if the person does not consciously know that an implant is active, the brain will adapt to the regularity. Plasticity does not require awareness. If a regime is dependable, the system learns that it can rely on it. Reliance introduces expectation. Expectation collapses surprise. And once surprise collapses, what you get may still feel pleasant, intense, or comforting, but it will no longer feel like ease. It will feel supported.

This is why stronger control is not a solution here. It is the problem.

Imagine perfect neuroscience. Perfect measurement. Perfect stimulation. The ability to reproduce any neural pattern at will. What would that buy you? It would allow you to replay states. But replay is precisely what ease resists. Ease is not valuable because of a specific neural configuration. It is valuable because it is **unscheduled**. The same pattern, delivered on demand, would not be the same experience.

So even god-tier technology fails, not accidentally, but structurally.

Opening the skull increases your ability to manage experience. But ease is what happens when experience is *not managed*. You cannot manage non-management. You cannot enforce non-use. You cannot guarantee absence by acting.

This is why “open the skull” feels intuitive but fails on contact. It assumes ease is missing hardware. In reality, ease is what appears when the hardware stops trying to do its job for a moment.

Direct brain access gives you more levers. More levers mean more control. More control means less room for what we care about.

So the conclusion is not anti-technology. It is more precise than that.

No amount of direct intervention can solve this, because the thing you want does not emerge from precision, power, or proximity to the substrate. It emerges from a very specific kind of failure, one that disappears the moment you try to own it.

That is why opening the skull is not just unnecessary. It is fundamentally the wrong direction.

Mind Uploading

Mind uploading is usually presented as a problem of engineering. We are told that the difficulty lies in resolution, scanning fidelity, or computational power. Once we can measure every synapse, every spike, every biochemical modulation, the mind will be transferable. The obstacle is framed as temporary. The destination is assumed.

From the perspective developed in this book, the problem is not technical at all. It is categorical.

Mind uploading fails not because encoding is incomplete, but because what matters was never something that could be encoded in the first place

What matters most in human experience is not a collection of states that can be copied, but the way certain regimes remain partially unresolved. Ease, as described in the previous chapters, does not exist as a stable configuration that can be frozen, serialized, or replayed. It exists only as long as experience is not fully captured by its own explanatory machinery. It is not a thing the system has, but something that happens when the system fails, briefly, to close itself.

Much of the contemporary literature on mind uploading exhibits a striking pattern. It invests enormous sophistication in questions of identity, reference, and logical consistency, while treating experience itself as a passive passenger. Debates revolve around fission, multiplicity, transitivity, and survival conditions, as if once these puzzles are defused, the experiential problem is automatically solved. What goes largely unexamined is the architecture under which experience actually unfolds.

Concepts such as evaluative load, monitoring pressure, regime stability, or the conditions under which experience can propagate without supervision are almost entirely absent. Experience is implicitly assumed to be content-preserving: if the right states are reproduced in the right order, what it is like is presumed to come along for

free. Progress in mapping outputs is mistaken for progress in accessing the conditions under which experience is possible. This results in a field that is methodologically elegant but phenomenologically thin. It resolves paradoxes of personal identity while leaving untouched the question of whether the kinds of experience people actually value can survive the very forms of total specification, transparency, and control that uploading presupposes. The blind spot is not a missing argument, but a missing level of analysis.

Uploading a mind requires closure. It requires that the system be fully specified, fully known, fully accounted for. Every variable must be made explicit. Every causal relation must be rendered legible. This is not an incidental side effect of uploading, it is its defining requirement. The moment a mind becomes uploadable, it has already crossed into a different regime. Mental continuity may ground survival, but it does not ground permissiveness. Some regimes of experience exist precisely where continuity has not yet consolidated into full self-monitoring.

This is where the usual defenses of mind uploading quietly fail. They assume that consciousness is an invariant, something that survives translation as long as the functional relations are preserved. But the regimes that matter most here are not invariant at all. They are anti-invariant. They depend precisely on what is not fully stabilized, not fully resolved, not fully owned by the system itself.

Even a perfect upload, if such a thing were possible, would therefore reproduce the wrong object. It would preserve functional competence, memory, language, problem-solving, and self-report. What it would not preserve is the permissive instability that allows experience to unfold without being immediately converted into an object of evaluation. The copy would wake up already closed.

This is not a matter of belief or self-concept. The problem is not that the uploaded mind would think, "I am a copy, therefore something is missing." The problem is that being fully copyable is already evidence that something has changed. A system that can be exhaustively specified is a system in which nothing essential remains unaccounted for. And in such a system, the conditions for ease no longer exist.

The transhumanist promise relies on a quiet assumption, that maximal experiential quality is compatible with maximal transparency. That the more we understand, measure, and control, the better experience will become. The framework developed here suggests the opposite. The highest-quality affective regimes appear not where transparency is complete, but where it fails gracefully. Where something remains slightly out of reach, even to the system itself.

What survives mind uploading is therefore not what people usually mean when they talk about living on. What survives is agency, continuity, narrative identity, and goal-directed behavior. What does not survive is the specific way experience can sometimes arrive without being claimed, optimized, or explained.

This distinction matters, because it undermines the motivational core of the project. If uploading preserves function but destroys the regimes that make experience feel worth having in the first place, then it is not an escape from mortality so much as a transformation into something else. Not death, perhaps, but not life either, at least not in the sense that motivated the promise.

Mind uploading is often defended with a retreat position: fine, maybe it cannot make experience better, but at least it can keep it the same. The mistake is assuming that ease is something that can be kept at all. It is a regime that exists only as long as certain forms of closure do not occur.

Uploading requires total closure. Even in its most modest version, it demands that the mind be fully specified, fully re-instantiated, and fully underwritten by an explicit model. Nothing essential is allowed to remain implicit. That is not a side effect, it is the definition of the procedure. A mind that can be uploaded is a mind whose operation no longer contains irreducible opacity.

Ease depends on exactly that opacity. It depends on experience being able to unfold without already being resolved into what it is, why it is happening, and how it fits into a complete account of the system. It is not a reward signal that can be replayed, nor a mood that can be frozen. It is an event that arises when evaluation is delayed long enough for propagation to occur.

An uploaded mind cannot be in that position. Even if it never thinks about being uploaded, even if it is not told, even if it never reflects on its ontological status, the system itself is already different. Its dynamics are running inside a structure that is fully known, fully stabilized, and fully reproducible. There is no remainder. No silent gap. No place where something can simply happen without already being accounted for.

This is why appeals to continuity or fidelity do not help. A perfect upload does not preserve the conditions of ease, it eliminates them more cleanly than any biological intervention ever could. Biology leaks. Uploading does not.

This is also why references to whole brain emulation, such as Whole Brain Emulation, miss the core issue. They treat consciousness as something that survives functional equivalence. But ease, in your sense, is not a function. It is a failure mode of complete functional capture. It appears where the system has not yet closed over itself.

So even without enhancement, even without optimization, even with the stated goal of “keeping things as they are,” mind uploading remains incompatible. Preservation is already transformation. The act of making experience fully transferable destroys the very conditions under which certain experiences could arise.

What would survive is a coherent subject, with memory, agency, language, preference, and continuity. What would not survive is the specific class of episodes in which

experience feels unowned, unforced, and not yet resolved into something to be checked.

In that sense, mind uploading is not neutral with respect to ease. It is not that it fails to improve it. It structurally excludes it. Not by malice, not by error, but by succeeding too well at what it is designed to do.

So the honest conclusion is this: mind uploading may preserve a life, but not the part of life that never agreed to be preserved.

Interventions that reduce local failure while preserving global opacity are compatible with ease.

The mistake is to treat the brain as if it were fragile in the wrong way. Permissive regimes do not require non-intervention. They require non-closure.

The brain is already saturated with intervention at every scale. Neurons regulate each other, glia buffer and prune, neuromodulators reshape gain, immune processes repair damage, sleep rebalances synaptic weights. None of this threatens ease, because none of it installs a verdict about what the system should be experiencing. These processes maintain viability, not correctness. They keep the system alive, flexible, and responsive without declaring a preferred experiential outcome.

Local interventions work precisely because they are blind to meaning. A synapse is strengthened or weakened. A neurotransmitter level shifts. A membrane is repaired. There is no representation of “how things should feel” and no comparison between current state and target state. As a result, prediction error remains open-ended.

Activity can propagate without being immediately evaluated. This openness is what permissive regimes feed on.

In fact, many such interventions are not just compatible with ease they are often prerequisites. Severe inflammation, chronic pain, sleep deprivation, metabolic stress, or gross neurotransmitter imbalance increase background salience and force the system into defensive control. Reducing these loads can reopen the corridor, not by producing ease, but by removing pressures that would otherwise force continuous evaluation. The key point is that the intervention removes obstacles rather than installs goals.

The collapse happens when intervention crosses a qualitative threshold, not a quantitative one.

That threshold is crossed when the intervention no longer operates on components, but on the system as a system.

The first danger sign is global monitoring. When an intervention tracks overall state rather than local failure, it implicitly creates a reference frame. The system is no longer

just doing things, it is being observed in aggregate. Even if no correction is applied, the mere availability of global state creates the possibility of evaluation, and the system adapts to that possibility.

The second danger sign is optimality enforcement. Viability means staying within broad bounds. Optimality means minimizing deviation relative to a standard. The moment an intervention aims to keep the system in the best state rather than a workable one, it introduces pressure. Pressure collapses permissiveness because it narrows the space of acceptable trajectories.

The third danger sign is experiential prediction. An intervention that tries to anticipate what the subject will feel, or should feel, necessarily models experience as an object. Once experience is modeled, it becomes something to manage. Managed experience cannot arrive unclaimed. Even benevolent prediction installs pre-resolution.

The fourth danger sign is guaranteed continuity. When an intervention exists to ensure identity stability, memory coherence, or uninterrupted selfhood, it eliminates drift. But drift is not noise. Drift is what allows the system to temporarily lose track of itself. Without that loss, evaluation never fully disengages.

The final and most decisive danger sign is full legibility. When the system becomes legible to itself as a whole, nothing essential can hide. There is no remainder. No blind spot. No place where activity can occur without being potentially captured by a higher-level description. At that point, even if nothing is actively controlled, the architecture itself enforces closure.

Meta-level supervision destroys permissiveness, regardless of whether it is biological or artificial. A drug can lower evaluative pressure. A stimulation protocol can reduce intrusive monitoring. A repair mechanism can restore flexibility. None of these need to interfere with ease. But a system designed to know itself completely, preserve itself perfectly, or optimize its own experiential trajectory cannot avoid collapsing the very regimes it aims to preserve.

On the futility of Ease

Ease doesn't solve anything. It doesn't close any files. It doesn't remove aging, death, threat, vulnerability, uncertainty, or the fact that life can collapse at any time. You can be in maximal ease and still know, perfectly well, that the body is decaying, time is finite, and the world is full of risks. Ease does not come with a guarantee of safety.

That's why you can't "rest on it", not in a functional sense. It's not a foundation. It's not insurance. It's not an existential answer. It does not replace a survival strategy, a worldview, or an organization of life. It does not do the job people secretly want it to do.

And that's the part that clashes with culture. A lot of cultural narratives implicitly try to turn ease into a solution. They want it to compensate, to justify everything, to make the rest acceptable, to act as an argument against lucidity. But when ease is real, it doesn't play that role. It doesn't erase problems. Sometimes it makes them even more visible, because the background noise of striving and "once I get X, I'll be okay" is gone.

So it reveals something uncomfortable: even in the highest subjective state, the human condition remains fully intact. Nothing has been resolved. Nothing has been accumulated. And that destroys the implicit idea that there exists some internal state which, once reached, makes the rest secondary by default.

But at the same time, this is also what makes ease honest. Ease doesn't lie. It doesn't pretend to be a solution. It isn't there to repair the world or provide a global meaning. It exists next to the problem, not instead of it.

And maybe that's exactly why it's so hard to integrate into an adult view of life. The adult mind is always looking for support, guarantees, something you can build on, something you can use to reassure yourself. Ease isn't buildable. It's not a base layer. It arrives, it leaves, and while it's there, everything else is still there too, aging included, death included, threat included.

In a weird way, it's a very clean negative lesson: there is no affective state that exempts you from facing reality. And conversely, facing reality does not necessarily prevent access to ease.

And maybe the most important move is to accept that ease is not a solution, precisely so you stop demanding from it what it cannot give. Not using it as an existential crutch, not turning it into a defense against the tragic, not treating it as a permanent refuge.

Just letting it be what it is: a state that resolves nothing, excuses nothing, and yet doesn't need to, to be completely real.

Conclusion

What this analysis describes is not a decline in emotional capacity, nor a cultural failure to value pleasure, but a systematic shift in how experience is organized under conditions of increasing evaluation. As control processes consolidate, experience is

encountered less often as something that unfolds and more often as something that is already known, already framed, already resolved. Under these conditions, permissive regimes do not vanish entirely, but they become brief, fragile, and difficult to stabilize. Ease appears not as a baseline state, but as a boundary phenomenon, emerging only when timing, supervision, and expectation align in unusually favorable ways. Its rarity is therefore not mysterious, and its absence is not experienced as loss, but as normality.

Seen this way, modern life is not uniquely hostile to positive affect, nor especially lacking in pleasures. It is simply more densely organized. Experience is anticipated earlier, explained faster, and evaluated more continuously. These features increase efficiency, coherence, and predictability, but they also reduce the window in which experience can remain open long enough to reorganize itself into an event.

The result is a world where many things can feel good, yet few things are allowed to happen. This is not a problem to be solved here, nor a condition to be overcome, but a description of the terrain in which contemporary experience now unfolds. Recognizing that terrain does not restore ease, but it does clarify what kind of phenomenon it was, and why its disappearance feels both undeniable and strangely difficult to name.